T1541

National College of Art and Design

Fine Art: Painting

On Explanations of Subjectivity by Peter FitzGerald

Submitted to the

Faculty of History of Art and Design and Complementary Studies in Candidacy for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts

1995

11541 NC 0020793 4

Acknowledgements

Many thanks to Dr Sue McNab.



Table of Contents

| Introduction | 5 |
|---|----|
| Structure of the thesis | 6 |
| Caveat | 6 |
| | |
| Chapter 1: Societal explanations | 7 |
| Structuralism | 7 |
| Problems with (post)structuralist explanations | 8 |
| Learning | 9 |
| Simpler systems | 10 |
| Linguistic relativity | 10 |
| Physics, Biology, Logic | 10 |
| Conclusions | 12 |
| | |
| Chapter 2: Psychoanalysis | 13 |
| The Oedipus Complex and its variants | 13 |
| Attitudes to evidence I | 15 |
| Lacan and later | 16 |
| Attitudes to evidence II | 17 |
| Testability | 17 |
| Contradictions | 18 |
| Theory by assertion | 18 |
| Why do theorists use psychoanalysis? | 19 |
| | |
| Chapter 3: Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema | 21 |
| Tools | 22 |
| | |
| Chapter 4: Explanation | 24 |
| Psychoanalysis | 24 |
| 1. Freud | 24 |
| 2. Freud + structuralism | 25 |
| Structuralism | 25 |

| Chapter 5: Theorizing about Consciousness | 28 |
|---|----|
| Dennett's theory of consciousness | 28 |
| Where is consciousness? | 29 |
| Problems | 30 |
| Billions of neurons | 30 |
| Zombies | 30 |
| Inaccessibility | 31 |
| Motivation | 31 |
| Qualia | 32 |
| Différance | 32 |
| Conclusions | 33 |
| Chapter 6: Beyond mechanism? | 34 |
| Gödel | 34 |
| Self-reference | 35 |
| Schrödinger's cat | 36 |
| On the leading edge | 37 |
| | |
| Conclusion | 39 |
| Bibliography | 41 |

Introduction

This thesis is about explanation. More specifically, it deals with existing explanations of subjectivity and why they may be faulty, misleading or wrong. It also suggests some ways forward.

The topic of the thesis is therefore, in part, the 'view from the inside'. If I want to make a work of art, I gather the necessary materials and begin. I have the impression of creating an image in accordance with certain ideas I would like to express. The work finished, I attribute the result, good or bad, to myself, to my wishes, thoughts, abilities and inabilities.

Apparently, I could be fooling myself. Two main schools of thought dominate theorizing about cultural production. Both suggest that the work does not stem from any 'I' as I conceive it — as I conceive myself to myself. The first school emphasizes society; the school's manifestations within the area of culture usually have heavy structuralist leanings. The second school is psychoanalytic. Both schools, alone or in their many intertwinings, deny the commonsense conception of an 'I' as an originator of artworks. It is with the alternative explanations these schools offer that this thesis takes issue.

Because the emphasis here will be upon the self as originator of artworks, the bias will tend towards the cognitive rather than, for example, the motivational. This will be the context in which Dennett's theory of consciousness is discussed. This theory is introduced to suggest how the vacuum left by the inadequacies of structuralist and psychoanalytic explanations might be filled — or rather how the problem might be approached, for Dennett's theory is little more than a skeleton, a pointer to how we should perhaps begin to reconceptualize subjectivity.

Ultimately, it seems, everything interconnects. If that is the case, then the starting point for explaining why we do what we do could be anywhere, but some beginnings are likely to prove far more efficient than others. The usual starting points — societal demands or half-hidden motives — are pitted here against consciousness. It might seem that no starting point could claim priority. However, a brief excursion into mathematical logic and theoretical physics towards the end of the thesis suggests that this assumption may be wrong. Consciousness may prove to be the favoured point of departure for explanations of subjectivity.

5

the substance of the second state of the second second

Structure of the thesis

Chapter 1 begins at the societal level, discussing mainly those explanatory systems to which the terms 'ideology' and 'structuralist' apply. The focus moves to the psyche in Chapter 2; it deals primarily with psychoanalysis. Chapter 3 is a 'case study' of one now-famous article in the psychoanalytic tradition, Mulvey's (1975) *Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema*.

To this stage I will have been arguing against much of what passes for explanation. Chapter 4 draws the arguments together. The following chapter describes Dennett's theory of consciousness. This is in order to show, first, how a relevant and acceptable explanatory system might be constructed, and second, that the locus of explanation can safely be moved away from society and ideology, and 'back' towards subjectivity. Chapter 6 tackles a few topics which suggest that any mechanistic theory of consciousness — such as Dennett's — may misrepresent and underestimate our ability to create.

Caveat

Explanation is a very large theme. The whole history of philosophy could be said to be about explanation, about how to understand the world and our place in it. Philosophy has produced no universal answers. It seems that the more fundamental the problem, the more intractable it becomes: there seems little hope of ever finding absolute explanations. Of necessity, therefore, the sights will be aimed a great deal lower here, in the belief that we *are* capable of recognizing explanations that take us nowhere.

Answers should attempt to satisfy not just the explicit question but also a second, implicit one: *Why should I believe what you are telling me?* Employing this second question, there is some hope of finding good explanations, or at least of identifying bad ones.

and the second second

Chapter 1: Societal explanations

Why do we do what we do? The explanations normally offered can be positioned within a space defined by two continua. The first ranges from *society* to *individual*, the second from *visible forces* to *invisible* ones.

Governing both societal and individual behaviour are such highly visible forces as constitute expressions of state power, as well as less obvious ones such as those which (may) control the media. Hall's (1982) overview of this theoretical field emphasizes the formative role of dominant ideologies. These may determine the content and signifying practices of the media. The media shape consensus which acts upon the individual and society, producing beliefs which echo and recycle the dominant ideologies.

From the point of view of subjectivity, what is most relevant is the link between the more and the less visible forms of ideology. Nochlin (1988, p. 2) claims that "...one of the most important functions of ideology is to veil the overt power relations obtaining in society at a particular moment in history by making them appear to be part of the natural, eternal order of things". For example, the role of women within art, objectively inferior through discrimination, can also come to seem naturally inferior through the workings of invisible ideologies. These, and the way in which they may form our minds, are the realm of the structuralists and poststructuralists.

Structuralism

According to Lyas (1992, p. 403), "Structuralism is the view that meaning is given to words and social actions by the structures of meaning that exist independently of the will or whim of individual speakers". Structuralism might be said to be based on three main ideas or 'findings': (1) the distinctions a language makes affect the distinctions we can perceive (for example, colours, types of snow); (2) words have no meaning in isolation, because meaning relies on the differences amongst their referents; and (3) common structures can be found to underlie different 'surface' expressions in different cultures (for example, in stories in different languages).

(a) Alter and a construction of the Paralage and the pairs of the pairs of the second second second second b at the construction of the construction of the construction of the second s second sec

and the second second

Particularly in its later developments — for example, Foucault, Baudrillard, Derrida — these structuralist (or poststructuralist) notions offer the possibility of a closed system. We can only perceive based upon the differences encoded within our cultural system (language primarily). The relationship with what is not so encoded, 'external reality', thus becomes very problematic. Derrida perhaps represents the most extreme form of such theorizing. His emphasis on slippage and deferral of meaning implies that loss of contact with the external and objective is to be coupled with an inability to pinpoint meaning internally, to have any stability of meaning.

In various forms, the structuralist analysis comes also to deny the meaning of subjectivity. For example, Barthes (1971, p. 944) claims an author's "life is no longer the origin of his fictions but a fiction contributing to his work". Foucault (1969, p. 927) places creative efforts within the context of transpersonal 'texts': "...it is a matter of depriving the subject (or its substitute) of its role as originator, and of analyzing the subject as a variable and complex function of discourse". The form our thoughts take and the medium in which they are expressed are products of social structures. We become nodes within the network of communicational flux that Baudrillard (1983) observes; we are transmission points for texts that live outside us. This amounts to an extreme loss of subjectivity; in essence, your thoughts are not your own.

(Post)structuralism thus calls into question any sense of 'I' juxtaposed to an external reality. A corollary is found in Lyotard's (1979) declaration of the end of 'metanarratives'. If the world *as we experience it* is a construction, not an objectively knowable 'reality', then no description we offer ourselves can be viewed without suspicion. The modernist belief in rationalism and progress is unmasked as just a story which we chose to tell ourselves.

Problems with (post)structuralist explanations

In (post)structuralism, the idea of the artist as originator of a work disappears. This is a depressing thought for artists, but it is an idea which is also surrounded by logical problems. These difficulties are of two main sorts. There is the loss of the ability to mean, a topic to which I will return in Chapter 4. It is the (post)structuralist notion of a cocooning from reality which needs to be tackled first. which the state work with the many charge and the state of the state o

This idea causes the greatest confusion for understanding of subjectivity when it is combined, as it very often is, with psychoanalysis (a point to be discussed further in Chapter 2).

Learning

There is an initial difficulty presented by the reading of most (post)structuralist texts. We are faced with the problem of determining the extent to which the writer believes that the socially defined constructs and structures that govern thought *are* our reality. This is perhaps the core dilemma of the structuralist position. At one end of a continuum, there is what often appears a totally hermetic view — all reality is a construction. At the other end there is a sort of empirical structuralism, for example in the researches of Piaget or, according to Hodge and Kress (1988), in Peirce's semiotics.

A mildly hermetic position poses no real problems. In fact, it could be said to be orthodoxy in the natural sciences, including psychological research (particularly since Broadbent, 1958, and Neisser, 1967). It amounts to saying that our perceptual processes are influenced by our conceptual ones, and vice versa.

A hermetic structuralist position, in contrast, is in serious difficulty. Consider first the idea of a conceptual system somehow floating 'above' a perceptual one. *If* there is a 'higher level' at which we deal with the world in terms of learned differences, and *if* there is a world out there to deal with, then there must also be a 'lower level' which translates between outside inputs — raw sensory data, in other words — and the higher level.

Could such a system function? There is the problem of acquiring the necessary distinctions. Unless the learner is to pass immediately from seeing nothing to seeing the 'correct' distinctions (different types of snow, for example), there must be a learning stage at which intermediate levels of differentiation are available. But when does learning stop? We deal all the time with novelty, even within acquired categories: it seems wrong, for instance, to claim that we only see a generic tree, rather than an individual one, especially when it is a tree we have never seen before. Moreover, we seem able to deal with the peculiarities of that one tree to any level of detail that our perceptual apparatus will allow.

A cognitive system which reacted only to concepts would be incapable of functioning in human fashion. It could not deal with the individuality of different objects. It would have the greatest difficulty coping with a novel object it had not yet learnt to categorize.

Simpler systems

Truly hermetic structuralism presents a different problem, and to deal with it another tack may be taken. Empiricism, it might seem, is the antithesis of such structuralism, but this is to miss the point: it could be claimed that evidence gathered by the 'empiricist' amounts to no more than bits of our hermetic world-story. Data, which the empiricist might think of as coming from 'outside' can be accommodated by the hermeticist as in fact products from within the system. Thus it seems that we can adopt an empirical stance and 'pretend' to look at the mind/world interface in an empirical fashion.

The question then arises: *if reality is just a story, then why is it trying to tell us it is not a story?* In other words, why do data exist which seem to make structuralist ideas untenable? There are at least three areas where doubts should arise.

Linguistic relativity

Before the development of hermetic forms of structuralism, data were permitted. The strongest data were thought to come from anthropology, where it was claimed, for example, that what colours you could discriminate depended upon the culture in which you grew up (see Hunt and Agnoli, 1991). Reviewing much available evidence, Gumperz and Levinson (1991) conclude that any strong form of linguistic determinism of culture-specific cognitive processes "no longer seems tenable" (p. 615). A blow to structuralism? No, in fact, for it must be that what is not culture-specific is universal, and structuralism has no argument with universals. It turns out, therefore, that structuralism is not open to refutation through a reassessment of the data on which it was, in part, founded.

