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TRAGEDY: THE REDEPTIVE VISION

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INTRODUCTION

The tyrannical nature of abstract thought is such that from the moment we begin to denounce it, or even feel the need to denounce it, we immediately become entangled in a web of contradictions and seductions which turn our protests into empty rhetoric. If we understand the power and omnipotence of abstraction then we must recognise that to challenge it will only double its charm. The foundations of abstract thought are so deep-rooted within us that our only possible approach has to be a superficial one and even within this the holes in our thinking are soon exposed.

At this stage it is necessary for me to clarify what is here designated by the word abstraction. I am not referring to any particular mode of abstraction but rather to abstraction as a congenital philosophy which pervades the whole of western life. Therefore we are in fact speaking of abstract man, who is

"instructed in systems, who thinks in forms,
signs, representations - a monster whose
faculty of deriving thoughts from acts
instead of identifying acts with thoughts
is developed to an absurdity" (1).

Having said this however the major contradiction now emerges. I am myself attempting to define within "an instructed system" -this thesis itself- the fundamental limit of systems which are divided on the basis of "deriving thoughts from acts". Definition however will inevitably persist, if only to expose the limit of definition itself, this being its essential "absurdity" or rather its tragedy.

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"And this faculty is an exclusively human one. I would even say that it is this infection of the human which contaminates ideas that should have remained divine" (2).

It appears that our attempts to denounce this "exclusively human faculty" of "deriving thoughts from acts", of thinking in terms of "forms, signs, representations", only reinforces the grip of abstract thought. It's self-examination causes only deeper infection and subsequently leads us even further away from those "ideas that should have remained divine".

In this thesis I ask three questions of representative thought. Firstly, what future is possible for representation considering its limit is well within view? Secondly, can it be that this limit has always been present and that its definitive nature has enabled representation to progress? Finally I propose that representative thinking has been from its very inception nothing more than a tragedy. It is this tragedy which emerges as the central theme of this thesis.

"Far from believing that man invented the supernatural and the divine, I think it is man's age-old intervention which has ultimately corrupted the divine within him" (3).

The stench of corruption within our cultured systems is self-evident. At this point in time it is hardly a matter for me to reason why and when this intervention occurred. I therefore turn to such philosophers as Nietzsche and Derrida to trace the source of this decline. We can only hope that the intervention of reason against itself does not result in a state of resignation, as what is lost is still further lost. Instead by divulging the nature of "man's intervention" a proposal emerges as a way of counter-acting the damage caused by abstraction and this answer lies in the art of tragedy.

Through this we can define the essence of abstraction and its repercussion throughout our entire cultural institutions, in particular the institution of thought itself. If we view abstraction as intervention then we must also view its tyranny as the protraction of the original intervention. There is an inherent risk involved in that by uncovering that tyranny we may protract it even further. This must be clearly identified from the start as the main difficulty in combating the mountain of abstract thought.

FOOTNOTES

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Chapter One

PRESENCE AND SELF-PRESENCE

"Never before, when it is life, itself that is in question, has there been so much talk of civilisation and culture. And there is a curious parallel between this generalized collapse of life at the root of our present demoralization and our concern for a culture which has never been COINCIDENT WITH LIFE, WHICH IN FACT HAS BEEN DEVISED TO TYRANNIZE OVER LIFE" (4)

It would appear from the above that the many questions concerning the collapse of modern life are not necessarily linked with questions of cultural deprivation. What is generally held to be the purpose of culture is the provision of a parallel to life. However if, in assessing how our cultural systems fulfill this role we find that they have never truly fed this need, then they have "never been coincident with life". It would seem therefore that our concern goes deeper than that of cultural deprivation.

"The world is hungry and not concerned with culture, and the attempt to orient towards culture thoughts turned only towards hunger is a purely artificial expedient" (5).

The hunger which Artaud describes does not stem from a culture which propagates that hunger. Its source instead lies in our basic disorientation from life itself.

"We need to live first of all to believe in what makes us live and that something makes us live- to believe that what ever is produced from the mysterious depths of ourselves need not forever haunt us as an exclusively digestive concern" (6)

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It would then appear that all discussion about civilisation and culture is somewhat inadequate when we confront the delicate question of life itself. We are haunted by "exclusively digestive concerns" because we do not yet understand what makes us live.

"If our life lacks brimstone, i.e. a constant magic, it is because we choose to observe our acts and lose ourselves in considerations of their imagined form instead of being impelled by their force" (7).

