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Domination and Resistance in Foucault

by

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Introduction

In Foucault's writings humanism is constantly twinned with terror. The issue of dominance is tightly bound up with much of his work especially as he comes to examine the new suppositions within modernity concerning the individual that he closely relates to a new way of seeing.

The intention of this thesis is to explore the issue of domination in Foucault's work and how it is worked out in society. Foucault has a strong suspicion of modernities humanism, as he sees it as being intrinsically linked to domination. It seems that Foucault is more comfortable with periods of history where social coercion is at least visible and overt. His critique of the modern period in history is aimed towards the social coercion and the subsequent terror that he believes has become insidious in modernity with the advent of modern science, as science, whilst feigning impartiality and disinterest, excludes the non-conformist and denies them the right to their discourse (Harland, 1987, p.108).

The validity of his critique must be questioned in relation to his practice. This thesis will examine the possibility that in Foucault's critique of domination, his contribution to knowledge allows new possibilities for domination. Therefore it also questions whether the methods he offers for resisting domination are possible and if they are consistent with his theories of power. It must also be questioned whether his bid to resistance of domination offers freedom from terror. The issue of domination in Foucault's work is connected to the issue of knowledge which he never sees as innocent but as a means for the exertion of power.

Synopsis of Chapters

Chapter One will serve to give a background to and a context for the issues involved in the thesis. Chapter Two and Chapter Three will discuss domination in relation to specific institutions and will be structured both thematically and chronologically. Chapter Two discusses domination in relation to the asylum and the clinic, drawing on two of Foucault's early texts, 'Madness and Civilisation', written in 1962 and 'The Birth of the Clinic', written the following year. Chapter Three deals with domination in relation individualisation and domination with reference to a later text, 'Discipline and Punish', written in 1973 and a paper written a year later, 'The Dangerous Individual in Nineteenth Century Legal Psychiatry'.

Chapter 1

Chapter One will begin by discussing the objectifying modes by which Foucault believes man¹ is turned into a subject² as he outlines them in 'The Subject and Power'. Foucault tends to reduce every relationship to a power relationship, so as domination is discussed power will inevitably be involved. It is impossible to give a simple outline of Foucault's theories of power. This is not the intention but it will be beneficial to have some knowledge of how Foucault believes power is attached to everyday life before looking at the specific institutions. Changing perceptions of the individual, as Classicism³ gives way to modernity are central to the issue of domination. The change takes place largely as the consequence of changes within language as the relationships between 'words' and 'things' alters the manner of

¹ For the purposes of this thesis the term "man" is to be understood, as Foucault uses it, as person, individual, or human-being, avoiding the irrelevant gender issues that dealing with it in any other way would raise.

² "Subject" and "object" are both ambiguous terms, which are often used interchangeably by Foucault. Their translation from French to English complicates Foucault's intentions. The context of their use should clarify the intention of their use in this thesis.

³ The terms "Classical" and "Classicism" are used loosely by Foucault but in the context of this thesis it can be assumed that he refers to the Neo-Classical rather than the ancient Classical period. It will be used in the same manner throughout this thesis.

representation. Man moved to a position outside the taxonomic tables where he began to see himself as an object. This leads to a whole new visual regime in which man is the subject of intensive investigation. He now enjoys no privilege over the world of things. As the natural sciences give way to the human sciences as man becomes the subject of investigation. All the points that will be discussed in chapter one will give a backdrop to and a context for the discussions in the following chapters.

Chapter Two

Chapter Two deals with the issue of the objectification of the individual due to the domination that resulted in the developing doctor/patient relationships of modernity. It will be discussed with reference to two of Foucault's earlier texts, 'Madness and Civilisation' and 'The Birth of the Clinic'. The theme of domination and objectification are of importance in both texts which are closely related to each other.

Firstly, within 'Madness and Civilisation' the objectification of man is preceded by the constitution of madness as an object as the patient is turned into a self-reflective mirror. The subtlety of this movement will be seen as Foucault exposes the "liberation" of the insane as a mask for increasing domination. Foucault suggests that as the insane are analysed it is always in terms of dissimilarity to reason. Therefore a standard of what is normal and acceptable is set as "a law of truth" and thus individuals are normalised. This issue will be taken up again in chapter Three in the discussion of surveillance.

In 'The Birth of the Clinic' Foucault was concerned about the rise of the "sciences of man". He believed that medicine had an important role in the constitution of these sciences. This will be briefly considered at this stage but will be dealt with in more detail in relation to the 'birth of the prison'. The main issue to be considered is the intensive laborious investigation of the body as an object with no status above any

other object. The implications of this will be considered with reference to the extermination of the Jews in the Nazi concentration camps and then in relation to the more contemporary issues of abortion, euthanasia and genetic engineering. It will be noted how increasing technology affects the extent of domination and anticipates the terror to which it can lead.

Chapter 3

The theme of Chapter Three will be individualisation and normalisation, and their relationship to domination, beginning with an examination of 'Discipline and Punish'. The position of the body within power relationships will be important in the discussion. It will look at how modernism brought along a new form of punishment, moving from torture to confinement, from the punishment of the body to the punishment of the soul, which according to Foucault raises issue of the constitution of the soul. This involves a completely new type of judgement, based not on circumstantial evidence but on the individual behind the action. Most importantly it involves the introduction of psychiatry to the penal system. This will also be discussed with reference to 'The Dangerous Individual in Nineteenth Century Legal Psychiatry'.

The chapter then will go on to look at the issue of surveillance as Foucault sees its application first during the seventeenth century plague, and then how the same principles are applied in Bentham's proposal for the panopticon, an architectural design that used the principles of surveillance that were applied during the plague. It is very much concerned with separation of individuals in space as a means for control. It will then be considered whether the same separation of individuals is as necessary for domination with the growth of technology.

The issue of normalisation which will have already been raised in relation to 'Madness and Civilisation' will be looked at again. The new carceral system

involves intensive examination and monitoring of behaviour in order to correct any deviations from the 'norm'. The extent to which this normalisation can be applied to everyday life with the increased technology of today will then be considered in regard to mass media, particularly the television industry. The disindividualisation of power within the panoptic set-up will also be considered in relation to increasing technology.

Chapter 4

Chapter Four will involve an analysis of Foucault's methodology. His avid criticism of modernity and its subtle domination will have become evident in the previous chapters. It will therefore be important to consider the alternatives Foucault offers beginning by looking at how his method of writing changed from an archaeological to a genealogical approach, then by considering how he connects the principles of the carceral system to the social sciences. Foucault's ideas of resistance will then be considered, questioning whether they are valid and if they can exist comfortably along with his other theories. This raises the issue of the role of the intellectual and his place in resistance against domination. It will question if Foucault's work contributes to the field of knowledge that he criticises in the "sciences of man" because of the manner in which it subjugates the individual.

Chapter One

Classicism to Modernity: Changing Perceptions of Man

Foucault's ideas on man, as a subject, run throughout his works. Beginning his essay on 'The Subject and Power' he defines his objective as being to outline, or in his words to "create the history" of the modes of objectification at work in culture, whereby human-beings are transformed into subjects. Foucault outlines three specific modes of objectification. The first of these three modes comprises of a sub-set of the modes of inquiry which try to give themselves the status of science of which he gives three examples:

1. The speaking subject being objectified in grammaire generale, philology, and linguistics.
2. The labouring productive subject who is objectified in the analysis of wealth and economics.
3. The living subject in objectified in natural science and biology .