Physics, Biology, Logic

Any empirical result in the linguistic-relativity debate would probably have suited structuralism. This lack of potential refutability is liable, of course, to be more

worrying to structuralism's opponents than to its adherents. Perhaps we *are* cocooned within a 'reality' of our own conception? We know that this is not the case, and 'know' here is used in a sense that even structuralist should agree with. To take an example, if I want to find out if it will rain tomorrow, I can listen to the weather forecast. Or I can toss a coin. The fact is, of course, that weather forecasts are more reliable than coin-tosses. Moreover, this is a 'fact' whether we conceive of our reality as internal to a conceptualized world-system or part of a world external to our conceptualizing. In other words, *there is a way that things are*. It follows that some theories of how things are will be better than others, and that some data will be more relevant than other data. (I consider this result to be fundamental to future arguments and will refer to it in future as the *forecasting finding*.)

The above line of analysis has a specific purpose. It is included to demonstrate what we of course know anyway: all theories are not equally good. Perhaps this assertion seems too anodyne to be worthwhile. However, the further conclusion, that theories must be judged according to evidence, often seems anathema to the poststructuralist ethos.

With this in mind, some data should perhaps be mentioned here, with the purpose of demonstrating that physics, biology and logic impose some massive constraints on how things are. In humans, for example, much of our behaviour suggests roots in biology rather than in concept. We cannot fly unassisted, for instance, having no wings. At the simplest cognitive level there is, for example, the orienting response to novel stimuli and there is depth perception in babies. At a slightly higher level, there may be the effects of colour on mood or of vertical symmetry on alertness. At even higher levels our ideas of beauty may still owe more to biology than to culture, and even our sense of pictorial composition seems inescapably bound to biology (because left- and right-handers have a different sense of good composition: Levy, 1976).

At a different extreme, there is the odd position that discourse may in fact have produced its own absolutes. The notion of the perfect circle would be one such. If physics and biology constitute one form of anchoring to data, the existence of such absolutes suggests an unavoidable conceptual anchoring as well.

Conclusions

There is a way the world (including society) is. It yields evidence. Extrapolation from the *forecast finding* suggests that there must be better and worse explanations of how we behave. Specifically, not all of the myriad theories of subjectivity can be equally good. Evidence can often separate the good from the bad, just as satellite photos may help in formulating better and better theories of the weather.

It may seem idle to speculate on the merits and demerits of various forms of structuralism. As the following chapter will show, however, structuralism has combined with psychoanalysis to form very influential explanatory systems. The extent to which such systems aspire to being hermetic is crucial in assessing their adequacy as a means of understanding subjectivity. una bala di lafang ali dala dalarini penterbahan penterbahan penterbahan dalam dalam dalam dalam dalam dalam d ender falle dalam dalam tersepaten tendente penterbahan delam delam delam delam delam delam delam delam delam d enderse penterbahan delam delam delam filipitationa delam enderse penterbahan delam d enderse penterbahan delam d

Chapter 2: Psychoanalysis

As stated at the start of Chapter 1, explanations of subjectivity tend to range along a continuum from *society* to *individual*. At the individual end of the continuum, psychoanalytic explanatory systems of one form or another have had a high level of acceptance among those theorizing about art. Such is the extent of this acceptance that the impression could be gained that psychoanalysis is somehow 'true'.

Because it is so widely used, psychoanalysis must be analysed as a source of explanations within art theory. How and why do theorists come to adopt psychoanalytic ideas? The route may more or less be as follows. Suppose I want to understand some aspect of human behaviour — art production, for example — in terms of the thoughts and motivations of the behaver. If I am unwary, the most 'useful' sort of theory I could adopt is one that would seem to be handing me a set of rules which govern behaviour but which in fact allow me to explain in a do-it-yourself fashion. The powerful attraction of psychoanalysis derives from its being just such a system: DIY parading as truth. In fact, so many are the variations on psychoanalysis since Freud's time that the would-be theorist can engage in a sort of meta-DIY; the theorist can pick and choose amongst bits of theories as well as terms and ideas within those theories.

The Oedipus Complex and its variants

The Oedipus Complex and its resolution demonstrate the construction of a classical psychoanalytic explanatory system. Put baldly, the Oedipus Complex begins with the boy's discovery that girls have no penis, at a time when he is being punished for masturbating with his mother as the fantasized love-object. Suddenly he realizes that the threat of castration, a punishment promised by his parents should he continue to masturbate, is 'true'. To preserve his penis, he abandons his mother as love-object and identifies with his father. His perception of the girl as castrated means that the sight of a naked female will forever more reawaken his own castration anxieties.

Masson (1985) describes the historical origins of the Oedipus Complex. If his analysis is correct, Freud's motives were far from edifying: the 'seduction' of

(a) the contract of the plant is easily being a subscription of the plant of the

Considering with an above the set of the set of the the theory of the set of the seto

sine a training of an and a second second

nel Revenue de 1991. O prese carge of la revenue de la revenue de la conseque de la revenue de La constante de la revenue de la constante de children was shifted from the actual — child abuse — to fantasy in order to placate a Viennese establishment horrified by his initial suggestions. There is a wider sense in which Vienna was 'ready' for psychoanalysis. This was the era of Symbolism, the belief that we see only the surface of things, the time of the visions of artists such as Rops and Redon.

Freud's ideas found a wide public. Three qualities of his approach would have recommended themselves to his contemporary and later theorists. First, there is the quality of and sheer enthusiasm conveyed by his writing. Second, there was the source of his evidence: listening to people, patients mostly, and systematizing what they had said. In contrast, the scientific psychology of the time must have seemed very cold, as well as very limited. Third, the concepts Freud used — repression, sublimation, symbolic substitution, and so on — were infinitely combinable, allowing the theorist to explain à la carte.

The second reason, Freud's source of evidence, is important because of what it implied for other theorists: if Freud could do it, they could do it too. Within mainstream psychoanalysis a number of influential theories arose, including those of Jung, Adler, Horney, Reich. More interesting for art theory is the sort of revisionary feminist approach of which de Beauvoir (1949) is probably still the most influential paradigmatic example.

There was a lot in Freud for feminists to object to; for example, on penisenvy:

Her self-love is mortified by the comparison with the boy's far superior equipment (Freud, 1933, p. 160)

She has seen it and knows that she is without it and wants to have it. (Freud, 1905, p. 336)

The effect of penis-envy has a share, further, in the physical vanity of women, since they are bound to value their charms more highly as a late compensation for their original sexual inferiority. (Freud, 1933, p. 166)

A typical response is that of Chodorow (1978):

and the second a real of a second second

We must face up to the Freudian excesses. Freud was only sometimes describing how women develop in a patriarchal society. At other times, he was simply making unsupported assertions which should be taken as no more than that, or as statements about how women (and men) ought to be...Most have no clinical warrant; they are not grounded in clinical experience or interpretation nor, as in the case of penis envy...are they interpreted in ways that follow psychoanalytic methodological principles. Rather, they grow from unexamined patriarchal assumptions, from Freud's own blindnesses, contempt of women, and misogyny, from claims about biology which Freud was in no position to demonstrate from his own research, from a patriarchal value system and an evolutionary theory to rationalize these values. (p. 142)

Elsewhere Chodorow exemplifies the reaction of later psychoanalysts to earlier ones, namely revisionism to taste. She says, for example:

My account agrees that crucial features of gender personality emerge out of the oedipal crisis. However, the traditional psychoanalytic account is open to significant criticism... (p. 141).

...the Freudian edifice stands on shaky ground. The assumptions it begins with are questionable, and it ignores or defines away clinical evidence and reasoning which contradict it. (p. 157)

Attitudes to evidence I

Dependence on clinical data and free-association responses is a very dicey way to construct and justify a theory of behaviour. According to Grünbaum (1986), Freud was at times well aware of this problem and of the charges of wishful theorizing to which it laid him open. Far from finding a valid solution, he was more inclined to slip into rhetoric:

...one hears of analysts who boast that, though they have worked for dozens of years, they have never found a sign of the existence of a castration complex. We must bow our heads in recognition of the greatness of this achievement, even though it is only a negative one, a piece of virtuosity in the art of overlooking and mistaking. (Freud, 1905, p. 337, Footnote 2)

Certainly, there are logistical and ethical problems associated with the controlled gathering of data from clinical patients. However, the question which Freudian psychoanalysis, and psychoanalysis in general, seems incapable of dealing with is still that very simple one: *Why should I believe what you're telling me*?

Lacan and later

Perhaps because the patriarchal excesses of Freud's writings are too blatant, many theorists turn instead to Lacan. Much more importantly, this is also a change towards structuralism, as Rose (1984, p. 1103) notes: "Lacan's move then simply completes the circuit by linking Saussure back to Freud." The shift of the idea of the phallus from the physical to the symbolic level has a clear appeal as an apparent further move away from biological essentialism towards explanations in terms of societal forces. However, the shift from Freud to Lacan, and from a pseudoempirical theory to a structuralist one, is also a move away from evidence. The new attitude is well expressed by Kristeva (1980):

The archivistic, archaeological, and necrophilic methods on which the scientific imperative was founded - the building of arguments on the basis of empirical evidence, a systematizable given, and an observable object - in this case, language - are an embarrassment when applied to modern or contemporary phenomena. (pp. 960-961)

In other words, it seems, we are back to hermetic structuralism. Hermetic structuralism and evidence are not incompatible (the *forecast finding*) and it is too simple to say, as Foucault (1976, p. 974) does, that we "diminish" the human subject through science. It is the politics that surround science that often do harm.

To take Kristeva (1969, 1973, 1974) as an example of psychoanalysis + structuralism, she is very much concerned to restore subjectivity to theorizing about social behaviour, to conceptualize the subject as creative. However, her theory is part of her own metatheory of semiotics whose prime role is to theorize and then deny itself in a sort of eternal, hermetic Catch 22. There seems to be no possibility of progress in Kristeva's system — which begs the question of how the system could have arisen at all.

The psychoanalysis + structuralism combination can take us into an exotic explanatory universe where all sense of practicality seems to disappear. Take as an indicator this quote from Gardiner (1992):

On the Lacanian side, Elizabeth Grosz marvels that Chodorow does not understand that psychoanalysis is a "method of reading and interpreting (where questions of truth, bias, and verification are not relevant)." The human subject is the effect of discourse, not its cause, and people and psychoanalysis are both discursive constructions: psychoanalysis has no aim, procedures, or tasks other than those governed by language. (p. 441)

Attitudes to evidence II

The *forecast finding* (Chapter 2) is an argument in favour of evidence. With evidence, the question *Why should I believe what you are telling me?* becomes tractable. It has received a very unreassuring response in the case of psychoanalysis, for both logical and evidential reasons.

Testability

First of all, there is the problem of whether psychoanalysis is open to testing at all. Popper's (1934) thesis on falsifiability is probably the most widely adhered to opinion on how scientists should seek confirmation for their theoretical stances (see Gregory, 1987a). According to Popper, theories cannot be proved, only rejected. They must be formulated so as to produce hypotheses which can be tested. Failure to disprove a hypothesis derived from a theory strengthens our belief in that theory.

Popper (1974) argued that psychoanalysis is not a scientific theory: because it did "not exclude any physically possible human behaviour...*the theory [is] compatible with everything that could happen*" (p. 128, his italics). Unless there could exist (otherwise plausible) behaviour which could refute a given psychological theory, the theory is not scientific in Popper's terms. There are certainly some difficulties with his argument about falsification (see Gregory, 1987a; Harris, 1981). Grünbaum (1986) also rejects Popper's claim that psychoanalysis is unscientific in totality, saying that parts of psychoanalysis are indeed testable. He singles out Freud's linking of paranoia and homosexuality as an empirical claim (one that seems tin de la servicie de la servicie de la servicie de la servici de la servicie de la subucción entre de la conse La servicie de la servición de la servicie de la se La servicie de la servicie de la servicie de la servicio de la servicie de la servicie de la servicie de la serv

(4) and (1) and any point (1) instructs (1) and (1) instructs (1) ins

ATPACTOR : MARCH

to have received some empirical support, unlike the Oedipus Complex — see Fisher and Greenberg, 1977).