Whether the above choice is unconscious or is determined by our philosophies the fact remains that we no longer understand the meaning of force. We choose to observe our acts rather than being "impelled by their force" and in so doing rob them of their significance as acts. By producing thoughts which originate in acts we neutralise the force of these acts. Thus the thoughts we produce can only represent the original force of our acts within some "imagined form". If our lives "lack brimstone" it is because we have separated our acts from force.

"All our ideas about life must be revised in a period when nothing any longer adheres to life" (8).

The important question then is not that we are clinging to a culture which has condemned itself from the very beginning, but rather to understand what essentially determined that fatality? That nothing in our culture any longer "adheres to life" can only be explained by the absence of life within our current cultural systems. Yet, has life ever been present within our systems, has it in fact only been represented in them? If we turn at this point to philosophy we can begin to trace how and why this separation from force occurred.

"If there is one inhuman idea in the world, one ineffectual and dead idea which conveys little enough to the mind, it is indeed the idea of metaphysics. This is due as René Guénon says to our purely occidental way, our antipoetic and truncated way of considering principles (apart from the massive and energetic spiritual state which corresponds to them)" (9).

It is our "antipoetic way of considering principles" in isolation which indicates a fundamental defect in our manner of perceiving and interpreting metaphysics. The concept of metaphysics is impoverished and exhausted because its foundation lies not in acts, but in the activity of thoughts themselves. By separating principles from the entire range of experience in which they appear western metaphysics resists "force". Nietzsche has observed this to be the case because metaphysics is founded upon the idea of opposites.

"The fundamental faith of metaphysicians is the faith in antithetical values" (10).

Metaphysics approached force and form as two separate questions, and because one can only discuss metaphysics within the language of metaphysics itself, we must also treat them within this context. There are three areas which must be addressed in discussing the opposites of force and form. Firstly, we must define how these opposites function through the isolation and exclusion of their counterpart. Secondly, we must show how opposites incorporate their double within a subdued form. It follows from this that we can undermine the foundations of such a philosophy by exposing the fact that it is based on that which it excludes. It then remains for us to illustrate how these opposites may be reconciled within tragedy.

It is to Nietzsche that we turn for an account of how these opposites manifest themselves. For Nietzsche the history of art and thought has been characterised by the struggle for predominance between two primary forces within nature. To these forces he has assigned the names Apollo and Dionysus. Apollo is the symbol of light and reason while Dionysus is the symbol of the life force itself, a life force free from the restraint imposed by the principle of individualisation.

"Apollo himself may be regarded as the marvellous divine image of the principium individuationis whose looks and gestures radiate the full delight, wisdom and beauty of illusion..... if we add to this awe the glorious transport which arises in man at the shattering of the principium individuationis then we are in a position to apprehend the essence of Dionysiac rapture, whose closest analogy is furnished by physical intoxication" (1).

Apollo therefore is the god of form and illusion, Dionysus the god of force. Dionysiac forces require the shattering of illusion to liberate them and conversely illusion is necessary to contain them. The significance at either then depends on the annihilation of the other.

"As a moral diet Apollo demands self-control from his people and a knowledge of self. And so we find that the aesthetic necessity of beauty is accompanied by the imperatives "know thyself" and "nothing too much" (12).

This Apollonian imperative of "nothing too much" finds its opposite in the Dionysiac imperative "Nothing too less" for Dionysus "calls into being the entire world of phenomena. Dionysus defies the good and bad indifferently" (13).

Therefore the major distinction between the two is that Apollo is selective and reduces phenomena through individuation whereas Dionysus embraces "the entire world of phenomena". While Apollo demands self-knowledge, Dionysus requires the opposite in terms of self-abandonment through action. We can then say that the difference between the two is the difference between presence and self-presence. Dionysus signifies action or presence while Apollo is only a reflection of that action. In order to represent force, the Dionysiac condition must be objectified. Therefore the Apollonian principle of objectification must negate force if it is to represent it. We are then faced with the question of whether Apollonian representation is a violation of the Dionysiac world of total phenomena.

"It is we alone who have fabricated
causes, succession, reciprocity,
relativity, compulsion, number law,
freedom, motive purpose, and when we
falsely introduce this world of symbols
into things and mingle it with them as
though this symbol-world were an "in
itself" we once more behave as we have
always behaved namely mythologically" (14).