The second mode of objectification he deals with is what he calls "dividing practices" whereby the subject is either divided inside himself or divided from others. The examples he gives are the mad and the sane, the sick and the healthy, the criminals and the "good boys." This is the mode that most closely relates to the three texts that will be considered in relation to objectification by the dominant discourses.

The third mode of objectification he identifies in his later work is within the domain of sexuality. It is concerned with how the individual turns himself into a subject (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1989 p208).

Later in the 'Subject and Power' Foucault gives two meanings for the term subject: the first is an explicit power relationship whereby an individual is made subject to someone else by control or dependence and the other is more subtle whereby the individual is tied to his own identity by conscience or self knowledge. In both cases the subject is defined in relation to power. The fundamental principle, or underlying concept behind both meanings for the term subject, is that they both suggest a form of power which subjugates the individual. As Foucault's work progresses he becomes increasingly absorbed with this issue of power.

This issue of power is so interwoven into all of Foucault's writings that it is impossible to give a simple outline of his interpretations of power. At this point a very basic outline will be useful background for this discussion. In discussing what he terms as the "will to do" in relation to subjectivity and power in 'The Subject and Power' he talks about how power applies itself to everyday life, in fundamental terms, power makes individuals into subjects. It does this through a series of processes. It begins by categorising the individual, then proceeds to mark him by his individuality thus attaching him to his own identity. The result is that a law of truth is imposed on him which he must recognise and which others must recognise in him (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1989, p.212). This process will become apparent as examples are discussed. Foucault describes power in very abstract terms, not existing in itself but only when put into action. He sees it as neither an institution nor a structure, which would seem to raise the possibility of it being a certain strength with which we are endowed. Foucault makes it clear that this is not what he is suggesting. Instead he sees it as something less tangible, as a complex strategical relationship in a particular society (1989, p.187). Rather than being a relationship between partners, (individual or collective) he sees it as a way in which certain actions modify others (1989, p.218). He perceives power as a question of government that directs groups or individuals, "the government of children, of souls, of communities, of families and of the sick "(1989, p.221). His

use of the term government here is not government in relation to political structures or state management which would imply direct confrontation between opposing parties. Power according to Foucault operates on a more discreet level (1989, p.221).

A brief consideration of Foucault's text 'The Order of Things' will give an idea of what Foucault's main concerns were as he considered modernity and its humanism. In this text he breaks history down into epistemes. An episteme functions as the "historical a priori" of the given epoch serving as a sort of "intellectual underground" as it represents a general field of knowledge. It is this "historical a priori" which is specific to different epochs which all the scientific minds of the epoch in which they live, unconsciously tap or presuppose. Foucault describes this historical apriori in terms of an archive "which comprises a general system of the formation and transformation of statements" (Harland, 1987, p.107).

Foucault sets out to write the history of the four major epistemes of the last five centuries: renaissance, classical, modern and post-modern-cum-structuralist. Harland explains how, while the fields examined in 'The Order of Things' are language, economic exchange and living organisms, his focus is on the sciences that have a particular bearing on man's own idea about himself. The objects that these sciences study turn out to be quite different from episteme to episteme. Thus, modern thinking understands language, economic exchange and living organisms in a very different sense to classical thinking; and further development of psychological and anthropological perspectives in the modern period yields more new objects. It is only with this development of psychological and anthropological views that the human sciences emerged. This emergence of the human sciences will be important throughout the following chapters. He continues to describe how these human sciences are dehumanised or at least begin to become dehumanised in the post-modern period. This will be relevant later in discussion of

Foucault's position in relation to this dehumanisation of the social sciences. If the humanist subject "man" was the "effect of administrative and governmental agencies," only a construction of the dominant discourses of the time, in the same way as it appeared it could also disappear (During, 1992, p.21). While humanism held that man was the creator of scientific codes Foucault argues that man is merely a category created by these codes. Rather than human-beings being the creators of science, he believes that science has created man. If this is true, that through science the human subject has been objectified by its construction as an "autonomous substance or individual consciousness", then it is possible for it to be deconstructed and this is what Kearney believes to be happening and what Foucault certainly desires to happen (Kearney, 1987, p.285). As we look at what Foucault sees as the construction of the idea of 'man' as we see its development in the asylum, clinic and prison, questions will be raised about domination, but also about Foucault's role in the dismantling of the discourses and the alternatives he suggests. Foucault argues that we have become conditioned to consider expressions of the human subject as individual or "original" when these expressions are in fact no more than surface "effects" of an anonymous system of Language or Thought, within the specific epistemes (1987, p.285-286). He believes that it is not individuals who invent the epistemes but rather the episteme pre-exists the individual, conditioning the human subject's thoughts and actions.

The changing relationships between "words" and "things" were important to the changes in thinking concerning the individual that came with Modernism. Looking first at this relationship in the Classical period will help us grasp why, when this relationship broke down in the modern period, it opened up such a vast scope for massive changes in thought, especially concerning the individual, and, according to Foucault, opened greater fields for the possibility of domination. The episteme, according to Foucault, decides the fundamental relation which exists between things (les choses) and how we understand them or conceptually represent them

through language (les mots). Change from epoch to epoch effects this relation between "things" and "words" due to changing epistemes (1987, p.285-287).

Harland describes how, in the classical period the non-human and the human split, allowing the natural world as object, to become known by the human mind as subject. Therefore knowing operates as representation. He uses the classical metaphor of the outside world being captured in the mind like a reflection in the mirror. This metaphor suggests that knowing is essentially optical. He explains how, according to Foucault, the partiality towards classificatory tables and taxonomies in the classical period was the result of the accentuation of the sense of sight through the first-hand observation that reigned in the classical period. Jay explains how the classical period was dominated by a new faith in the power of direct observation which was enhanced by developing technology. The findings of this direct observation was recorded and ordered within the visible space of the classificatory table (Jay, 1993, p.403-404).

A harmony existed in the classical age between the pattern of names in language and the pattern of things in nature within the classification tables (Harland, 1987, p.110). According to Foucault the basis of this harmony in classical language has always been the making of tables or pictures. The possibility of knowing things and their order passes, in the Classical experience, through the sovereignty of words. A harmony existed between "words" and "things" based on the form of representation. "Words form[ed] a colourless network on the basis of which representations [were] ordered" (Foucault, 1973, p.311).

This harmony between language and representation was to break around the end of the eighteenth century as the "observing eye" was moving towards observation from a position outside its tables. This was reflected in the natural sciences when the focus shifted from what was directly observable, to forces inaccessible to

sight such as electricity, heat and magnetism, which could only be understood or described in abstract terms (Harland, 1987, p.111).

Foucault articulates how the classical dream of a single great pattern of names, dissolves into multiplicity of languages, each being affected by different histories with differing grammar and vocabulary. Thus the possibilities of expression are limited. Instead of the pure transparency of classical language, language is now filled with hidden forces that the language user never directly experiences (Harland, 1987, p.112). These abstract ideas bring with them a view of man not present in classical thinking.