There is in fact a very simple (if controversial) test. Psychoanalysis is intended to cure mental disorders. If it does so more efficiently than methods that do not use psychoanalytic theory, then there must at least be something in the theory or in the skills of those who use it. There is no such evidence (Eysenck, 1986; Farrell, 1981).

Contradictions

Grünbaum (1986) adduces a considerable amount of evidence to suggest that central tenets of Freudian psychoanalysis are either mutually contradictory or are selfcontradicting within the corpus of Freud's writings. Freud argued that a cure could only be effected when the patient's insights tallied with the causes of the disorder. However, Freud also recognized that those who had been cured might relapse, and that spontaneous cures might occur without insight. In a well-known shift of position, Freud moved the locus of incest between female patient and father from the actual, in his earlier writings, to the imaginary in his later. This left in limbo the nature of the patients' supposedly crucial insights into the cause of their neuroses, since what was earlier correct and curative was later false and symptomatic.

Furthermore, a theory with symbolic substitution and repression at its heart can almost certainly produce any explanation for any behaviour. Amongst these explanations would necessarily be ones that were mutually contradictory, a sure sign of an inadequate system of logic. Anyone, for example, reading Freud's (1901) theory of dreams would have to agree that there is an infinite number of ways of arriving at a given manifest content, many of those ways incompatible with each other.

Theory by assertion

Unfortunately, there appears to be no neutral way of gathering evidence: the search for data is always motivated by a curiosity that stems from some world-view or other. Yet the *forecast finding* shows that some evidence is better than others. Predicting voter behaviour — an example involving human behaviour — is safer using opinion polls than by counting pebbles on a beach. Not all evidence is equally

the second of the

Est di qual producer producer producedo i dandro o nume occada da concernenti da concernenti da concernenti de concernenti da concernenti

are on an assessed Calor and State of the optical of a second state of a second of the second state of the second state of the second state of the second produce the second state of the second produce the second state of the State of the second state of the sec
good, and nor are all theories. Despite the many difficulties, answers to questions of the form *Why should I believe...?* can be attempted.

It is interesting, then, to take a look at the way in which psychoanalytic theory is formulated. Whether it be Lacan, Kristeva, de Beauvoir, Chodorow, or the many others, there is a remarkable similarity: it is theory construction by assertion, almost never by evidence. Theory construction does exist — see, for example, Shaffer (1985) — but the outcome is not psychoanalytic. It is extraordinary, in fact, that Freud comes across in many places as perhaps the least confident and most diffident of psychoanalytic thinkers.

I think this point, and the need for evidence as an antidote, is demonstrated well by the following quotes from Easthope's (1986) examination of *Dennis the Menace*:

Gnasher is a mongrel whose hair sticks up like his master's. He is all head and teeth, teeth which can function on occasion as a circular saw. Constantly hungry, he chases cats on sight. Clearly gnasher is the phallus, though a suitably boyish phallus. His appetitiveness is a genital form (chasing pussies) disguised as the oral (he eats anything). (pp. 30-31)

Denis's schemes are unrealistic because their hidden object is the mother. They contain an incestuous desire for an impossible world and that is why he is beaten for them. (p. 31)

Why do theorists use psychoanalysis?

Grünbaum (1986) offers his own version of an explanation for the persistence of psychoanalysis:

Proponents seem to want (a) to free the study of human ideation from the evidential burdens of the standard empirical sciences and (b) to draw an ontological boundary line between mental and other natural processes so as to strengthen the case for (a). Their motivation is likely to be religious, political, or the understandable desire to safeguard a lifetime professional investment in the practice of psychoanalytic treatment. (p. 220)

A number of different partial explanations exist therefore for psychoanalysis and its continued use. One may be its quasi-religious nature, demanding obedience and bestowing the aura of expertise on its practitioners. A second is its very equivocal attitude towards evidence. For those that need a scientific feel to their theories, it has often aspired to scientific status, although lacking a structure that would permit testing. For those who consider science an irrelevance or a travesty upon human nature, it can seal itself off within a world of language and concept.

A third reason must be feminism. Feminists are inclined to adopt one form or another of psychoanalysis in order to escape what they often perceive as the only alternative: biologically determined essentialism, which would bring with it the danger of justifying patriarchal attitudes. Doane (1981) talks, for example, of

...the inevitable alliance between "feminine essence" and the natural, the given, or precisely what is outside the range of political action and thus not amenable to change. This unchangeable "order of things" in relation to sexual difference is an exact formulation of patriarchy's strongest rationalization of itself...The body is always a function of discourse. (p. 219)

Doane (1991a, p. 8) claims that "psychoanalysis enhances the legibility of the ideological effects of Western culture's construction of femininity." But, as Gardner (1982) summarizes, there are many available theories of the development of sexuality. There is no reason to think that it is a straight choice between psychoanalysis and biology. Moreover, it is far from clear that either Freud or Lacan break the biology-sexuality link (Frosh, 1987; Wilson, 1986). The overwhelming impression offered by a reading even of feminist post-Freudian psychoanalysis is of a cult of the 'genius' of Freud and Lacan — a far cry from any liberation from patriarchy.

What use is psychoanalysis? It has only one that I can see: it allows the theorist to theorize by assertion rather than by evidence. The question *Why should I believe...*? receives no answer.

There is still a possible dodge: to use psychoanalysis 'as a tool'. This is what Mulvey (1975) claims to be doing in her seminal article on film and the gaze. Because of the importance of that paper it is the subject of the next chapter.

and an end of a second second a second base with a second with a second se

Chapter 3: Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema

Mulvey's (1975) article, *Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema*, is probably the most influential psychoanalytically based analysis of how the gaze operates in cinema. I would like to continue the analysis of psychoanalysis with a look at that paper.

Mulvey says (p. 62): "Traditionally, the woman displayed has functioned on two levels: as erotic object for the characters within the screen story, and as erotic object for the spectator within the auditorium." Men in film gaze at women on behalf of the spectator (p. 63).

To explain why such scopophilia should be pleasurable, Mulvey calls upon the Freudian notions of fetishism and voyeurism. Both mechanisms deal with the threat of castration that the sight of the naked female supposedly evokes in men. Voyeurism constitutes a fascination with and attempt to demystify the shock of her 'lack'. Fetishism is a substitution of objects or parts of the female body as sites of visual pleasure away from the traumatic genital zone. But Mulvey (1975) left open an important question: how is it that women enjoy cinema even though its gaze is male? Mulvey (1981) implicates a residue of pre-Oedipal 'masculinity' in women:

...Hollywood genre films structured around masculine pleasure, offering an identification with the *active* point of view, allow a woman spectator to rediscover that lost aspect of her sexual identity, the never fully repressed bed-rock of feminine neurosis. (p. 71, her italics)

Is there any particular reason why we should believe Mulvey's analysis of the gaze? Psychoanalysis is shaky ground on which to build any explanation. But there are more straightforward reasons for doubting her analysis. For example, there is no room within her explanation for women to derive pleasure from looking at men; this appears an unreasonable position. There seems also no possible explanation of fetishization amongst male homosexuals — they are after all interested in looking at men, not women. Yet photographs by Mapplethorpe, for example, are often very fetishistic.

and the first second present present and the second second second second second second second second second sec

and fine his and the second second second second and a second second second second second second second second

Surely there must be simpler explanations of the gaze. The work of writers such as Nochlin (1972, 1988) and Wolf (1990) suggests that power relations in society position women as to-be-looked-at. Attempts to position men as the object of the gaze run into a whole gamut of difficulties that seem power-related: men are not supposed to be passive, 'available' objects within a patriarchal system, but rather active seekers.

For our species to survive, we *must* have keen interest in sex. If, as seems reasonable, this interest generalizes from the body to things which remind us of the body — parts of the body and sex-related objects — this would correspond to what psychoanalysis labels fetishization. Combine this idea with the notion that power relations in society require the female to position herself as available to male regard. The 'male gaze' results. To suggest that castration anxiety and a host of other psychoanalytic terminology offers a better explanation seems to me to be wishful or blinkered thinking.

Tools

Mulvey's (1975) article highlights the extent to which the gaze in film — and in society in general — is male. That is a result which can be taken out of the context of her explanation in terms of fetishism. But it is interesting too to note the words in her opening paragraph (p. 57): "psychoanalytic theory is thus appropriated here as a political weapon, demonstrating the way unconscious of patriarchal society has structured film form." This sentence is unusual in its logic. For psychoanalysis to demonstrate anything, it would have to be capable of doing so. That of course would need to be established, which Mulvey does not do prior to this sentence; and because everything that follows is couched in psychoanalytic terms, the validity of psychoanalysis cannot be established subsequent to the sentence. The words *appropriated* and *weapon* possibly signify Mulvey's awareness of this logical weakness. They carry the suggestion that she can take psychoanalysis or leave it. If so, she vitiates her belief in the evidential status of the psychoanalytic explanation of fetishism, and the whole article therefore makes no claim to truth.

This is the sort of odd situation in which using a theory as a 'tool' can land a writer. Here is another example:

a state of the sound of the

If psychoanalysis is a tool that will unlock the meaning of dreams, it should also unlock that of films.

The psychoanalytic methodology is thus justified as an essential first step in the feminist project of understanding our socialization in patriarchy. (Kaplan, 1983, p. 12)

Again, the logic being used here is at the least very awkward.

Is a tool useful? It seems to me that a tool can only reveal something of substance to the extent that it is correct. Using a tool in fact implies another theory, one that is outside of the theory that is the tool, and to which the results of using the tool will be added. Where there is no theory outside the tool — as in Mulvey's article, despite her disclaimer — the tool is not a tool but part of the author's theory.

Since all theorizing involves tools, there is a real problem of knowing which tools are legitimate. The only solution, for those who believe in the possibility of explaining at all, would appear to lie in bootstrapping, iterative refinement, and in principles such as parsimony. Of course, if a tool can be rejected as unsound then the task of finding an explanation has at least avoided one possible pitfall.

A reading of some feminist writers — for example Gamman and Marshment (1988), Wilson (1986) and perhaps even Doane (1991b) — suggests disillusionment with the psychoanalytic path. There is a hint that psychoanalysis has delayed an understanding of what constructs the position of women within society. The success of Mulvey's article indicates, however, a willingness of the psychoanalytic, the film-theory and much of the feminist community to take on board the idea of the gaze as an expression of male dominance — but only when couched in psychoanalytic terms. It is worth noting that the central gaze idea, that "*men act* and *women appear*" was published by Berger (1972, p. 47, his italics) three years before Mulvey's article (Berger's *Ways of Seeing* was published in the U.S. in 1973). It was also expressed by Nochlin (1972). In fact, the debate is in some ways as old as the brazen stare of Manet's *Olympia* (see, for example, Clark, 1980; Kent, 1985a, 1985b; Lipton, 1992; Zola, 1867). So, far from being an advance, the way in which Mulvey's article drew debate down the psychoanalytic path may have been a costly mistake for feminism.

al provinsi analy to compare a subsective sin excellent chiercone active. The energy of the second Alternational second second subsective and subsective second second second second second second second second se

Chapter 4: Explanation

Both (post)structuralism and psychoanalysis imply a loss of ability to *mean*, for different reasons. In the former, meaning exists only through difference; there is an emptiness at the heart of any concept. Potential meaners too do not themselves mean what they express: they are transmission nodes within 'texts' that speak through the meaners. Nor do (post)structuralists allow us to *explain*, for the end of big stories, the death of metanarratives, disallows confidence in any explanatory system. Psychoanalysis then compounds our impotence by placing the driving force for our actions outside our conscious ken.