If this symbol-world of signs, representations, etc., is one of man's fabrications and not an "in itself", then it would follow that abstraction does violence to the totality of phenomena by reducing it to the simplicity of sign and metaphor. Abstract thought by itself would be no great tyranny if only it was truly solitary. However, its tyranny lies in its monopolisation and permeation of all aspects of thought. Artaud has indicated that it is at the very root of language and thought that all things become reduced and exist by sign and metaphor. Jacques Derrida has described the boundaries set up by the western model of thought as finite boundaries whose finitude is ensured by the repetition of the sign.

"Repetition separates force, presence and life from themselves. Repetition summarizes negativity, gathers and maintains the past presence as truth, as ideality" (15).

What Derrida is essentially saying here is that metaphorical representation exists by negating "force, presence and life". The sign can only represent force as "Past presence, as ideality".

"For the sign is always that which can be repeated" (16).

Hence the sign manages to exclude danger, contingency and change through its repetition. Representation begins, and can only begin, with the "past presence". Therefore any possibility of "presence" within representation is ruled out. It is necessary to clarify what Derrida describes as "presence". For him "presence" is synonymous with "difference", which he defines as the presence of force as opposed to the representation of force.

"Pure presence as pure difference" (17).

Derrida views the entire history of representation as having been made possible by the negation of force or "presence". The previously stated Apollonian imperative of objectivication dictates that to represent force is to separate oneself from force. Thus according to Derrida representation can only exist in the absence of force.

"presence in order to be presence and self-presence has already begun to represent itself" (18).

From this we can infer that the translation of force in Apollonian terms- the only terms we possess - can only produce a negative of force. Because Apollo "demands restraint" through individualization "presence" must become "self presence" or self knowledge if it is to represent itself. Force must be externalized if it is to be represented. Therefore when force is viewed from outside, "presence" becomes "self-presence".

"Form fascinates when one no longer has the force to understand force from within itself" (19).

What is force from within itself? Could it be that force can only be seen in its transformation from inherent force to the force expressed in and by our thoughts? The exterior of force has no name. If we assume it to be intangible then once it is described or represented it can only be the negative of force. Force is viewed from within in the Dionysiac terms of "intoxication" and abandon to the moment. However, is this internal view possible without detachment from the force, without reconstructing it and re-presenting it in the moment it appears? If force is not seen from within itself then representation as Derrida claims "fascinates" as form in isolation.

Therefore we can state that representation does not owe its allegiance to force but instead has another origin of its own. If this origin begins at the moment of separation from force then we can begin to understand what Derrida means by "fascination".

FOOTNOTES

Artaud, Antonin			<u>The Theatre and its Double</u>	
(4)	"	"	"	Page 7
(5)	"	"	"	Page 12
(6)	"	"	"	Page 13
(7)	"	"	"	Page 8
(8)	"	"	"	Page 16
(9)	"	"	"	Page 44
(10)	Neitzsche, Friedrich		<u>Beyond Good and Evil</u>	Page 16
(11)	"	"	<u>Birth of Tragedy and</u> <u>Genealogy of Morals</u>	Page 24
(12)	"	"	"	Page 34
(13)	"	"	"	Page 29
(14)	"	"	<u>Beyond Good and Evil</u>	Page 33
(15)	Derrida, Jacques		<u>Writing and Difference</u>	Page 246
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Chapter Two

REPRESENTATION AND IT'S ORIGIN

"Thought underlies grammar, an infamy
harder to conquer" (20).

If it is the case that thought underlies grammar it would follow that representation does not in fact reveal force but instead obstructs its appearance. Could this be the root of its "fascination", that is, its self-presence as self-fascination.

"All true feeling is in reality untranslated.
To express it is to betray it. But to
translate it is to dissimulate it" (21).

Because all "true feeling" or the experience of force is outside the realm of representation we can say that representation essentially "dissimulates" while claiming to reveal. Is this a form of self-protection or can it be that representation begins with itself?

"If life is the unrepresentable origin of
representation then representation is the
absence of an origin" (22).

Here Derrida states that representation has no origin outside itself, its own history and its own self-commentary. Is it because force is untranslatable that translation is made possible? Is this then how representation progresses, that is, by dissimulation and within isolation. Life is unrepresentable "because the essence of force is its very elusiveness". Derrida also applies this to language itself by describing it as the inadequate means of representing the unrepresentable without making it into what it is not, the representable.