In classical thinking everything was represented on the one level. The nature of the one doing the representing was no different from the nature of the objects he represented. Wealth, needs, and political economy were represented on the same level as species of plants and animals. Man no longer enjoyed privilege over the things of nature (Habermas, 1987, p.259). When this correspondence between language and the world breaks down, massive changes regarding "self" take place. "The subject doing the representing has to objectify himself to gain some clarity about the problematic process of representation itself" (1987, p.260).

Man had suddenly found himself under the control of his own language and biology and economic system rather than being detached and superior to them making him an object of nature (Harland, 1987, p.113). The static order of the classical age is forfeited as life, labour and language break free from the domination of the taxonomic gaze. Yet Jay argues that the post-classical episteme was "still hostage to the primacy of sight, if mobilised in a new visual regime" (Jay, 1993, p.405). Domination was still closely related to the observing gaze. Foucault however, sees the new visual regime having a greater capacity for domination due to its increased subtlety.

As the following two chapters look at specific regimes of power within institutions the idea that man can now view himself as an object is very important. The great capacity for domination, with this background will become obvious. It is the objectification of man that forms much of the basis of Foucault criticism of modernity.

Chapter Two

Domination and the Subject / Object

Two of Foucault's earlier books, 'Madness and Civilisation' and 'The Birth of the Clinic' convey Foucault's early preoccupation with the issue of domination, as he perceives its growth, in the sphere of the asylum and the medical field. He describes the science of mental disease as it developed in the asylum. He believed it to be deficient in dialogue, as it was based on the order of observation and classification. (Jay, 1993, p.390) Foucault describes how, from the seventeenth century increasing scientific rules of knowledge regulated the confinement of the insane and how this served the interests of social domination. The mad were made into objects that were available for discussion and treatment, for legal regulation and scientific diagnoses (Kearney, 1987, p.292). Before psychiatry could treat madness, it had to constitute it as an object.

Foucault describes how one of the leading psychiatrists of the postclassical era, Phillip Pinel, posited himself in relation to his patients. He saw it as important that the patients would see themselves as "pure spectacle and absolute subject(Jay, 1993, p.390-391).".. For this to be possible he attempted to turn the patient into a "self-reflective mirror" (1993, p.390-391) The patient was no longer just an object of the scrutiny others. He was to be turned in upon himself so he would see himself as an object.

Those leading the reformation of the treatment of the insane, like Pinel and Tuke claimed their goal to be the liberation of the insane, the abolition of constraint and the constitution of a humane milieu. Foucault argues that the study and treatment of mental illness has been contrived and controlled to create conditions conducive to the exertion of power. The discourse was created with a specific end proposing

that the category of 'madness' was an invention. He believed that its invention would serve constitutional and ideological purposes in that there was a specific social need to centralise and conserve power. It was this need that had produced the climate in which this category could be created. The category required the excluded from the social fold those who did not conform to the established codes of "normal behaviour" (Kearney, 1987, p.292).

Foucault is adamant that the claims made by the reformers were a mask hiding the real issues of the free terror of madness being substituted by "the stifling anguish of responsibility." The fear and terror now raged under the "seals of conscience." The madman was made to feel guilty, to be aware of himself as an object. It was held that if he understood his guilt and objectivity that he could then return to awareness of himself as a free and responsible subject, and consequently return to reason (Foucault, 1984, p.145-6).

Two processes, the first of which began around the middle of the seventeenth century that dramatically effected the history of reason were the arresting and institutionalisation of one in every hundred inhabitants of Paris. The second, at the close of the eighteenth century, was the transformation of places of incarceration and asylums into closed institutions where the individuals would be supervised by doctors for medically diagnosed mental illnesses. Habermas identifies two types of practices that emerged from these developments. The subject in the position of observation, being raised to the level of universal reason flattens out any elements that could serve to destabilise the hegemonic monologue it holds with itself by turning everything around it into an object. The other resulting practice was the forced severing of any analogous traits between madness and reason (Habermas, 1987, p.244). Thus the difference between normal and abnormal is definitively laid down in the interest of domination, so that the abnormal can be normalised. In other words there is an imposition of a "law of truth" as discussed in 'The Subject and

Power'. This idea of normalisation will be considered later as it is raised again in 'Discipline and Punish' and will be discussed in relation to the development of technology.

Foucault, in his analysis of the psychiatric institutions and clinical psychology, twins humanism with terror. This is central to his critique of modernity. Believing that the psychiatric institution was born from the humanitarian ideas of the Enlightenment, Foucault demonstrates for the first time the double movement of liberation and enslavement. Again this relates to the subtlety that he recognises in modernity's domination, the fact that it pretends to be liberating while in fact it is creating ways in which domination can be made more effective. The subject is less aware of how he is being enslaved because he has been liberated from physical chains. This idea he later relates to the carceral system.

Institutional ruling meant that psychiatric treatment was only possible patient became to an object of continuous supervision, manipulation, isolation, and regulation. Especially significant is that the patient becomes the object of medical research (Habermas, 1987, p.246).

The setting up of the asylum was in many ways an exemplar for the doctor patient relationship that Foucault concentrates on in 'The Birth of the Clinic'. In its preface he opens by stating that the book is "about space, about language, and about death; it is about the act of seeing, the gaze" (Foucault, 1973, p.i). He also states in the preface that the object of the book is both historical and critical; that it is interested in determining the conditions that allowed the possibility of medical experience in modern times (1973, p.xi). The idea of the gaze is constantly at the fore in Foucault's work in its conjunction with domination.

Foucault's concern in 'The Birth of the Clinic' is largely pertains to the "sciences of man" which he believed dawned with the birth of modernism. As he investigates the thoughts, modes and influences that shaped clinical practice, he also has in mind the wider sphere of influence that these ideas reached. He believed that medicine was very important in the constitution of the sciences of man. He saw this importance as not being just of methodological significance but also as being ontologically significant because it concerns man's being as an object of positive knowledge (1963, p.197). Foucault questions the manner in which this new mode of knowledge, the science of man, presents itself as a science. He opposes the idea of clinical medicine as a science on the grounds that it does not comply with the formal criteria, or attain the level of rigour expected of physics, chemistry or physiology. He also questions it because the mass of empirical observations are scarcely organised and the experiments and results uncontrolled (Habermas, 1987, p.278).

'The Birth of the Clinic' and 'Madness and Civilisation' both refer to the organisation of the supervised institute and in the clinical observation of the patient, whereby there is effected a division between seeing and being seen. This is part of the basis for Foucault linking the idea of the clinic to the idea of the science of man. It is an idea that obtains dominance at the same time as that of subject-centred reason: that killing of dialogical two-way relationships transforms subjects who are monologically turned in upon themselves, into objects for one another (1987, p.246). It breaks down the dialogical relationships that allow individuals to remain as subjects, and through dominating monologue turns them into objects and only objects.