Structuralism and psychoanalysis could be regarded as self-contained entities, intriguing in themselves and amusing to play with. It is when they are applied in all seriousness that things often seem to go wrong. The way in which this happens follows a consistent pattern, namely that of tripping over their own premisses.

Psychoanalysis

Is psychoanalysis, when applied for example to film, intended to explain behaviour — why films are made a certain way, why the spectator enjoys certain types of scene, and so on? If the answer is not *yes* then we face an immediate contradiction: an explanation that is not intended to explain. If the answer is *yes* then there are two common situations:

1. Freud

Freud was an empiricist: he intended explaining behaviour, and he intended his explanations to be verifiable. It is unfortunate that, as a reading of Grünbaum (1986), Masson (1985), Popper (1974) or Farrell (1981) suggests, there are deep-seated problems which make Freudianism untenable.

It does seem that those who employ strict Freudian explanations must stand or fall by the same criteria as Freud's work. In other words, if I apply the notion of the Oedipus Complex, as Freud defined it, in order to explain a work of art, and the Oedipus Complex is nonsense, then my explanation, at least in those aspects which

a a server a la deservetes a di binadan ta , la quitta di sabeler ense din righta di se Bon dans servet fast Sarras anale socre an asservicedo divas par di sobele Lide Saspeda patiente a conservet fabres socres sint et tropono avec setto soca parto a sec

a function of the

rely on the Oedipus Complex, must also be nonsense. To use Freudianism 'as a tool' is no escape.

2. Freud + structuralism

This appears to be far and away the favourite explanatory system, for example in its various Lacanian embodiments. On the positive side, such a system incorporates two concepts which almost certainly must be true in some form: (1) that we cannot always be conscious of our motives, and (2) that our perceptions of the world are to a greater or lesser extent socially constructed. However, it is also an explanatory system that explains itself to a halt very quickly. What is it explaining? Behaviour? No: unless behaviour is conceived as 'text'. Text, then? Yes, but the explanatory system too is text. If all is text, there seems no way in which any particular explanation of behaviour can be privileged, can be better than any other, for any such assumption would be just more text. This would seem to be the nature, for example, of Kristeva's (1969) semiotics. Her championing of Freud and Lacan, in her 1973 article, must be illogical when paired with her 1969 insistence that semiotics, the theory of theories, must be self-denying.

Structuralism

The structuralist explanatory dilemma would seem to reach its epitome with the writings of Derrida and Spivak. In Derrida (1968), meaning is permanently on the point of vanishing: meaning is difference, difference is never present, always deferred, always a compromise, a suppression of parts of itself. For Spivak explanations are ideological, incomplete, repressive, marginalizing. In both Spivak and Derrida, the reader is confronted with the problem that they are trying to explain what they have declared to be inexplicable, which has as a logical corollary that their prose is often (deliberately?) unintelligible. With Spivak, there is the additional frustration that she employs explanatory systems — Marx, for example, or Lacan although not believing in explanation.

In a way, I suspect both Spivak and Derrida are not wholly wrong. They highlight the slipperiness of meaning and interpreting where their predecessors may have been content to believe their own explanations. However, it seems to me that

25

Spivak and Derrida have fallen victim to two different types of problem. Spivak has put a Derridean and Lacanian gloss on the sort of theorizing about ideology that grew out of the Frankfurt School. She has combined this approach with notions of the Other familiar since de Beauvoir (1949). It is her repeated insistence — for example in her 1979 article — that all explanations are ideological constructions that leads her to the unwarranted conclusion that the explanatory undertaking is fundamentally corrupt and hopeless (although apparently worthwhile or she would not engage in it).

To declare the impossibility of explanation is an act of faith, and it would be just as legitimate to have a belief in the objective and therefore the explicable. *Knowability* — knowing whether or not an explanation is correct — is a different matter, but one which does not seem to fit the parameters of Spivak's system.

Derrida's difficulty — or the difficulty with Derrida — is of another type. In his 1968 article he is bent on describing what he claims cannot be described. The attempt leads to constructions such as:

And it is this constitution of the present as a "primordial" and irreducibly nonsimple, and therefore, in the strict sense nonprimordial, synthesis of traces, retentions, and protentions (to reproduce here, analogically and provisionally, a phenomenological and transcendental language that will presently be revealed as inadequate) that I propose to call protowriting, prototrace, or différance. The latter (is)(both) spacing (and) temporalizing. (p. 422)

Trying to read Derrida — for example, of Grammatology (1967) — is extremely disheartening. The task has been undertaken (see Sim, 1992; Stam, Burgoyne & Flitterman-Lewis, 1993, pp. 23-26) and through them a few concepts can be gleaned from his texts. However, I would argue that the difficulty with Derrida reflects a difficulty which Derrida has created for himself. He tends to a level and type of description in which he is himself embedded ("we who inhabit a language and a system of thought": Derrida, 1968, p. 418). Self-embedded describing is an option based on a conviction, but we need not share that conviction.

Derrida's (1968) *différance* represents a sort of (post)structuralist Nirvana, a haven of apparently justifiable unintelligibility, a sort of relieved despair. In the following chapter I would like to describe a theory of consciousness. The purpose is

N

to show how a change in viewpoint or level of description may make the intractable manageable. As a by-product, it may make Derrida explicable.

计正确问题 医结合 化化合物 化合物 化合物 化合物 化合物 化合物 化合物 化合物 化合物

Chapter 5: Theorizing about Consciousness

It may seem strange to want to describe a theory of consciousness. We know that any such theory, unless mystical, is going to talk of consciousness as *caused*. No sooner is consciousness defined, therefore, than it vanishes into those processes of which it is the result. It would seem that subjectivity will prove just as evanescent, whatever the theory of consciousness, as it does under psychoanalysis or (post)structuralism.

There are three answers I can think of to this objection. First, if subjectivity, in particular our sense of agency, 'vanishes' even when theorized correctly on the basis of reliable evidence, then so be it. At least we would for once have a well-founded theory. Second, in a universe in which all may somehow be interconnected there is a pressing need for efficiency in explanatory systems. The next word I choose to write may in some sense be determined by *everything*, but to seek to explain my choice on the basis of everything may provide an excellent approximate reason for my choice, but it may also be vastly inefficient unless the correct subset of everything is selected. The selection had better be of the best variables and influences. Third, findings from physics suggest that consciousness may be necessary in explaining physical systems. The final chapter discusses this topic, which indicates that consciousness may in fact be the starting point to favour in any explanation of subjectivity.

What follows is a very quick outline of Dennett's (1991) theory of consciousness. The purpose is to give the flavour of how a theory of conscious can be expounded using a combination of logical reasoning and empiricism.

Dennett's theory of consciousness

The key to Dennett's (1991) theory of consciousness is process. It is an 'identist' theory, in that mind and brain are equated: our sense of awareness *is* brain processes.

The way in which our brain deals with information is dependent on two main types of influence: biology and culture. Biology determines that our eyes react to

(a) A second and a second construction of the second second construction of the second construction

An electronic of the character of public form

. The support standard is 17.855 statement of constructions and the second second second second second second s Advanced the support statement of the second seco provides

and the second second

light in a certain way, that neurons code sound as firing patterns, and so on. The ability of organisms to learn has accelerated biological evolution through the 'Baldwin effect': a learnable 'good trick' may quickly come to be favoured in the genotype. Dennett (1991, p. 193 ff.) suggests that one characteristic feature of consciousness, inner speech or talking to yourself, might be one such good trick.

Culture forms consciousness in a manner reminiscent of (post)structuralism. However, Dennett favours the notion of the *meme*, a term attributable to Dawkins (1976):

Examples of memes are tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, ways of making pots or of building arches. Just as genes propagate themselves in the gene pool by leaping from body to body via sperm or eggs, so memes propagate themselves in the meme pool by leaping from brain to brain via a process which, in the broad sense, can be called imitation. (Dawkins, 1976, p. 143)

Much of the appeal of memes in contrast to (post)structuralism, it seems to me, is memes' active nature. Our brains are parasitized by memes which then compete for expression with no necessary regard for the good of their host.

Competition is also the key notion in Dennett's model of *production*, of how we have conscious thoughts, or speak, or act, and so on. The model is of the 'pandemonium' variety: multiple subprocesses activated by the ongoing context compete or cooperate in the tussle to attain expression. What we are conscious of thinking or meaning is not prior to, but caused by these competing subprocesses.

Where is consciousness? A counterintuitive, but logically consistent aspect of Dennett's theory relates to 'where' consciousness occurs: it is not located anywhere. There is no point or time at which consciousness occurs, no stage or screen upon which our experience must appear in order to be felt as conscious. Consciousness *is* brain activity.

This idea of 'mechanical' interpretation in the brain is the central insight of *any* materialistic theory of the mind, but it challenges a deeply held intuition: our sense that for *real* understanding to occur, there has to be *someone in there* to validate the proceedings, to *witness* the events whose happening constitutes the understanding. (Dennett, 1991, p. 322)

A brain does not contain a witness; it is a witness.

Problems

The above is an extremely brief synopsis of Dennett (1991). Frankly, what he describes is not what consciousness *feels like*. It is difficult to know how much this problem matters. It could be argued that nothing feels like what it apparently is — a cup of tea feels like a cup of tea, not like a conglomeration of subatomic forces. Accessibility (see below) is also a key difficulty for consciousness and this must also contribute to the 'feel' problem.

However, there is also much resistance to mechanism. We do not see ourselves as automata. Consider the following as possible counter-arguments.

Billions of neurons

A common problem is the feeling that neurons cannot of themselves yield consciousness.

How *could* a complicated slew of electrochemical interactions between billions of neurons amount to conscious experience? And yet we readily imagine human beings to be conscious, even if we can't imagine *how* this could be. (Dennett, 1991, p. 433, his italics)

An answer of sorts, in the form of a question, can also be taken from Dennett (1991):

Well, what did you think it would seem like if [consciousness] were just a combination of electrochemical happenings in your brain?...Why shouldn't such combinations of electrochemical happenings in the brain have precisely the effects we set out to explain? (Dennett, 1991, p. 410, his italics)

Zombies

The bugbear in theorizing about consciousness is probably the zombie. It has two qualities which make it ideal for antimechanistic philosophers: it has no soul and

manager as the set of the set of the set of the set of the barrier of the set of the set of the set of the set

it refuses to die. Dennett takes the zombie idea to the point of absurdity in his reflections on 'zimbos' (unconscious, self-monitoring, reflexive zombies):

We can readily see that at the very least the zimbo would (unconsciously) believe that it was in various mental states - precisely the mental states it is in position to report about should we ask it questions. *It* would think it was conscious, even if it wasn't! Any entity that could pass the Turing test [i.e., fool a panel of experts into believing it could think like a human] would operate under the (mis?)apprehension that it was conscious. In other words, it would be the victim of an illusion. (Dennett, 1991, p. 311, his italics)

Inaccessibility

If Dennett's theory is correct, then consciousness is an emergent property of those many cooperating and competing processes which characterize the functioning of the mind and brain. A consequence predictable from such a model is inaccessibility: we will be able to report on only a limited amount of what goes on inside our heads. Why? Some processes are too fleeting to leave a reportable trace, others do not connect with processes responsible for generating reports, others lose out in competition with processes that do result in a report (a memory, a speech act, a drawing, and so on).

Inaccessibility would also appear to be a key problem when it comes to theorizing subjectivity. The problem can be tackled under a number of headings.

Motivation

Dennett's theory is essentially cognitive. I have chosen to use it because of the way it tackles the question of why the world appears to us the way it does. However, the theory does relegate motivation to second place — in other words, why we do what we do and, more importantly for subjectivity, why we differ from one another in what we want to do.