"So it happens that language the organ
and symbol of appearance can never
succeed in bringing the innermost core
of (force) to the surface" (23).

When it comes to the unknown, the incorporeal, we employ the language of the known. The incorporeal can only be defined in terms of what it is not, by negation. That which is inexpressible, in this case life and force, is always transfigured through metaphor. Is there any path then within the representation of force which does not lead to self-reflection or the confirmation of its own hopelessness, the hopelessness of language, of communication itself? I believe not and this then is the tragic limit of representation.

"The critic and the doctor are without resource when confronted by an existence which refuses to signify or by a language without trace, that is to say without difference" (24).

It is difficult to imagine a mode of thinking other than metaphorical representation because such a mode is never verbalised, never expressed. Without presentation its existence can only be defined in terms of its absence. Therefore thoughts can only be measured by the form they take. Unrecorded thoughts cannot be seen if they have no body or structure to hold them, if they possess no double. Representation can only deal with the outer manifestation of thought, thought which signifies. What of thought which does not signify? Does it make up the history of silence, of the "unrepresentable" of force without language and without "difference".

"Good inspiration is the spirit-breath
which will not take dictation because
it does not read, and because it
precedes all texts" (25).

Therefore representation assumes significance only in the absence of force because force precedes text. Why does representation persist if the "spirit breath will not take dictation"? Does it derive its strength from within itself because it has no origin? Is it because it has always known its limitations that it has been able to continue regardless?

"In relation to the manifestation-illusion of nature (true expression) creates a void in thought. All powerful feeling produces in us the idea of the void and the lucid language which obstructs the appearance of this void also obstructs the appearance of poetry in thought" (26).

If all "powerful feeling" has its origin in the void then it follows that representation distracts from this void

"by creating in reaction a kind of fullness in thought" (27).

The absence of thought is a void which is covered up by the illusion of "fullness" which language creates. What is this "lucid language" which obstructs the appearance of this void? Is it the deception of grammar or the adeptness of grammar itself? Nietzsche observed that language is the "organ and symbol of appearance". Can it be then that the illusion of thought is only the illusion of appearance? Does grammar in fact constitute thought in terms of an Apollonian image of beauty?

Before we pursue this idea let us conclude what we have discussed so far. We have established that Apollo tyrannises in the absence of Dionysus, or in other words, form tyrannises in the absence of force. Representation is made possible only by the negation of force and equally force excludes its double if it is taken in isolation or rather understood as "presence". If form progresses in the absence of force then so does the attainment of what Derrida terms "pure presence as pure difference", that is, the presence of original force as a present totality because it also excludes its double, form, expression and reflection. Each is negated on encountering the language of the other. Derrida's ideas that "representation is the absence of an origin," that "force precedes text", leads us to the conclusion that representation has no origin outside itself and that force is without history then perhaps its mystery is essentially the mystery of creation, the void itself. We can also say that it is precisely this absence which creates the space for representation.

FOOTNOTES

	<u>Artaud Antonin</u>	<u>Collected Works Vol I</u>	Page 103
(20)	" "		
(21)	" "	<u>The Theatre and its Double</u>	Page 71
(22)	Derrida, Jacques	<u>Writing and Difference</u>	Page 23
(23)	Nietzsche, Friedrich	<u>Birth of Tragedy and Genealogy of Morals</u>	Page 48
(24)	Derrida, Jacques	<u>Writing and Difference</u>	Page 24
(25)	" "	" "	Page 179
(26)	Artaud, Antonin	<u>The Theatre and its Double</u>	Page 71
(27)	" "	" "	Page 74

Chapter Three

THE ILLUSION OF THOUGHT

If we take language to be the "organ and symbol of appearance" can it be said that western metaphysics has in fact been no more than a legacy of form? Because opposites rebound on each other, the exclusion of one creates the appearance of the other. Can it be that what we call thought is no more than the absence of thought? This idea is embedded in Nietzsche's concept of the dual origin of opposites. For him the fallacy of antithesis is the rock on which all dualism perishes.

"How could something originate in its anti-thesis? Truth in error, for example? For it may be doubted firstly whether there exists any anti-thesis at all, and secondly whether these popular evaluations and value-antithesis on which the metaphysicians have set their seal, are not perhaps merely foreground valuations, merely provisional perspectives, perhaps moreover the perspectives of a hole-and-corner, perhaps from below, as it were frog-perspectives" (28).