Foucault becomes engrossed with the idea of the examination of open corpses. He is quick to point out that looking below the surface of the body does not mean that the doctors begin to perceive what they had once speculated or that they begin to

listen to reason rather than imagination. Rather it allowed what had previously been below and beyond what they could observe to be investigated. It allowed the forming a new union of words and things that enabled one to see and to say. He identifies the possible breadth of experiment by describing the domain of the careful gaze. The gaze was only receptive to what could be directly observed. The visual was elevated to the degree that "the eye becomes the depository and the source of clarity", it can only bring a truth to light, that it has received and in as far as it has brought it to light. It is the eye that first opens truth (Foucault, 1963, p.xii-xiii). While the visual was very important in the classical age, this new visual regime of modernity had very different implications, as has already been discussed in Chapter One. Man has now moved himself to a position outside the classificatory table so that he can now observe himself as an object, with the same status as any other object.

This intensive, empirical, laborious observation was the opening of a scientifically-structured discourse of the individual in that it opened the possibility of creating a rational language of the individual.

Foucault goes to great lengths to highlight the significance of the modern approach to and emphasis on death. He explains how with the coming of the Enlightenment, death came into the sphere of reason, and became for the philosophical mind an object and source of knowledge. Foucault suggests that the new more penetrating gaze shifted the focus from the vitality of the patient to the patients mortality. Life had been equivocal and death transparent, but now the old values and the mystery of life and death was transformed by pathological anatomy and the nineteenth century was haunted by the absolute eye that makes life into a corpse. Foucault believed it was no coincidence that at a time when the clinicians were trying to define their method that the constitution of pathological anatomy took

the form it did. Death provided a stable, visible, legible basis, for language about the individual to develop around (1963, p192).

Before this shift, disease had been bound up with the metaphysic of evil, now it became visible and legible. Death had now detached itself from counter-nature and become the concrete "a priori" of medical knowledge now that it embodied itself in the living bodies of individuals (1963, p.196). Foucault suggests that it is reflective of our culture that the first scientific discourse about man had to pass through this stage of death. It was only when the western man had eliminated himself by passing through this stage of death that he could constitute himself in his own eyes as an object of science. "He grasped himself within his language, and gave himself, in himself and by himself, a discursive existence" (1963, p.196). The opening of the corpse and the subsequent focus on death played an important role in allowing this elimination, bringing a stage of death to the individual. He says that this experience of Unreason brought the birth of psychology and its very possibility and that the integration of death into medical thought gave birth to a medicine that is given as the science of the individual. So in Foucault eyes the idea of the individual and their experience in modern culture is indebted to the medical professions new way of looking at the corpse (1963, p.197).

Foucault believed that the new regime of vision and observation in the medical field had violent implications. David Levin refers to the "life threatening violence implicit in the technological operation of theoretical vision" as being Foucault's main concern (Levin, 1988, p.117). This seems to be an extreme proposition but its validity can be understood in the outworking of medical observation and investigation, when it is taken to its extreme.

As humanism allows the individual to be the object of continuous supervision, manipulation, isolation, and regulation, and especially the object of medical research,

the rights of the individual diminish, and domination, according to Foucault, is inevitable.

The Enlightenment's obsession with the observation and meticulous documentation of man meant the anthropologists began examining the differences between races. Physicians, psychiatrists and others joined in creating discourses of the "other". The body and the mind were analysed and generalised assumptions were made. The fruit of this labour was seen in the domination white skinned people exerted over black. The result was slavery and repression. In the twentieth century, however, the treatment of the Jews in the holocaust shows how repression became more acute. Increasing technology opened wider scope for experimentation and new possibilities for control. The fascists had learnt to see things through the conceptual models left after the disintegration of language. "In the sphere of the social sciences and the world of individual experimentation, blind observations and empty concepts are grouped together rigidly without meditation" (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1972, p.201). Morality had no role to play. Experimentation had no limits. For their project to be effective, fascist anti-Semitism had to create its own object (1972, p.207). And so the fascists went to work to form a discourse of the Jewish race that would acquire scientific status. When there is little concern for the subject of the investigations, the actions that follow to solve the perceived problem need little consideration and are arbitrary as the individual is merely an object. Therefore there is no problem with forcing ethnic groups to a new region or branding individuals as Jews and sending them to the gas chambers (1972, p.202). Trials against the physicians of the Third Reich are recorded revealing the horror of human experimentation in the laboratories in the name of science. The ultimate laboratory was the gas chamber. If the body is only an object, investigations by the cold and rational gaze can result in cold, rational, calculated but unmeditated action. When practicalities supersede morality the individual becomes a voiceless object.

When the individual is only an object many other questions are raised. Adorno and Horkheimer identify one of the key issues in the extermination of the Jews as being economic concerns. In the same way questions of economics can affect the rights of the individual in a less totalitarian state, in a more subtle manner. Life can be reduced to quantifiable economical terms. The question of abortion could be considered in terms of the costs, the cost and inconvenience of caring for a sick or handicapped child, or indeed any child, rather than considering the rights of the individual. Genetic engineering can also be reduced to quantifiable economical terms. If it is being used to control the choices of the characteristics of the individual to be created and the most perfect individual possible is desired, in who's interest is it? The interest of the child, the object, or the 'creator'? If the individual is only an object, the benefits of what genetic engineering can achieve may be assessed on grounds of what is useful rather than on grounds of any concerns for the individual who is the object of the project. Intensive medical research preceded the objectification of the individual and consequently the Jews as a nation. It also precedes the practice of genetic engineering. When practicalities take over the rights of the individual, the terror that ensues is incalculable. This is quite blatantly seen in the treatment of the Jews in the gas chambers, but is less clearly seen in the question of genetic engineering. The reason for this is that the question of genetic engineering remains very much within the domain of the medical field and the ethics of the issue receiving relatively less consideration. The domination over and the horrific treatment of the Jews is clear, but the control over the type of individuals that are born does not appear to be so horrific but could the domination be on the same level? Instead of destroying those individuals that are seen as useless why not prevent their creation in the first place by engineering something better? It would seem that all these issues of life become lost in issues of power rather than morality if the individual is merely a object.

Chapter Three

Domination, Individualisation and Normalisation

Dreyfus and Rabinow identify the twin themes of Discipline and Punish as being "spatial exclusion and cultural integration" (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983, p.3). The birth of the psychiatric institution and of the clinic in general is exemplary for a form of disciplining that Foucault will describe later purely and simply as the modern technology of domination. The archetype of the closed institution which Foucault initially discovers in the clinically transformed world of the asylum, turns up in the forms of the factory, the prison, the barracks, the school, and the military academy (Habermas, 1987, p.245).

He states that the book is

"intended as a correlative history of the modern soul and of a new power to judge; a genealogy of the present scientifico-legal complex from which the power to punish derives its basis, justifications and rules, from which it extends its effects and by which it masks its exorbitant singularity" (Foucault, 1977, p.iii).

In drawing out these histories he follows certain general rules, which he outlines, two of which are particularly relevant. He intends to "make the technology of power the very principle both of the humanisation of the penal system and of the knowledge of man," and to ascertain whether the entry of the a whole new body of scientific knowledge and thus the soul into legal practice, is not effect of a transformation of a way in which the body itself is invested in power relations (1977, p.xi).