To the extent that our motives may be established in a nonconceptual manner, they may be inaccessible to report. There will be innate tendencies, preconceptual conditioning, reward and punishment regimes including such strong emotions as love and fear. These may be unavailable to sophisticated forms of cognitive formulation

and so govern our actions in ways which we cannot fully describe or control. In pre-Dennett parlance, motives may be unconscious.

However, what matters here is the approach. There is vast literature of empirical investigation of motivation. Baars (1988), for example, has attempted to translate certain Freudian concepts into empirical form. The articles on creativity of Barron and Harrington (1981), Eisenstadt (1978), Götz and Götz (1979a, b), Rushton (1990) or Simonton (1977) would be other token instances. Such a literature has had virtually no impact on theorizing the creative subject within theories of cultural production. No doubt there are many reasons for this lack, but chief among them may be the devotion of theorists to psychoanalysis and (post)structuralism.

Qualia

A quale is the undefinable something an experience has that is supposed to raise it above the mechanical: it is what feelings, colours and so on *feel like* in a way that is meant to be beyond mechanism, to be purely subjective. Nagel (1974) believed he was pinning the idea down when he posed his infamous question: *what is it like to be a bat?* As Hofstadter (1981a, p. 403 ff.) comments, the question has the fundamental problem that it has a be-ee (a winged mammal) but no be-er. If the question were *what is it like for a human to be a bat?* the nature of the difficulty would be immediately obvious.

What is happening with qualia, it seems to me, is a mistake in type or level of description. There is the experience of the colour red, for example, and an attempt to describe that experience. The two will never be the same, and it is fruitless to demand that they must be. A theory of consciousness will never *be* consciousness, it cannot be. What it must be, however, is justified in its explanation of how consciousness comes about. We will never get the 'feel' from that description (although it seems that something in us will always go on to demand it).

Différance

Our minds often seem to be engaged in an endless verbal attempt to describe the world inside or outside ourselves. In Dennett's terms, a process — in this case a very large one involving many subprocesses — has taken temporary control of our brains. I would like to contend that Derrida's (1968) writing on *différance* is, in its

denses gester i delegi og solden er næben som bester at den solden som bester i delegi den og solden. Benne bester i dense for en en stære solden og solden bester fræmer og stære solden i delegi dense og solden Benne bester solden solden i gester er at solden for at solden som solden at solden i delegi delegi delegi dele Benne bester solden solden i gester er at solden solden som stære gebene at solden solden i delegi delegi deleg essential characteristics, a product of this process' (1) being language-based; (2) being self-embedded; and (3) turning on itself.

Self-embeddedness is another form of inaccessibility: the process has access only to those events which occur within its descriptive powers. Language cannot sense the fleetingness of the process of word identification, let alone sense sound or colour. Language can only report what is given to it to report. The evanescent processes of tying a spoken or written word to its meaning, of separating its sound or form or meaning from all similar tokens is what différance appears to entail. Such a process is at and beyond the limits of what a self-embedded, self-reporting language system can report. Its attempt to report those processes — Derrida's paper — is inevitably going to fail.

Conclusions

Has this excursion into Dennett's theory brought anything? I believe so. First, it suggests that subjectivity may receive better, fuller and more accurate explanation if approached from outside the fields of (post)structuralism and psychoanalysis. Second, an adequate theory of consciousness may even explain the sort of situation into which Freud, or Lacan, or Derrida, theorized themselves. Third, a successful theory of consciousness may prove a paradigm for theorizing the whole of the subject, including motivation and creativity. Fourth, Dennett's theory of consciousness represents the sort of approach to theorizing subjectivity in which the question *Why should I believe what you are telling me*? is allowed and in which evidence and reasoning are offered in the quest for better and better answers.

Having moved consciousness to centre-stage, it becomes necessary to take the matter further. Results emanating from mathematics and theoretical physics are so unusual and compelling for what they suggest about the role of consciousness that they must be considered. The final chapter attempts just this.

en establis persona en en enveniget de la degenara per di 1997. Le tradicione e el control de la control de la Articipii de la defensa en encentra de la tradicipii de la tradici

Chapter 6: Beyond mechanism?

To throw everything into doubt is not a very original or constructive activity. The description of one theory of consciousness in the last chapter was an attempt to find a way forward after so much negativity with respect to structuralism and psychoanalysis.

In the end, could it all be a matter of viewpoint? A theory of consciousness can 'position' the structuralists, the structuralists can position theorists and theories of consciousness. The problem is where to start explaining, what (working) propositions to hold as fundamental. There is no universally accepted solution, the Cartesian "I think therefore I am" notwithstanding.

Reasons of efficiency argue against the notion that any starting point is as good as any other (always assuming that efficiency is worthwhile). But it may be possible — one day, if not now — to do better than this: one reason for my interest in emphasizing consciousness is the extraordinary role assigned to it in aspects of mathematical logic and theoretical physics. If subjectivity proves fundamental in such disciplines, then perhaps a starting point for explanations will in fact have been found.

There are three cases now to be discussed.

Gödel

In a paper published in 1931 Kurt Gödel demonstrated that any complex system of mathematical logic contains one unexpected flaw: it can produce a statement which it cannot prove but which we nonetheless know to be true. In informal terms, the statement, correctly deduced according to the rules of the mathematical system, is an assertion to that system of the form *You cannot prove this statement*. If the system can prove the statement, then it cannot be a correct mathematical system because it has proved a contradiction. Therefore it must be true that it cannot prove the statement. And therefore there is a statement which we know to be true but which cannot be proved by that system. Worse still, any conceivable complex mathematical or logical system will produce the same result. The conundrum is: *How do we* know *this logical truth which cannot be deduced within*

and the second second

real strength in all well in the solution of th

any conceivable mathematical or logical system? Is there something above logic, something preternatural about our minds?

It is Penrose (1989) who brought Gödel's Theorem to broad attention in debates both in physics and in theorizing about consciousness. He believed it to be "a good part of the reason for believing that consciousness is able to influence truth-judgements in a *non*-algorithmic [nonmechanistic] way" (p. 538, his italics).

Gödel's Theorem is certainly a problem for supporters of mechanism: something we can know but which no mechanism can allow us to know. That at least is Penrose's argument.

Dennett (1978a) had previously argued against this sort of interpretation. He maintained that a person's thought processes cannot be captured within a single algorithm. They are rather a bundle of algorithms and heuristics. Whereas it is indeed true that a single algorithm cannot prove Gödel's Theorem within itself, Dennett believed that another algorithm or heuristic might provide the proof from outside.

Unfortunately, Dennett does not go through any detailed mathematical argument. I find it very hard to comprehend how a second algorithm — a different aspect of our minds, perhaps — could realize somehow that it had the proof that was inaccessible to the first algorithm, without actually following the logic of the first algorithm and arriving at the same accessibility problem.

All that can be said, perhaps, is that Gödel's Theorem is tantalizing in its possible implications.

Self-reference

Gödel's Theorem is an example of the fact that a strange and undefinable effect may occur when something references itself. Another well-known example is one of the simplest: *This sentence is false*. If the sentence is correct in the assertion that it is false, then the sentence must be true... Other examples (from Hofstadter, 1981a, p. 276 ff.) include *Thiss sentence contains three errors* and *This sentence contains one error*. Hofstadter ponders on how

each of us is trapped inside a powerful system with a unique point of view - and that power is also a guarantor of limitedness. And this vulnerability - this self-hook - may also be the source of the ineradicable sense of "I." (p. 278)

Human consciousness, of course, is self-referential. A peculiarity of determinists, be they structuralists or empiricists, is their own position within the system they champion: do they believe themselves to be determined in their actions in the same way as those others whom they write about? If so, what sense or meaning do they hope to find in their act of writing? Can they originate meanings?

The area of self-reference is very difficult and slippery. Like Gödel's Theorem, however, it is one other possible loophole for those wishing to escape mechanism.

Schrödinger's cat

At the subatomic scale at which quantum effects can be measured, standard and apparently highly successful quantum theory has placed itself in the odd position of involving consciousness. Subatomic particles or forces are demonstrably in a 'complex superposition of states' — that is, simultaneously in many definable states rather than in one particular state — until a measurement takes place. When a measurement is carried out, they adopt one of the possible states. The problem is that measurement is defined and seemingly only definable in terms of human consciousness: someone has a look, and a state is immediately adopted.

The 'phenomenon' is best known, perhaps, in terms of Schrödinger's cat. This thought experiment involves a cat inside a box (this is yet another case of scientists giving themselves a bad name). The cat may be alive or dead depending upon whether a quantum event has released poison within the box. Schrödinger's equations, apparently well-founded, force the conclusion that the cat is both alive and dead until someone opens the box and has a look, at which point the cat will be alive or dead (see Penrose, 1989, p. 375 ff). This is quite a power to bestow upon subjectivity, and physicists have expended a great deal of effort to get around the problem, apparently without much success. One proposal is the 'many-worlds' solution (see Penrose, 1989, pp. 381-382). In this, the universe splits at every

* 12 J 12 T 1 2 4

ingen bespinningen
moment into an infinite number of universes; the result is that in one universe the cat is alive, in another dead, in another the cat never existed, and so on. A further implication would seem to be that whatever is behind you at the moment is not actually there until you turn around and look at it — a strange rerun of Berkeley's solipsism.

To add another level of confusion, there is also Dennett's (1991) argument that there is no single spatial or temporal point at which consciousness occurs within an individual. So there is no definable time at which the measurement occurs which will force the quantum event into one state or another.

On the leading edge

Physics yields a further conundrum, but this one may point the way out of some of the dilemmas. Penrose (1989) again:

According to relativity, there is not really such a thing as the 'now' at all. The closest that we get to such a concept is an observer's 'simultaneous space' in space-time...but that depends on the *motion* of the observer! The 'now' according to one observer would not agree with that for another. Concerning two space-time events A and B, one observer U might consider that B belongs to the fixed past and A to the uncertain future, while for a second observer V, it could be that A belongs to the fixed past and B to the uncertain future... (p. 292; his italics)

The above is reminiscent of Merleau-Ponty's (1964, p. 291) assertion: "I say of a thing that it is moved; but my body moves itself, my movement deploys itself." We are self-deploying, and the results from quantum physics and from relativity put us with respect to ourselves, *possibly*, in a world-creating, causally determining position. This sense of flow or movement is also to be found in Dennett and Derrida. For Dennett, all mental activity including consciousness is process without endpoint, like a continuous falling-forward. Something similar is detectable in Derrida: meaning as ongoing and ever-elusive.

These viewpoints should at least give pause for thought to mechanists and determinists. Where there are self-reflective selves, each in its own spacetime, there would seem to be at least the possibility of subject as agent.

Gödel himself was a mystic (Rucker, 1982, p. 170). He put the problem of determinism this way:

There is no contradiction between free will and knowing in advance precisely what one will do. If one knows oneself completely then this *is* the situation. One does not deliberately do the opposite of what one wants. (quoted in Rucker, 1982, p. 168; Rucker's italics)

a third set is a straight of

er hende is men en eine die eine het werden die gegennig gesche kanne eine eine eine geschieden werten die eine sollte die die die eine geschieden eine eine eine eine eine werden einerste sig diese die einer die het Geschieden die diese staten die eine eine werden automotion staten eine eine die eine die einer die die einer automotionen.

Conclusion

This thesis has been about explanation, in particular explanations of subjectivity. When I make an artwork, who is this 'I'? Is there any sense in which I am correct in seeing myself as the work's author? The search for an answer was guided by another question when assessing others' theories: *Why should I believe what you are telling me*? Beginning with structuralism, I emphasized that it had a very difficult and ambivalent relationship with 'reality' or the objective. The *forecast finding* implies that evidence exists and must be explained whether it is conceptualized as stemming from world-as-external-reality or world-as-story/text.