If we suppose the existence of a common origin between Apollo and Dionysus we can then see how opposites incorporate each other within a subdued form. When Nietzsche applied this theory to metaphysics itself, he proceeded to de-structure a myth which maintains the existence of opposites in isolation.

"Maybe reason, cold, circumspect
without instinct in opposition to
the instincts has itself been no
more than a form of sickness" (29).

Nietzsche's suspicion of reason evolved from his belief that the deception we ascribe to the senses may in fact be the result of a deeper deception on the part of consciousness. He applied the converse of this suspicion to illustrate how abstract thought, because it also incorporated its opposite within itself, is also a form of deception. In the same way that psychoanalysis later showed how repression breeds obsession Nietzsche exposes reason's superstition to the fear of the unreasonable which may already have infected it. Nietzsche's idea of the sublimation of opposites describes how the expression of instinctual desires is directed from a primitive form to a socially acceptable one. Derrida's treatment of the dual origin of reason and madness elaborates on this.

"Madness is expelled, rejected, denounced
in its very impossibility from the very
interiority of thought itself" (30).

We are here again faced with the point stressed in the introduction that in denouncing something we add to its appraisal. To decry abstraction we must be firmly rooted in it so perhaps our concern is no more than fallacy. The support inherent in our denial forces us to commit a double tyranny within a language that condemns language itself.

"Order is denounced within order" (31).

We have to be within something before we can protest against it and such protest only serves to further protract the situation. Nietzsche warned that the solitary course pursued by western metaphysics can only result in a re-appraisal of itself by itself. It is incapable of viewing itself outside of its own terms, its own rhetoric. Derrida suggests that language has reached the point, or has always been at the point, where even in its negative it falls foul to its own analysis. For him language's denouncement adds up to

"a protest from within" (32).

Such a protest can only be made from a position of immersion in its own language, order, syntax and is expressed in the very voice it aims to silence. We have therefore produced a philosophy from opposition to philosophy, a metaphysics born out of opposition to metaphysics. To say no is to say yes in the tongue of the adversary, this being its inherent tragedy.

"There is in life's flame, life's appetite, life's irrational impulsion, a kind of initial perversity. The desire characteristic of eros is cruelty since it feeds upon contingency; death is cruelty, resurrection is cruelty, transfiguration is cruelty, since nowhere in a circular and closed world is there room for true death" (33).

What is cruelty if not the cruelty of predetermined limits? If representation is a "circular and closed world" which only allows protest from within itself then it would seem that its initial perversity lies in its efforts to change itself. Do opposites recur and rebound on themselves continuously, is there "no room for true death". To imagine an end to structuralism, representation, form, is to dream of recreating them. It would seem that no alternatives exist. The only possibility lies, as it always has, in restructuring what is already there, what is already created.

"When the hidden God creates he
obeys the cruel necessity of
creation which has been imposed on
him by himself, he cannot not create" (34).

Language can only recreate itself, within itself, and outside of origin. It would follow therefore that what we have labelled as tyranny is in fact no more than the "cruelty of necessity". This is probably the attraction or fascination of tyranny, that it draws a protest into itself, it functions as self-preservation in the face of blind necessity.

At this point it is necessary to state that dualism also has its benefits, namely the maintenance of shadow, of rage against the other, that which is being denied. For what could be more important than this hunger.

"I mean it is important for us to eat
first of all, it is even more important
for us not to waste in sole concern for
eating our simple power of being hungry" (35).

Therefore the maintenance of illusion is important. As we
stated earlier "true expression" hides what it would make
apparent. This is because

"An image, an allegory, a figure that
masks what it would reveal have more
significance for the spirit than the
lucidities of speech and its analyties" (36).

Does the end of dualism then signify the end of mirrors,
the end of doubles, the end of difference. Is it's demise
futile in that

"Freedom is a convention and even
more unbearable then slavery" (37).

FOOTNOTES

(28)	Nietsche, Friedrich	<u>Beyond Good and Evil</u>	Page 15
(29)	" "	" " " "	Page 23
(30)	Derrida, Jacques	<u>Writing and Difference</u>	Page 35
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(33)	Artaud, Antonin	<u>The Treatre and its Double</u>	Page 103
(34)	" "	" " "	Page 102
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(36)	" "	" " "	Page 71
(37)	Artaud, Antonin	<u>Collected Works, Vol I</u>	Page 20

Chapter Four

"THE REDEMPITIVE VISION"

So far we have shown that the idea of antithesis holds little weight because opposites continually repeat and reproduce themselves. We have seen how metaphysics is de-mythologised when confronted with its own language. We have said that order can only be denounced within order, thereby recreating itself by negation, and that tyranny is in fact no more than tragic necessity. We therefore reach a conclusion which is bound in tragedy.