In the investment of the body in these power relations the "political economy" of the body is significant to Foucault,. Even if the treatment of the body has dramatically changed, the issues are still related to the body. Its

"forces, their utility and their docility, their distribution and their submission....are....directly involved in a political field; power relations have an immediate hold upon it; they invest it, mark it, train

it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks , to perform ceremonies, to emit signs" (Foucault, 1977, p.25).

By the means of this analysis he intends to come to an understanding of how "man, the soul, the normal or abnormal individual have come to duplicate crime as objects of penal intervention" and in what way this specific mode of subjection was able to give birth to man as an object of knowledge allowing the creation of a discourse that gained a scientific status (Foucault, 1977, p.24).

The opening chapter of the book raises issues that remain important throughout. Foucault opens by describing the scene of a torture and execution in 1757 where the body was the major target of penal repression. Next he describes a detailed timetable drawn up by Leon Faucher for 'the House for young prisoners in Paris'. This timetable, written only eighty years after the execution previously described includes minute details of when the prisoners were to rise, wash, make beds, eat, etc., each action in response to a drum roll. What caused this movement from the public spectacle of execution to the timetabled prison system? Foucault refers to Benjamin Rush's in his desire for the means torture to disappear from the history of punishment. He hoped that they would be regarded as the marks of the barbarity that reflected the lack of influence from reason and religion over the human mind (Foucault, 1977, p.10). He believed that reason could change a long standing system of punishment. Modernity brought the supremacy of reason that was necessary and fundamental to bringing about this change. This is an issue that Foucault focuses on. Instead of harming the body as a form of punishment, the soul became the focus. The body was only harmed if it was a means to reach the soul through imprisonment, confinement, forced labour, penal servitude, prohibition from entering certain areas, deportation and such forms of punishment which replaced the old system. The body is instead "caught up in a system of constraints, privations, obligations and prohibitions." Instead of inflicting unbearable sensations on the body, the new form of punishment was based on an economy of suspended rights (1977, p.11).

If the punishment is no longer being applied to the body what was to be the object of punishment? Foucault answers this in the words of Mably-- "Punishment if I may put it so, should strike the soul rather than the body" (1977, p.16). Foucault grants that the punitive system as it developed was little to do with Mably's terms of the conversion of the soul, but nevertheless the principle of punishment striking the soul was felt throughout its system. In Foucault's thinking the soul is describes it as the "present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body." It is not an illusion or ideological effect but exists as a reality produced by the power functioning around the body of those being punished or supervised. He claims that the soul is born out of methods of punishment, supervision and restraint (1977, p.28). It "inhabits" man and "brings him into existence." It is the "effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body" (1977, p.30).

If punishment was to strike the soul, the question that now had to be dealt with was how the soul could carry the marks of discipline. The classical notions of punishment that used the body as a surface on which the marks of punishment were left as a warning to others gave way to a new system. In this field as in the others discussed, the idea of the spectacle had reigned, but the new visual regime of modernity brought changes to this idea. The body which once was a surface on which, "through the systems of retaliatory marks, inflicted on it in the name of the sovereign, the lessons of power were written for others to read", becomes "caught up with an inward looking web of power relations" (Dirks, Eley and Ortner 1994, p 124). It was these "inward looking webs of power" relations that helped constitute the new soul. While the body was no longer a surface to carry the marks of punishment, it still remained very important in the new regimes of power and control. It had already been identified during the classical age as an "object and target of power". Foucault points out that signs of attention being paid to the body are easy to find, the body being "manipulated, shaped, trained, which obeys,

responds, becomes skilful and increases its forces" (Foucault, 1977, p.39). In classical times there were attempts to make the body docile so power could be exerted over it. Why then is Foucault so concerned about the 'docile body' of modernity? His concern is the new matters concerning the body that emerge with modernism. One is the scale of the control that could be exerted over bodies. Previously they had been treated 'en masse'. Now they were to be treated "retail" or "individually." Next the subtle coercion that was exercised upon the body at the level of the mechanism itself- movements, gestures, attitudes and rapidity. His next concern is the new object of the control, and here is reflected the changing patterns of language. The old transparency of classical language has gone so what was signified was no longer important. Previously behaviour and language were the objects of control. They were now ignored and instead the new emphasis was put on constraint that bears on the forces rather than on the signs. The final change in the scale of control that he notes is in terms of modality, "an uninterrupted, constant coercion," supervising the "process of the activity rather than its result," and is "exercised according to a codification that partitions, as closely as possible, time, space and movement" (1977, p.136-7).

Foucault describes this new concentrated control the "art of the human body" in that it was "not directed only at the growth of its skills, nor at the intensification of its subjection, but at the formation of a relation that in the mechanism itself making it more useful... the human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it breaks it down and rearranges it" (1977, p.138). The discipline that Foucault describes works not literally on the body but on its forces. It "increases the forces in (economical terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience)" (1977, p.138). Foucault describes how the classical age accelerated the obsession with minute details until it reached the stage that by the means of rigorous discipline man wished to "embrace the whole of this vast machine without the slightest detail escaping his attention" (1977, p.141).

The rigorous analysis of everything that the new 'Age of Reason' brought with it is reflected in the clinical gaze and this clinical gaze was reflected the prison system which relied on a clinical knowledge about convicts (1977, p.249). This brought to the penal system a new method of judgement. "Under the cover of the relative stability of the law, a mass of subtle and rapid changes....occurred" (1977, p.17). While there were some changes between what was permitted and what was forbidden with the progression from torture to imprisonment a certain constancy remained. The main changes took place in that

"judgement is also passed on the passions, instincts, anomalies, infirmities, maladjustment's, effects of environment or heredity; acts of aggression are punished, so also, through them, is aggressivity; rape, but at the same time perversions; Murders, but also drives and desires....It is these shadows lurking behind the case itself that are judged and punished" (1977, p.17).

Foucault's argument is that these introduce to the verdict something beyond circumstantial evidence, something that is not "codifiable." It is rather the knowledge of the criminal, one's estimation of him, what is known about the relations between him and his crime, and what might be expected of him in the future. Foucault suggests that "behind the pretext of explaining an action, are ways of defining an individual" (1977, p.18). The emphasis was put on the character of the criminal rather than on the crime itself and this was reflected in the punishment. Thus under the new penal systems the judges were not judging the crime but the soul of the individual (1977, p.19).

This new method of judgement was possible because of the way in which "a whole set of assessing, diagnostic, prognostic, normative judgements concerning the criminal have become lodged in the framework of penal judgement" (1977, p.22). The term that Foucault uses to describe this application of a new form of truth to the old penal mechanisms is the "scientifico-judicial complex."

This issue is taken up in an address Foucault made to the Law and Psychiatry symposium at York University in Toronto in which he deals with the integration and intervention of psychiatry into law in the early nineteenth century. He explains how the essential question in a modern tribunal is "Who are you?" Instead of just dealing with the crime there must be much more than admission to the crime. "There must be confession, self-examination, explanation of oneself, revelation of what one is" (Foucault, 1978, p.126). Before the early nineteenth century penal law operated on two terms, that of the offence and the penalty, but the new criminology operated on three; the crime, the criminal and the means of repression (1978, p.127). The additional of this character of the criminal, to the field of penal practice determined its course. Foucault believed that modern criminology's emphasis was laid so heavily upon the criminal rather than the crime that the crime seemed to be "no more than a shadow hovering about the criminal" (1978, p.128).