The examination of explanation moved on to psychoanalysis. Its history, at least in so far as it relates to cultural explanations, has seen a progressive move away from science in favour of theorizing by assertion rather than by evidence. Indeed, arguing more or less from a position that we only have access to distorted constructions of a world-story, theorists of a combined psychoanalytic/structuralist position seem to consider any demand for support for their theorizing symptomatic of a scientistic, positivist, modernist, perhaps even antisocialist and antifeminist delusion.

Despite such arguments, I persisted here with the question *Why should I believe...* Psychoanalysts could be seen to dismiss evidence, for two reasons less high-minded than their theoretical protestations may suggest: (1) they wish to theorize unfettered by data, and (2) such data as exist cast doubt on many fundamental psychoanalytic tenets. After considering Mulvey's *Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema* I suggested that some feminist theorists are coming round to the conclusion argued here: that psychoanalytic explanations of culture have misled and delayed and, worse, perpetuated patriarchy.

If structuralism and psychoanalysis do not afford good explanations of subjectivity, a start must be made elsewhere. I chose Dennett's theory of consciousness here as an example of how the problem might be approached. It represents nothing more than a possible beginning, and the really 'interesting' questions of subjectivity — including motivation, creativity, will — were barely touched upon. However, consciousness may be *the* correct starting point for explanations of subjectivity, if the logical and physical results outlined in Chapter 6

39

are valid. We may be agents after all, causally determining our lives, not just dupes of ingrained social structures and hidden desires.

That would be nice.

이 수밖에 가지 않는 것이 같아. 여러 가지 않는 것이 같아. 이 것은 것이 같아. 이 나는 것이 같아. 이 나는

The product of the second s

그는 가는 것을 가지 않는 것

그는 그는 것으로 가슴다.

이 가슴 가 있는 것 않는 것 같아.

상태는 이상 이렇게 물었

그 않는 것 같아?

Bibliography

- ADORNO, Theodor, "Reconciliation under Duress", in FRASCINA, Francis, & HARRIS, Jonathan (Eds.), Art in Modern Culture: An Anthology of Critical Texts, London, Phaidon, 1992. Original source: Der Monat, 1958/59, pp. 75-78.
- ADORNO, Theodor, & HORKHEIMER, Max, "The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception", in *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, New York, Seabury, 1972.
- ALTHUSSER, Louis, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses", in HARRISON, Charles, & WOOD, Paul (Eds.), Art in Theory, 1900-1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992, pp. 928-936. Original source: "Idéologies et Appareils Idéologiques d'Etat (Notes pour une Recherche)", La Pensée, 151, June 1970, pp. 3-38.
- APPLEYARD, Bryan, Understanding the Present: Science and the Sould of Modern Man, London, Pan, 1992.
- APTER, Michael J., "Reversal Theory, Cognitive Synergy and the Arts", in CROZIER, W. Ray, & CHAPMAN, Antony J. (Eds.), Cognitive Processes in the Perception of Art, Amsterdam, Elsevier, 1984.
- AVRIL, Beatrice, "Knowledge is Power for Good or for Evil", *Irish Times*, 1993, p. 8.
- AYER, A. J., The Problem of Knowledge, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1956.
- AYERZA, Josefina, "Richard Rorty, Philosopher", *Flash Art*, Vol. XXVI, No. 173, November-December, 1993, pp. 72-73.
- AYERZA, Josefina, "Mary Kelly: Gloria Patri", *Flash Art*, Vol. XXVII, No. 174, January-February, 1994, pp. 68-69.
- BAARS, Bernard J., A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988.



- BAREAU, Juliet W., The Hidden face of Manet, Burlington Magazine, London, 1986.
- BARRETT, Michèle, "Psychoanalysis and Feminism: A British Sociologist's View", *Signs*, Winter, 1992, pp. 455-466.
- BARRON, Frank, & HARRINGTON, David M., "Creativity, Intelligence, and Personality", *Annual Review of Psychology*, Vol. 32, 1981, pp. 439-476.

BARTHES, Roland, Mythologies, London, Paladin, 1982. First published in 1957.

- BARTHES, Roland, "From Work to Text", in HARRISON, Charles, & WOOD, Paul (Eds.), Art in Theory, 1900-1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992, pp. 940-946. Original source: "De l'oeuvre au texte", Revue d'esthétique, no. 3, 1971.
- BAUDRILLARD, Jean, "The Hyper-realism of Simulation", in HARRISON, Charles, & WOOD, Paul (Eds.), Art in Theory, 1900-1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992, pp. 1049-1051. Original source: L'Echange Symbolique et la Mort, Paris, 1976.
- BAUDRILLARD, Jean, "The Ecstasy of Communication", in JENCKS, Charles (Ed.), The Post-Modern Reader, London, Academy Editions, 1992. Original source: FOSTER, Hal (Ed.), The Anti-Aesthetic, Essays on Postmodern Culture, Port Townsend, Bay Press, 1983.
- BECKER, Werner, "Critical Theory: The Frankfurt School and its Influence on Culture and Politics", in JOACHIMIDES, Christos M., ROSENTHAL, Norman, & SCHMIED, Wieland (Eds.), German Art in the 20th Century: Painting and Sculpture 1905-1985, Munich and London, Prestel-Verlag and Royal Academy of Arts, 1985, pp. 91-96.
- BELL, Clive, "The Aesthetic Hypothesis", in FRASCINA, Francis, & HARRISON, Charles (Eds.) Modern Art and Modernism, London, Harper & Row, 1982. Original source: Art, Chatto and Windus, 1931.

BELSEY, Catherine, Critical Practice, London, Routledge, 1987.

e por la companya de la comp

the contraction from the second part of the providence of the second strategy of the

- BENJAMIN, Walter, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction", in FRASCINA, Francis, & HARRIS, Jonathan (Eds.), Art in Modern Culture: An Anthology of Critical Texts, London, Phaidon, 1992, pp. 297-307. Original source: Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1936.
- BENVENUTO, Bice, & KENNEDY, Roger, *The Works of Jacques Lacan: An Introduction*, London, Free Association Books, 1986.

BERGER, John, Ways of seeing, London, BBC and Penguin, 1972.

- BETTERTON, Rosemary, "How do Women Look? The Female Nude in the Work of Suzanne Valadon", in ROBINSON, Hilary (Ed.), Visibly Female: Feminism and Art Today, London, Camden, 1987. Original source: Feminist Review, Vol. 19, March 1985.
- BOHM, David, "Postmodern Science and a Postmodern World", in JENCKS, Charles (Ed.), *The Post-Modern Reader*, London, Academy Editions, 1992, pp. 383-391. Original source: GRIFFIN, D. R. (Ed.), *The Reenchantment of Science, Postmodern Proposals*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1988.
- BORGES, Jorge Luis, "Borges and I", in HOFSTADTER, Douglas R., & DENNETT, Daniel C. (Eds.), *The Mind's I*, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1981, pp. 19-20. Original source: YATES, D. A. & IRBY, J. E. (Eds.), *Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings*, New York, New Directions, 1962.
- BRENNAN, Teresa, "Introduction", in BRENNAN, Teresa (Ed.), Between Feminism and Psychoanalysis, London, Routledge, 1989.
- BROADBENT, Donald E., Perception and Communication, Pergamon, Oxford, 1958.
- BROADBENT, Donald E., In Defence of Empirical Psychology, London, Methuen, 1973.
- CHERNIAK, Christopher, "The Riddle of the Universe and its Solution", in HOFSTADTER, Douglas R., & DENNETT, Daniel C. (Eds.), *The Mind's I*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1981, pp. 269-276.

- ta muno detero de colección de la secala que que de control da causte do transmenta que en los é tenéncios en financia de las Subjittations enconseite a la control de las controls de las controls de las las cabatelos en anticipar de las del menaces efformante dificulta que definidad de las las de labores en que derendo contrata de las financias de las controls de las controls de las controls de las c
- Bergersen Markanen, and Ball Michael C. Maggin of The Arthree Merican Merican International International Communication France for the second floor on control
 - 1. The assessed have been actively appreciate for each provide the

- an fa estado indicador y estada error (na calificador) e cada fil a republica e antena en entre en entre en en A complete en entre de la calificada da estador estadore da 1938 e

- erent al esta cobattori en colletto devido caso das contencios en contra consular consulario, en esta testa serifica cobata provinci da Estatuna e concentra con contra consular en contra formanetes con conservo estatuna da Constata en conferencia e

- CHICAGO, Judy, Through the Flower: My Struggle as a Woman Artist, London, Women's Press, 1982.
- CHODOROW, Nancy, The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978.
- CHOMSKY, Noam, "Politics and the Intelligentsia", in FRASCINA, Francis, & HARRIS, Jonathan (Eds.), Art in Modern Culture: An Anthology of Critical Texts, London, Phaidon, 1992, pp. 32-35. Original source: N. Chomsky, Dialogues avec Mitsou Ronat, Flammarion, 1977.
- CHRISTALLER, Thomas, "Einige grundsätzliche Überlegungen, warum Künstliche Intelligenz etwas mit natürlicher Intelligenz zu tun hat", *Kunstforum*, Vol. 126, March-June, 1994, pp. 206-210.
- CLARK, T. J., "Preliminaries to a Possible Treatment of Olympia in 1865", in FRASCINA, Francis, & HARRISON, Charles (Eds.) Modern Art and Modernism, London, Harper & Row, 1982, pp. 259-273. Original source: Screen, Vol. 21, no. 1, Spring 1980, pp. 18-41.
- COCKCROFT, Eva, "Abstract Expressionism, Weapon of the Cold War", in FRASCINA, Francis, & HARRIS, Jonathan (Eds.), Art in Modern Culture: An Anthology of Critical Texts, London, Phaidon, 1992, pp. 82-90. Original source: Artforum, Vol. 15, No. 10, June 1974, pp. 39-41.
- COLLINS, Judith, "Introduction", in GRIMES, Teresa, COLLINS, Judith, & BADDELEY, Oriana (Eds.), *Five Women Painters*, Oxford, Lennard, 1989.
- COLLINSON, Diané, "Aesthetic Experience", in HANFLING, Oswald (Ed.), *Philosophical Aesthetics*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992, pp. 111-178.
- COTTINGHAM, Laura, "Post-'68", *Flash Art*, No. 174, January-February, 1994, pp. 31-34.
- CRARY, Jonathan, Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century, Cambridge, October Books, 1990.

DAVIES, Paul, The Cosmic Blueprint, London, Heinemann, 1987.



- DAWKINS, Richard, "Selfish Genes and Selfish Memes", in HOFSTADTER, Douglas R., & DENNETT, Daniel C. (Eds.), *The Mind's I*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1981, pp. 125-144. Original source: *The Selfish Gene*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1976.
- DE BEAUVOIR, Simone, *The Second Sex*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1953. Original source: *Le Deuxième Sexe*, 1949.
- DE SAUSSURE, Ferdinand, Course in General Linguistics, La Salle, Open Court, 1983. Original source: Cours de Linguistique Générale, Paris, Payot, 1916.
- DELEVOY, Robert L., LASCAULT, Gilbert, VERHEGGEN, Jean-Pierre, & CUVELIER, Guy, Félicien Rops, Brussels, Éditions Lebeer Hossmann, 1985.
- DENNETT, Daniel C., "The Abilities of Men and Machines", in *Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology*, Montgomery, Bradford Books, 1978a, pp. 256-266.
- DENNETT, Daniel C., "Where am I?", in *Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology*, Montgomery, Bradford Books, 1978b, pp. 310-323.
- DENNETT, Daniel C., "Consciousness", in GREGORY, Richard L. (Ed.), *The Oxford Companion to the Mind*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987, pp. 160-164.
- DENNETT, Daniel C., Consciousness Explained, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1991.
- DERRIDA, Jacques, of Grammatology, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974. Original source: De la Grammatologie, Editions de Minuit, 1967.
- DERRIDA, Jacques, "Différance", in ROSS, Steven David (Ed.), Art and its Significance: An Anthology of Aesthetic Theory, Albany, State University of New York, 1984, pp. 411-436. Original source: Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie, Vol. 62, No. 3 (July-September), 1968, pp. 73-101.
- DESCARTES, René, "Discourse on Method", in Discourse on Method and the Meditations, London, Penguin Classics, 1968. Original source: Discours de la Méthode, 1637.