Nietzsche saw tragedy as a synthesis between Apollonian and Dionysiac principles. Tragedy contains the unity of forces, the birth of life and decay, simultaneously. Ascent is already mapped by descent, tragedy as the attainment of that which is already lost.

"This is why true beauty never strikes
us directly. The setting sun is beautiful
because of all it makes us lose" (38).

Is this loss Artaud speaks of the loss of self which is experienced in the weakening of individuation? All Dionysiac experience demands the destruction of individuation in order to

"tear asunder the veil of maya to sink
back into the original oneness of nature" (39).

This "oneness" can be achieved only through the renunciation of self. This explains the feeling of "loss" which accompanies all revelations of true beauty.

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"The peculiar blend of emotions in the heart of the Dionysiac revealer seems to hark back (as the medicinal drug harks back to the deadly poison) to the days when the infliction of pain was experienced as joy while a sense of supreme triumph elicited cries of anguish from the heart. For now in every exuberant joy there is heard an undertone of terror, or else of wistful lament over an irrecoverable loss" (40).

Therefore the Dionysaic experience is twofold. The sense of joy is accompanied by a sense of anguish. Terror goes hand in hand with revelation. Dionysus for Nietzsche was the complete affirmation of existence in all its complexity, diversity and dark dimensions. Therefore the experience of Dionysus can only result in the destruction and fragmentation of the individual.

"And that is why all great myths are dark, so that one cannot imagine save in an atmosphere of carnage, torture, and bloodshed, all the magnificent fables which recount to the multitudes the first sexual division and the first carnage of essence that appeared in creation" (41)

The Dionysiac condition symbolises the initial division within nature.

"As though nature were bemoaning the fact of her fragmentation, her decomposition into separate individuals" (42).

It would seem that Dionysus taken in isolation can only prove destructive to the individual. Therefore Apollo returns at this point to reinstate the individual once more.

"The theatre like the plague is a crisis which is resolved by death or cure. The god shows us how there is a need for a whole world of torment in order for the individual to produce the redemptive vision" (43).

Apollo thus appears as the objectification of the Dionysaic condition. Its illusion is once again necessary to "produce the redemptive vision". In this manner Apollo interprets and lends form to the Dionysaic experience of force. Apollo provides an element of detachment which disorientates the individual away from himself and produces a sense of the universal.

"while the transport of the Dionysiac state lasts, it carries with it a lethean element in which every thing that has been experienced by the individual is drowned. This chasm of oblivion separates the quotiatian reality from the Dionysaic but as soon as the quotiatian reality enters consciousness once more it is viewed with loathing, and the consequence is an ascetic abulic state of mind. Hamlet being an example of the Dionysaic man" (44).

The Melancholic condition results if illusion fails to follow the Dionysaic experience. What separates melancholy from tragedy is that tragedy reconstructs the Dionysaic drama behind the "veil of illusion". Therefore the only path by which representation can progress is that of illusion.

"understanding kills action, for in order to act we require the veil of illusion" (45).

FOOTNOTES

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|------|----------------------|---|
| (38) | Artaud, Antonin | <u>The Theatre and its Double</u>
Page 71 |
| (39) | Nietzsche, Friedrich | <u>Birth of Tragedy and
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| (40) | " " | " " Page 27 |
| (41) | Artaud, Antonin | <u>The Theatre and its Double</u>
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| (42) | Nietzsche, Friedrich | <u>Birth of tragedy and
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| (44) | Nietzsche, Friedrich | <u>Birth of Tragedy</u> Page 51 |
| (45) | Nietzsche, Friedrich | <u>Birth of Tragedy and
Genealogy of Morals</u> Page 52 |

CONCLUSION

Thus we see how tragedy incorporates the Dionysaic principle within the illusion of form. Force is not represented in tragedy but instead holds dual presence with form. Therefore tragedy is superior to Apollonian representation because it does not separate acts from thoughts. Tragedy manages to incorporate both simultaneously. Tragedy is both the affirmation of life and the affirmation of loss. The tragic vision then ultimately redeems representative thought.

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