Foucault finds the combination of law and psychiatry an uneasy one. The reformers of the treatment of the insane like Pinel, who has already been mentioned, fought to separate the delinquents from the mentally ill in the detention centres and now this was being reversed in the "pathologification" of crime. Why were the psychiatrists so determined to fit themselves into this legal arena? Foucault does not see it as an imperialistic attempt, seeking out a new domain or as part of the "internal dynamics of medical knowledge attempting to rationalise the confused area where madness and crime mix" (Foucault, 1977, p.129).

It has already been discussed how, as modernism neared, there was an increased obsession with knowledge even of minute details, but Foucault does not see the psychiatrists interest in crime as a field of knowledge for them to conquer but rather "a modality of power to be secured and justified." The motivation according to Foucault was not innocent interest. It was not the simple application of "a new medical rationality to mental or behavioural disorders" but rather it was the

functioning of a sort of public hygiene (1978, p.128). Again we can see power being exerted through knowledge, an idea linked to the idea of surveillance.

Before dealing specifically with the idea of surveillance as it is embodied in the panopticon, Foucault raises the issue of surveillance as it was imposed at the end of the seventeenth century in towns in France effected by the plague. It demonstrates the growing obsession with knowledge and documentation of acquired knowledge. Permission had to be sought if anyone was to leave their house, anyone to leave the street was condemned to death. "It is a segmented, frozen space. Each individual is fixed in his place. Inspection functions ceaselessly. The gaze is alert everywhere." Every person had to be accounted for and all facts, name, age, sex, deaths, illnesses, complaints and irregularities had to be observed (Foucault, 1977, p.195). All information had to be reported to a central authority who decided what course of action had to be taken. This constant centralisation of knowledge and information concerning the individual allowed control. "The relation of each individual to his disease and to his death passes through the representatives of power, the registration they make of it, the decisions they take on it" (Foucault, 1977, p.197). It is this form of discipline that creates individuals as objects.

In 1791 Jeremy Bentham wrote a treatise on a model prison which Jacques Alain Miller refers to as his "panoptic device" a "polyvalent apparatus of surveillance, the universal optical machine of human beings" (Jay, 1993, p.381). This figure brought together the ideas applied during the plague and transformed them into a centre with a surveillance system of shutters and windows ensuring that the prisoner could be seen but could not see and that he could be the object of information but never a subject in communication. There was the possibility of axial vision from above but never of lateral. Each prisoner was separated from his fellow inmates, "a collection of separated individuals" (Foucault, 1977, p.201). The rigorous

documentation that occurred during the plague was applied in the prison system. The examination of the prisoners as subjects and the documentation procedures correlating individual data with cumulative systems made "it possible to classify, to form categories, to determine averages, to fix norms" (1977, p.190). This individualisation of, in this case the prisoner, this production of the modern individual as object and instrument of power is, Foucault argues, the opening of an epistemological space wherein the social sciences emerged. It created the conditions for the emergence of the sciences of man (Owen, 1994, p.176). The connections Foucault make between the carceral system and the social sciences will be considered later.

The principles propounded in the idea of the panoptic device depended heavily on the distribution and control of the individual by spatial separation. The compact model of the disciplinary mechanism was based on the individual being positioned in a fixed space, within a closed space in which all events can be recorded. "An uninterrupted work of writing links the centre and the periphery, in which power is exerted" (Foucault, 1977, p.197). Mark Poster points out that since the increase of bureaucracy and its concentration of power in bureaucratic activity and the ability of the computer to store such a vast amount of information, spatial separation is no longer necessary. The ability to monitor behaviour has extended beyond the bounds of the institution to the general public. Disciplinary control and domination can reach right into the mundane details of life through the traces of behaviour in credit card activity, traffic tickets, telephone bills, loan applications, welfare files, fingerprints, income transactions, library records and so forth, breaking down the distinction between the public and the private (Poster, 1984, p.103).

The knowledge of the individual is accumulated by different bureaucratic bodies, providing a source of detailed information on the individual, which may be used by select authorities within the bureaucratic core.

If a sales assistant in a shop has reason to suspect the validity of a credit card, the shop has the right to phone the bank and get information of their details, and hold the credit card user until the police deal with the problem. If someone is using stolen cash as opposed to a stolen credit-card these procedures are not possible. The use of a credit card increases the likelihood of an individuals actions being traced.

Access to information spans between bodies such as police, courts, banks, hospitals, welfare departments and schools or colleges. The fact that the police have access to information concerning the individual is more easily accepted and commonly known than the fact that other bodies have this access to one anothers information. Creditors when dealing with loan applications have rights to access to information concerning the applicants credit history. Those who have a bad credit history are blacklisted and this blacklist is available to every credit company, eliminating the possibility of default.

When the use of increasing bureaucracy is considered in relation to the present health-care system, the ability to control individuals as a result of accumulated knowledge is evident. Much of this bureaucratic activity is carried out by nurses, who must record detailed information on the patients. The nurses activities in turn can be monitored by the information they have obtained concerning their patient. If the patient is to receive medical attention they must give certain information about themselves. An "unlimited work of writing" allows actions to be closely monitored.

As bureaucracy and technology increases so does the possibility of greater accumulation of knowledge of the individual, and the details of their daily life and actions, and thus the possibility of the extension of disciplinary power.

Individuals who once were limited in a small space and separated from others, in order for their behaviour to be monitored, can now be allowed to move outside the physical confines of an institution and among general society, with the use of electronic tabbing devices that allow their movement to be constantly monitored. The spatial separation within the institution becomes less important as technology allows traces of behaviour to be monitored from a distance.

The issue of normalisation has been raised in the attempts to rehabilitate both the insane and the criminal. Surveillance observes the deviations from what is considered to be normal behaviour with the view to transformation. The electronic age also offers new possibilities for normalisation. Mark Poster believes that electronic communications media rely on criterion that allow the constitution of a 'normal' individual as their audience. This assumption is based on the fact that media information systems are largely constituted by one-way communication, constructed by specific institutions such as the television industry, the political and legal institutions who act as regulatory bodies and also the critical institutions like the journalists and the critics. None of these categories include the audience as a group, rather the voices are spoken on behalf of the audience. If what is to be presented is to be generally acceptable it must be based on an assumed general receiver who does not possess too many individualised traits, a "fictionalised norm of a person" (Poster, 1984, p.102). This fictionalised norm is created to serve the purposes of the imagining institution. Similarly, if the receivers are to comprehend the intended message, they must transform themselves to a certain extent into the assumed norm. While Poster leaves some space for the possibility of resisting these norms he believes that "inevitably one will gradually accept the norms displayed on the screen and come to accept them as real norms" (1984, p.102). This is another extension of surveillance. "The receiver's self-transformation is a kind of surveillance practised continuously in advanced industrial society (1984, p.102). John Hartley sees the television audience as the largest community that has

never won adequate means of self-representation because it exists within the imagined rhetoric of the broadcasters, the politicians and the critics. The television audience becomes, in Edward Said's terms, the "other" of powerful, imperial discourses (Hartley, 1992, p.105).