Ne construction of the second the second of the second second second second second second second second second

- DOANE, Mary Ann, "Woman's Stake: Filming the Female Body", in PENNEY, C. (Ed.), *Feminism and Film Theory*, Routledge, New York, 1988, pp. 216-228. Original source: *October*, No. 17, Summer, 1981.
- DOANE, Mary Ann, "Film and the Masquerade: Theorizing the Female Spectator", in *Femmes Fatales: Feminism, Film Theory, Psychoanalysis*, London, Routledge, 1991, pp. 17-32. Originally published in 1982.
- DOANE, Mary Ann, "Introduction", in *Femmes Fatales: Feminism, Film Theory, Psychoanalysis*, London, Routledge, 1991a, pp. 1-16.
- DOANE, Mary Ann, "Masquerade Reconsidered: Further Thoughts on the Female Spectator", in *Femmes Fatales: Feminism, Film Theory, Psychoanalysis*, London, Routledge, 1991b, pp. 33-43.
- DONALD, James, "On the Threshold: Psychoanalysis and Cultural Studies", in DONALD, James (Ed.), *Psychoanalysis and Cultural Theory: Thresholds*, London, Macmillan, 1991, pp. 1-10.
- DVORAK, Josef, "La Rivoluzione sul Divano: Psicanalisi e Jugendstil", in MAZZOTTA, Gabriele (Ed.), Le Arti a Vienna: Dalla Secessione all Caduta dell'Impero Asburgico, Venice, Edizioni la Biennale di Venezia, 1984, pp. 477-484.
- DWORKIN, Andrea, Pornography: Men Possessing Women, London, Women's Press, 1981.
- DYER, Richard, "Don't Look Now: The Male Pin-up", in KUHN, Annette (Ed.), *The Sexual Subject: A* Screen *Reader in Sexuality*, London, Screen, 1992, pp. 265-276. Original source: *Screen*, Vol. 23, Nos 3-4, September-October, 1982, pp. 61-73.
- EASTHOPE, Anthony, What a Man's Gotta Do: The Masculine Myth in Popular Culture, London, Collins, 1986.
- EISENSTADT, J. Marvin, "Parental Loss and Genius", American Psychologist, March, 1978, pp. 211-223.

ing a second In the second second

- ESCOBAR, Elizam, "Language, Identity and Liberation: A Critique of the Term and Concept 'People of Color'", *Left Curve*, Summer, 1993, pp. 54-58.
- EYSENCK, Hans J., "Failure of Treatment Failure of Theory?", *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1986, p. 236.
- FARRELL, Brian A., *The Standing of Psychoanalysis*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1981.
- FELSKI, Rita, "Feminism, Realism and the Avant-Garde", in MILNER, Andrew, THOMSON, Philip, & WORTH, Chris (Eds.), Postmodern Conditions, Oxford, Berg, 1990, pp. 62-78.
- FINKEL, Leif H., "The Construction of Perception", in CRARY, Jonathan & KWINTER, Sanford (Eds.), *Incorporations*, New York, Urzone, 1992, pp. 392-405.
- FISHER, Seymour, & GREENBERG, Roger P., *The Scientific Credibility of Freud's Theories and Therapy*, New York, Basic Books, 1977.
- FLECK, Robert, "New French Aesthetics", *Flash Art*, Vol. XXIV, No. 156, January-February, 1991, pp. 85-87.
- FORRESTER, John, "Psychoanalysis: Telepathy, Gossip and/or Science?", in DONALD, James (Ed.), *Psychoanalysis and Cultural Theory: Thresholds*, London, Macmillan, 1991, pp. 169-187.
- FOSTER, Alasdair, Behold the Man: The Male Nude in Photography, Edinburgh, Stills Gallery, 1988.
- FOSTER, Hal, "Subversive Signs", in HARRISON, Charles, & WOOD, Paul (Eds.), Art in Theory, 1900-1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992, pp. 1065-1066. Original source: Recodings: Art, Spectacle, Cultural Politics, Seattle, 1985.
- FOUCAULT, Michel, The Order of Things, London, Tavistock, 1970. Original source: Les Mots et les Choses, Éditions Gallimard, 1966.

a base da navera en en en antipologie d'haven en presentation de la company a consideration de la company a co Presentation de la company de la classificación de la company de la company de la company de la company de la c

and the state of the

er af Loo Al Daha (Adapan Telepa antendintea), la regative a Daharon (Adapan Maria), da antendintea David Maria (Maria), data (Catalana), da da antendintea (Daharon), da da antendintea (Maria), Davidencia (Catal David Maria), la la manataria (1991), que cate (1991)

ROUCESLIE Multiple The Galaxies Party and the Assess of Science Longer and Science (as service was Chever Editories Stational Conf.)

- FOUCAULT, Michel, "What is an author?", in HARRISON, Charles, & WOOD,
 Paul (Eds.), Art in Theory, 1900-1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas,
 Oxford, Blackwell, 1992, pp. 923-928. Original source: Bulletin de la Société
 Française de Philosophie, no. 63, 1969.
- FOUCAULT, Michel, "A Lecture", in HARRISON, Charles, & WOOD, Paul (Eds.), Art in Theory, 1900-1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992, pp. 970-976. Original source: GORDON, C. (Ed.), Michel Foucault: Power/Knowledge, London, 1980. Transcription of a lecture delivered in 1976.
- FOUCAULT, Michel, "Afterword: The Subject and Power", in DREYFUS, Hubert L., & RABINOW, Paul (Eds.), *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, London, Harvester Press, 1982, pp. 208-226.
- FRAGER, Robert, & FADIMAN, James, *Personality and Personal Growth*, New York, Harper and Row, 1984.
- FRANCBLIN, Catherine, (Interview with Julia Kristeva), in HARRISON, Charles,
 & WOOD, Paul (Eds.), Art in Theory, 1900-1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992, pp. 1084-1085. Original source: Flash Art,
 no. 126, February-March 1986, pp. 44-47.
- FRANCK, Georg, "Die temporale Wirklichkeit der Gefühle", Kunstforum, Vol. 126, March-June, 1994, pp. 127-138.
- FREUD, Sigmund, "On Dreams", in HARRISON, Charles, & WOOD, Paul (Eds.), Art in Theory, 1900-1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992, pp. 26-34. Original source: Grundfragen des Nerven- und Seelenlebens, Wiesbaden, 1901.
- FREUD, Sigmund, On Sexuality, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1905.
- FREUD, Sigmund, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, 1933. NCAD photocopy file.
- FROSH, Stephen, The Politics of Psychoanalysis: An Introduction to Freudian and Post-Freudian Theory, Houndsmill, Macmillan, 1987.

(1) Constructing a second of Addition of the second and a static of a second static of the second s second s second second

era en 1944 das Conferences en antiendes construités desais autories en constraction d'économies de la construité d'autorités de la construité de la conference de la construité de la construité de la construi de la construité de la construité de la construité de la conference de la construité de la construité de la cons de la construité de la cons

Figure S., Presser "Depth & Mything in the second statement of the statement of the second s Second s Second se Second s Second s Second s Second se Second sec

(2) In Conc. (1), (2) and (2) an

n barrelar, et general d'ar recificar en destructurates de 38 des rato de l'ordera autor est. Persona de servici de servici de antar est, destructura est.

- FRY, Roger, Vision and Design, Harmondsworth, Pelican, 1920. Original source: "An essay in aesthetics", New Quarterly, 1909.
- GAMMAN, Lorraine, & MARSHMENT, Margaret, "Introduction", in GAMMAN, Lorraine, & MARSHMENT, Margaret (Eds.), *The Female Gaze*, London, Women's Press, 1988.
- GARDINER, Judith Kegan, "Psychoanalysis and Feminism: An American Humanist's View", Signs, Winter, 1992, pp. 437-454.
- GARDNER, Howard, *Developmental Psychology*, Glenville, Scott, Foreman and Co., 1982.
- GIDDENS, Anthony, "Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age", in FRASCINA, Francis, & HARRIS, Jonathan (Eds.), Art in Modern Culture: An Anthology of Critical Texts, London, Phaidon, 1992, pp. 17-22. Original source: Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1991, pp. 1-9.
- GÖTZ, Karl Otto, & GÖTZ, Karin, "Personality Characteristics of Professional Artists", *Perceptual and Motor Skills*, Vol. 49, 1979a, pp. 327-334.
- GÖTZ, Karl Otto, & GÖTZ, Karin, "Personality Characteristics of Successful Artists", *Perceptual and Motor Skills*, Vol. 49, 1979b, pp. 919-924.
- GREENBERG, Roger P., "The Case against Freud's Cases", *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1986, pp. 240-241.
- GREER, Germaine, The Obstacle Race, London, Book Club Associates, 1979.
- GREGORY, Richard L., "Falsification", in GREGORY, Richard L. (Ed.), *The Oxford Companion to the Mind*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987a, pp. 254-255.
- GREGORY, Richard L., "Logical Positivism", in GREGORY, Richard L. (Ed.), *The Oxford Companion to the Mind*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987b, pp. 441.

- GRIFFIN, David Ray, "The Reenchantment of Science", in JENCKS, Charles (Ed.), The Post-Modern Reader, London, Academy Editions, 1992, pp. 354-372.
 Original source: GRIFFIN, David Ray (Ed.), The Reenchantment of Science, Postmodern Proposals, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1988.
- GROSZ, Elizabeth, Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction, London, Routledge, 1990.
- GRÜNBAUM, Adolf, "Précis of *The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique*", *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1986, pp. 217-228.
- GUMPERZ, John J., and LEVINSON, Stephen C., "Rethinking Linguistic Relativity", *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 32, No. 5, December, 1991, pp. 613-623.
- HALL, Calvin Springer, and LINDZEY, Gardner, *Theories of Personality*, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1978.
- HALL, Stuart, "The Rediscovery of 'Ideology': Return of the Repressed in Media Studies", in GUREVITCH, Michael, BENNETT, CURRAN & WOOLLACOTT (Eds.), Culture, Society and the Media, 1982, pp. 56-90.
- HANFLING, Oswald, "Aesthetic Qualities", in HANFLING, Oswald (Ed.), *Philosophical Aesthetics*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992, pp. 41-73.
- HARDING, D. E., "On Having No Head", in HOFSTADTER, Douglas R., & DENNETT, Daniel C. (Eds.), *The Mind's I*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1981, pp. 23-30. Original source: Perennial Library, Harper & Row, 1972.
- HARRIS, Henry, "Rationality in Science", in HEATH, Andrew F. (Ed.), *Scientific Explanation*, Oxford, Clarendon, 1981, pp. 36-52.
- HEBDIGE, Dick, "A Report on the Western Front: Postmodernism and the 'Politics' of Style", in FRASCINA, Francis, & HARRIS, Jonathan (Eds.), Art in Modern Culture: An Anthology of Critical Texts, London, Phaidon, 1992, pp. 331-341. Original source: Block, Vol. 12, 1986-87, pp. 4-26.

and the second substant which and a state which have been a second second second second second second second se

- HIRSCH, E. D., Jr., "Validity in Interpretation", in ROSS, Steven David (Ed.), Art and its Significance: An Anthology of Aesthetic Theory, Albany, State University of New York, 1984, pp. 342-358. Original source: Validity in Interpretation, New Haven, Yale University, 1967, pp. 1-23.
- HODGE, Robert, & KRESS, Gunther, "Saussure and the Origin of Semiotics", in *The Polity Reader in Cultural Theory*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994, pp. 38-49. Original source: *Social Semiotics*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1988.
- HOFSTADTER, Douglas R., Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1979.
- HOFSTADTER, Douglas R., (Comments following various articles), in HOFSTADTER, Douglas R., & DENNETT, Daniel C. (Eds.), *The Mind's I*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1981a.
- HOFSTADTER, Douglas R., "The Turing Test: A Coffeehouse Conversation", in HOFSTADTER, Douglas R., & DENNETT, Daniel C. (Eds.), *The Mind's I*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1981, pp. 69-92. Original source: "Metamagical Themas: A Coffeehouse Conversation on the Turing Test to Determine if a Machine can Think", *Scientific American*, May 1981b, pp. 15-36.
- HOFSTÄTTER, Hans H., "L'Iconographie de la Peinture Symboliste", in Le Symbolisme en Europe, Brussels, Musées Royaux des Beaux-Arts de Belgique, 1976.
- HORGAN, John, "Can Science Explain Consciousness?", *Scientific American*, July, 1994, pp. 72-78.