One of the strengths of the panoptic architectural figure in relation to power-distribution was the prevention of the prisoners' knowledge of whether they were being watched or not rendering its effects permanent even if the action of looking was discontinuous. The actual exercise of looking became unnecessary as the prisoners, not knowing whether they were being watched or not had to behave as if they were being watched so they became the bearers of the power. "This architectural apparatus should be a machine for sustaining a power relationship independent of the person who operates it" (Foucault, 1977, p205).

The central effect of this panoptic machine is that it "autonomises and disindividualises power (1977, p.202). Power is no longer invested in a person but rather in the "distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights and gazes" (1977, p.202). Anyone can observe as long as they remain anonymous and the more numerous those anonymous and temporary observers are, the greater the risk of the inmate being surprised and the greater his anxious awareness of being observed and so he learns to discipline himself.

"It was to the ever growing influence of the state, to its ever more profound intervention in all the details and all the relations of social life, that served the task of increasing and perfecting its guarantees, that by using and directing that great aim the building and distribution of buildings intended to observe a great multitude of men at the same time" (Foucault, 1977, p202).

Julius saw this technical program as the fulfilment of historical process.

"Our society is not one of spectacle but one of surveillance, under the surface of images one invests bodies in depth; behind the great abstraction of exchange there continues concrete training of useful forces; the circuits of communication are the supports of an accumulation and a centralisation of knowledge" (1977, p.217).

Developing technology has brought this idea of surveillance to new levels of effectiveness and broadened its use to everyday life. The fear of constantly being watched increases as technology heightens the effectiveness of surveillance and broadens its sphere to many mundane activities of life, like leisure activities, walking down the street, shopping, driving a car, with the use of video surveillance. As in the architectural panopticon it is not always necessary for actual observation to be taking place. It is enough if people think they might be being watched. A sign informing that video surveillance is in operation may suffice. If cameras are in operation it is not always necessary for some one to be observing what is recorded. As long as people think they might be being observed, they will behave as if they are. This also relates to the electronic tagging devices that have been described in relation the distribution of individuals in space.

The outworking of the individualisation and normalisation that the carceral system stands for have far reaching effects, especially as technology increases. The modes that Foucault outlines, within the carceral system, that allow individualisation and normalisation to take place, he then applies to society. Increasing technology means that these modes need to be re-examined as is revealed in the discussion on how spatial separation of individuals is less necessary for domination to be effective as technology increases and information becomes more easily centralised. The issues of individualisation and normalisation show the extent to which power can be exerted over an individual.

Chapter Four

Foucault's Methodology and the Problems of Resistance

If all of Foucault arguments about domination and his criticism of it does not proceed to offer another alternative or an effective method to resist power, his work is little more than mental exercise and an interesting read. His work very successfully uncovers the operations of power in institutional discourses and disciplinary practices, but does it offer any more than this? If he argues that the construction of the subject is based on subjection, how can this subjection be resisted?

Foucault's methods of analysis developed substantially within the period between the writing of 'Madness and Civilisation', 'The Birth of the Clinic' and the later text 'Discipline and Punish'. The two earlier texts belong to his earlier "archaeology" period in which he tries to see past periods through their own eyes. His "archaeological version of scientific history is a fascinating recovery of all the discards and failures and forgotten areas of human thought" (Harland, 1987, p.101). Within this form of history he argued that man was imprisoned in the epistemic framework within which he lived. If his identity was created by the surrounding discourse, the only way change could be effected would be if he could contribute something revolutionary to the discourse, but it would be impossible to contribute anything original to the discourse if it had been the discourse that had shaped the individual thoughts. If the discourses are wholly determining no place is left for autonomous political action. Foucault stressed the continuity and regularity of the discourses of different regimes but how can we account for the mutation from one epoch to another? Foucault acknowledged the short comings of this method and being strongly influenced by Nietzsche began to work within a genealogical framework. 'Discipline and Punish' belongs to this new period of writing. His genealogy does not totally counter his archaeology but

“extend[s] into new areas of discourse the campaign against science and humanism” (Harland, 1987, p.155). Foucault sees genealogies as anti-sciences, a “form of history that accounts for the constitution of knowledges, [savoirs], discourses, domains of objects, etc., without having to refer to a subject” (1987, p.155). The main difference Harland identifies between archaeology and the genealogy is the latter’s emphasis upon power rather than upon knowledge and upon practices rather than language (1987, p.155). His new emphasis shifts away from the notion of epistemic frameworks existing in an idea towards materialism, relating power directly to bodies. He is attempting to show how the relations of power are able to pass materially into the very density of bodies without even having to be relayed through the representation of subjects (1987, p.156).

Serious problems arise concerning Foucault’s genealogical history when his consistency is considered. He seems at times to be falling into the traps that he so vehemently criticises. Habermas argues that genealogical history shares the same fate as that of the social sciences. He claims that it retreats into a “reflectionless objectivity of a non-participatory, ascetic description of kaleidoscopically changing practices of power” (Habermas The genealogical historiography turns out to be a “presentistic, relativistic, cryptonormative, illusionary science.” This is exactly the basis Foucault takes for his criticism of the social sciences. The social sciences, according to Foucault “submit to the ironic movement of scientistic self- mastery and end up in an unsalutary objectivism.” Genealogical history like wise, according to Habermas has an ironic fate, in that “it follows the movement of a radically historicist extinction of the subject and ends up in an unholy subjectivism ” (Habermas, 1984, p.270). Foucault says that we have to “promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of subjectivity that has been imposed on us for years ” (Foucault, 1987, p.160). Tim Stringer in a paper attempting to find a basis for a new democratic subject encourages adherence to Foucault’s proposal of the reassertion of subjected forms subjectivity and getting rid of the constitutive

subject in order that we can reconstitute ourselves as democratic subjects. Stringer, not surprisingly, does not proceed to explain exactly how this takes place, or whose advice can be taken about the form of this reconstitution of self. (Stringer, 1988, p.9) In suggesting and promoting new forms of subjectivity is Foucault not doing the same as the social sciences did in its hegemony over the object? It seems that criticisms he applies to the social sciences are not far from the criticisms that can be applied to his own theories. Further inconsistencies become apparent by the manner in which he correlates the carceral system to the social sciences.

Foucault asserts that the social sciences called for a technique overlapping subjection and objectification and argues that the

“carceral network constituted one of the armatures of this power-knowledge that made the human sciences historically possible. Knowable man (soul, individuality, consciousness, conduct, whatever its called) is the object effect this analytical investment, of this domination observation” (Foucault, 1977, p.305).

He claims that the introduction of the soul of the criminal into criminological discourse part of the humanistic strategy on which “domains of analysis (e.g., subjectivity, personality, consciousness), techniques and discourses (e.g. Psychopathology, psychoanalysis), and the moral claims of humanism” (Sawicki, 1994, p.40), could be built. This is quite a leap that he takes here. It is evident that the carceral system and the human sciences have this subjection and objectification in common but how one activates the other is not quite so clear. Donnelly argues that this connection works by analogy only as Foucault fails to explain how the diffusion takes place between the two. While Foucault believes that it is unsurprising that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons (Foucault, 1977, p.134). He provides a genealogy of the emergence and constitution of the social sciences and its objects, shows how the disciplinary effects of the technology of power can be obtained through the

application of the knowledge of the human sciences to therapies and social technologies but he does not explain how 'the birth of the prison' effects the present forms of discipline, how these technologies of power are diffused from one to the other (Habermas, 1984, p.272). Donnelly suggests that Foucault is coming ironically close to the perils of the argument of origins-- "as if to understand an object, one need discover the its pristine origins, and hence the key to or germ of its subsequent development" (Donnelly, 1994, p.337-8). Is this not the fallacy that the genealogical history is attempting to avoid?

There also seems to be a problem with the fact that Foucault denies that there there being any class of human agents shaping the disciplinary code. "If the answer comes back, it is the general diagram which programs or informs specific practices, here, there, and everywhere else, that simply transfers the problem without resolving it" (Donnelly, 1994, p.337-8). Foucault has brought us no further than the archaeological discussions had brought us. So if Foucault's theories of discipline and power have gaps in their connection to practice can we hope for anything better from his theories of resistance?

Foucault cites several points that constitute effective resistance. He believes that for resistance to be effective it must be transversal and not to be aimed at the institutions of power but rather at the effects of power. It must be immediate, not against the chief enemy but against the immediate enemy. Resistance should be concerned with the status of the individual, asserting the right to be different and resisting the separation of individuals and the tying of individuals to their identity. It is also in opposition to privileges of knowledge. To summarise these points he gathers them all around the question, "Who are we?" Resistance is a refusal of these abstractions, of economical and ideological state violence which ignore who we are individually and also a refusal of scientific and administrative inquisition that determines who one is" (Foucault, 1982, p.211-12). In one sense Foucault seems



to be quite clear and concise in his description of resistance but a lack of clarity becomes apparent when it comes to knowing what the object of resistance should be. He states that the main objective of these struggles is to attack not so much an institution of power but rather a technique or a form of power. So it is not a frontal attack against the state or capital but rather a "series of guerrilla skirmishes in prisons, factories, schools or universities, wherever the nakedness of power reveals itself beneath the cloak of humanism" (Bove, 1994, p.322). It seems that resistance takes place very much in the arena of ideological concepts. If modernity's technologies of power are as subtle as Foucault suggests, to the extent that the individual is unable to recognise the fact that he is being disciplined, (since discipline has moved its emphasis from the body to the soul, rendering the body docile), how does he recognise the forms of power that he should resist, unless he is told?

Does Foucault then believe that the intellectual has an important role to play in the definition of fields for resistance? He does insist that the intellectuals should indeed initiate localised counter-responses, skirmishes, active and preventative defences. If Foucault encourages the intellectual to initiate these resistances or if he attempts to initiate these resistances himself, is he not himself producing more knowledge that could be used to dominate? Does it not extend the range of science, allowing greater areas of life to fall under the control of knowledge? Foucault says that it is not the role of the intellectual to 'enlighten' the oppressed and that to assume the role of 'representative' is itself hegemonic, providing leadership and hence merely extending power and thus revaluing the subject. Yet he says that every intellectual must engage in a regional confrontation with power and resist its mechanisms. He claims that in doing so they "indirectly join forces with others-- workers, women, gays,-- who are struggling in their own areas" (1994, p.326) He does not seem to have any suggestion as to how the knowledge of the intellectuals can

diffuse into practice without passing through the structures of hegemonic power based on knowledge (1994, p.326).

Bove argues that there is some hope for the liberation of intellectuals from the discourses of power, but he has some serious reservations concerning this. He believes that it is impossible to know if Foucault's genealogical studies have not and cannot be opted as a disciplines for reproducing a discourse of power. He says that if it is impossible to know whether this is the case in genealogy, as he suggests, then it cannot be accepted as a locally useful weapon in the skirmishing of the oppressed against power. He understands the main threat to genealogy as being that while it differs in some ways from the social disciplines that Foucault criticises, it is still within the "academic industry of scholarship" and therefore there is the possibility that will be used as a "reserve of knowledge to be tapped for information, metaphors or authority" thus making it an extension of disciplinary power (Bove, 1994, p.326).

Conclusion

Many of the problems of modernity that Foucault has discussed in relation to domination have been seen in the preceding chapters, in the objectification, individualisation and normalisation found in modernity. While several problems arise in his theories about domination, most of his criticisms of modernity's possibilities for domination can be understood, especially as they are applied to more contemporary issues. For Foucault to claim that domination is inevitable in all relationships of modernity seems to be a generalised approach but the intensity of the new medical approach in its objectification certainly opens up the possibility of unlimited domination.

Foucault's idea that the terror, which he believes to be implicit in modernism, is necessarily a subtle terror has been contested, as the holocaust has been discussed. It certainly does seem to have its subtleties but increasing technology has undermined this to a certain extent. When the individual is placed on the same level as any other object, what is left to hold back the reign of terror? What experiments cannot be tried out on the body if it only has the status of an object. If the use of terror is a major component in the basis of his criticism, it would be hoped that the alternatives he offers provide freedom from this terror. His theories of resistance seem to suggest otherwise.

The main questions surrounding Foucault's work, relate to his theories of resistance, as to whether he can provide a better alternative to the forms of domination that he criticises in modernity. In his thinking there are possibilities for the usurpation of power, to a certain extent, but this then leads to the repression of others. Foucault is in no position to suggest who should dominate, or to suggest any constraints upon resistance. Many of the characteristics of modernity that he criticises raise their heads, with different masks, in his own theories. The terror

that exists in modernism is the result of webs of power, often linked to institutions but also affecting details of private life as individuals police one another, and even police themselves. Sometimes the terror of modernities discipline is subtle, in other cases it is horrifically explicit. In Foucault's work terror operates on a different level than modernities. The individual is encouraged to resist forms of domination that objectify. His 'will to power' is unrestrained by any moral or ethical guide lines, so there is the possibility of masses of individuals and groups who feel repressed struggling against one another without the possibility of an equilibrium being established, without moral or ethical restraints.

In reducing every relationship to a power relationship, resistance to domination must merely become the movement of power from one position to another. It seems that equality in power relationships is impossible, making domination inevitable so resistance is just about moving power into the arena of the once oppressed. Once the oppressed have transformed webs of power by resisting, is this new structure of power to be resisted by the new victims of oppression? If all is reduced to power relationships without universal principles, domination becomes a matter of who is strongest rather than what is right. We are left with a question as to who should hold most power. Perhaps Foucault would join with Fish in saying that "someone is going to be restricted next, and it is your job to make sure that that someone is not you" (Veith, 1994, p.163). The resistance Foucault suggests makes domination arbitrary, based entirely on ones own wishes notions and will, without any restrains. It would be impossible for Foucault to remain consistent to his theories which deny any type of universalism, if he were to suggest any restraints to those resisting power. The ethics of desire amounts to the will (what I choose) to power (what I want) on both the political and the individual level, and results in ruthless power struggles. (Veith, 1994, p.198). Is this not the basis of terrorism, and possible totalitarianism, which Foucault has so vehemently criticised?

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