HUMPHREY, Nicholas, The Inner Eye, London, Faber and Faber, 1986.

HUMPHREY, Nicholas, A History of the Mind, London, Vintage, 1992.

HUNT, Earl, & AGNOLI, Franca, "The Whorfian Hypothesis: A Cognitive Psychology Perspective", *Psychological Review*, Vol. 98, No. 3, 1991, pp. 377-389. (C) A set of the s

and have deep granted and other we that and another

nen speciel and an and a second second with the providence of the second second of the second second second sec

- HUTT, Corinne, "Sex-role Differentiation in Social Development", in McGURK, H. (Ed.), *Issues in Childhood Social Development*, London, Methuen, 1978, pp. 171-202.
- JARDINE, Alice, "Of Bodies and Technologies", in FOSTER, Hal (Ed.), Discussions in Contemporary Culture, Seattle, Bay Press, 1987, pp. 151-158.
- KAPLAN, E. Ann, Women and Film: Both Sides of the Camera, New York, Methuen, 1983.
- KAPLAN, E. Ann, "Feminism/Oedipus/Postmodernism: The Case of MTV", in KAPLAN, E. Ann (Ed.), Postmodernism and its Discontents: Theories, Practices, London, Verso, 1988, pp. 30-44.
- KELLY, Mary, "On Sexual Politics and Art", in PARKER, Rozsika, & POLLOCK, Griselda (Eds.), *Framing Feminism*, London, Pandora, 1987, pp. 303-312.
 Original source: TAYLOR, B. (Ed.), *Art and Politics*, Winchester, Winchester School of Art, 1980, pp. 66-75.
- KELLY, Mary, "Beyond the Purloined Image", in PARKER, Rozsika, & POLLOCK, Griselda (Eds.), *Framing Feminism*, London, Pandora, 1987, pp. 249-253. Original source: *Block*, 1983, No. 9, pp. 68-72.
- KELLY, Mary, "Re-Presenting the Body: On Interim, Part I", in DONALD, James (Ed.), Psychoanalysis and Cultural Theory: Thresholds, London, Macmillan, 1991, pp. 59-67.
- KENT, Sarah, "Looking Back", in KENT, Sarah & MORREAU, Jacqueline (Ed.), Women's Images of Men, New York, Writers and Readers Publishing, 1985a, pp. 55-74.
- KENT, Sarah, "The Erotic Male Nude", in KENT, Sarah & MORREAU, Jacqueline (Ed.), Women's Images of Men, New York, Writers and Readers Publishing, 1985b, pp. 75-105.
- KOCH, Gertrud, "Why Women Go to Men's Films", in ECKER, Gisela (Ed.), Feminist Aesthetics, London, Women's Press, 1985. Original source: NABAKOWSKI, G., et al. (Eds.), Frauen in der Kunst, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1980.

n de la companya de En la companya de la c

a service a state and a service present states at reaction and a service and a service and a service of service International services

zi i shinada u alifakki di shina zaraki domeniana u ang baayaya na pikaka ku ta bar 19. Shina na alifa da ka shina ka shina na ka shina na ka shina a shina barka ta 1790. Baka 19. Shina na alifa ta shina na ka shina na ka shina na ka shina na shina ta shina na ka shina na ka shina ka sh

(1) C. C. M. P. M. Presseries and S. Kaskerer et al. Phys. Cond. 10, 100 (1996).

kulika dan kanasa baga bagi sa sering senakar kulikan sering dan kulikan sering dan sering dan sering dan seri Berang kulikan sering dan sering d Berang

er di separat di una sessi dale degli dala 1990 del 1990 di parte di di una 2000 dana dal 1999 - Settema ana secondari di Asia di Secondari, sciente del como agli di seconda di Calibilita di 1990 - Parte del Asia di

n jalan sebagi ang padiki di sebut na sebut sebut sebut na sebut na sebut na basan pananakan pada sebut na bas Internet na pangana na sebut na sebut na pangakit na sebut na ting sebut na sebut na sebut na sebut na sebut na Internet na sebut na

- KRISTEVA, Julia, "Semiotics: A Critical Science and/or a Critique of Science", in MOI, Toril (Ed.), *The Kristeva Reader*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1986, pp. 74-88. Original source: Séméiotiké. Recherches pour une Sémanalyse, Seuil, Paris, 1969.
- KRISTEVA, Julia, "The System and the Speaking Subject", in MOI, Toril (Ed.), *The Kristeva Reader*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1986, pp. 24-33. Original source: *Times Literary Supplement*, 12 October 1973, pp. 1249-1252.
- KRISTEVA, Julia, "Revolution in Poetic Language", in HARRISON, Charles, & WOOD, Paul (Eds.), Art in Theory, 1900-1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992, pp. 960-963. Original source: La Révolution du Langage Poétique, Paris, 1974.
- KRISTEVA, Julia, "Powers of Horror", in HARRISON, Charles, & WOOD, Paul (Eds.), Art in Theory, 1900-1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992, pp. 1015-1017. Original source: Pouvoirs de l'Horreur, Paris, 1980.
- KUHN, Annette, "Women's Genres", in KUHN, Annette (Ed.), *The Sexual Subject:* A Screen Reader in Sexuality, London, Screen, 1992, pp. 301-311. Original source: Screen, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 18-28, Winter 1984.
- KUHN, Annette, "Introduction", in KUHN, Annette (Ed.), *The Sexual Subject: A* Screen *Reader in Sexuality*, London, Screen, 1992, pp. 223-226.
- KUHN, Thomas, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, in HARRISON, Charles, & WOOD, Paul (Eds.), *Art in Theory, 1900-1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992, pp. 936-940. Original source: Postscript to second edition of book, 1970.
- LACAN, Jacques, "The Mirror-Phase as Formative of the Function of the I", in HARRISON, Charles, & WOOD, Paul (Eds.), Art in Theory, 1900-1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992, pp. 609-613. Original source: "Le Stade du Miroir comme formateur de la fonction du je", lecture to International Psychoanalytic Congress, Zurich, 1949.
- LEM, Stanislaw, "Non Serviam", in HOFSTADTER, Douglas R., & DENNETT, Daniel C. (Eds.), *The Mind's I*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1981, pp. 296-317.

Klassicki, A., Bassicki, M., Korka, K., Karaka, K., Karaka, Karaka, K., Korka, K., Karaka, K. (2014) Distribution of the second system in the standard state and the second system annexis. Intersection Applications of the state state of the system of the system.

e stande en en stand hanna de seuren de en enstructure de sina de parte de la transference de la la seure es de la paste de la company de seure de la seure de la seure de la comptete de la stande de la seure es estemblis de la company de la seure de la company de la seure de la stande de la stande de la stande de la company de la seure de la company de la seure de la company de la seure de la stande de la stande de la seure

edi de la ametrica de la seconda da seconda da seconda esta da la conseco da conseco da conseco da el basema de seconda da esta seconda da finicada da da seconda da sec

na series a series de la serie de la se La serie de la s

er i serie d'horres alle diviente en a consecto diverditte con Ruddal 2003, e è eige a diviente della desta Gio di accente diverse della ella diverta de la la consecte accente deve della diviente diviente di deve di diverse di deve di accente di la consecte diverse prota segnato de la diviente di diviente di diviente di diverse di diversa di diverse di diviente di diverse di c ta segnato de la diviente di diviente di diviente di diviente di diverse di diverse di diverse di diverse di div

(A) Comparison of the contract of the second contract of the contract of th

a para de la companie La companie de la comp Original source: A Perfect Vacuum: Perfect Reviews of Nonexistent Books, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971.

- LÉVI-STRAUSS, Claude, "The Structural Study of Myth", in *Structural Anthropology*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 196, 1955, pp. 206-231. Original source: *Journal of American Folklore*, LXXVIII, No. 270, 1955, pp. 428-444.
- LEVY, Jerre, "Lateral Dominance and Aesthetic Preference", *Neuropsychologia*, Vol. 14, 1976, pp. 431-445.

LIPTON, Eunice, Alias Olympia, London, Thames and Hudson, 1992.

- LURY, Celia, "Popular Culture and the Mass Media", in BOCOCK, Robert, & THOMPSON, Kenneth (Eds.), *Social and Cultural Forms of Modernity*, Cambridge, Polity, 1992, pp. 367-402.
- LYAS, Colin, "Criticism and Interpretation", in HANFLING, Oswald (Ed.), *Philosophical Aesthetics*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992, pp. 381-403.
- LYOTARD, Jean-François, "The Psychoanalytic Approach", in DUFRENNE, Mikel (Ed.), *Main Trends in Aesthetics and the Sciences of Art*, New York, Holmes & Meier, 1978, pp. 134-150.
- LYOTARD, Jean-François, "The Postmodern Condition", in JENCKS, Charles (Ed.), The Post-Modern Reader, London, Academy Editions, 1992, pp. 138-142. Original source: La Condition postmoderne: Rapport sur le savoir, Paris, Editions de Minuit, 1979.
- LYOTARD, Jean-François, "Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?", in JENCKS, Charles (Ed.), *The Post-Modern Reader*, London, Academy Editions, 1992, pp. 142-150. Original source: *Critique*, Vol. 419, April 1982.
- MAGNANI, Gregorio, "Second Generation Post-Photography: The Transformation of Critical Practice into Style", *Flash Art*, March/April, 1988, pp. 84-87.
- MASSON, J. M., The Assault on Truth: Freud's Suppression of the Seduction Theory, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1985.
- McCRONE, John, "Quantum States of Mind", New Scientist, 20 August, 1994, pp. 35-38.
- McGRATH, Roberta, "Looking Hard: The Male Body under Patriarchy", in *Behold the Man: The Male Nude in Photography*, Edinburgh, Stills Gallery, 1988, pp. 56-62.
- MERLEAU-PONTY, Maurice, "Eye and Mind", in ROSS, Steven David (Ed.), Art and its Significance: An Anthology of Aesthetic Theory, Albany, State University of New York, 1984, pp. 289-307. Original source: EDIE, J. M. (Ed.), Eye and Mind: The Primacy of Perception, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1964.
- METZ, Christian, The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and the Cinema, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1982. Original source: Le Signifiant Imaginaire, Union Générale d'Éditions, 1977.
- MITCHELL, Juliet, "Freud and Lacan: Psychoanalytic Theories of Sexual Difference", in Women: The Longest Revolution: Essays in Feminism, Literature and Psychoanalysis, London, Virago, 1984, pp. 248-277. Original source: MITCHELL, Juliet & ROSE, Jacqueline (Eds.), Feminine Sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the Ecole Freudienne, London, McMillan Press, 1982.
- MOROWITZ, Harold J., "Rediscovering the Mind", in HOFSTADTER, Douglas R., & DENNETT, Daniel C. (Eds.), *The Mind's I*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1981, pp. 34-42. Original source: *Psychology Today*, August 1980.
- MULVEY, Laura, "You don't know what is happening, do you, Mr Jones?", in PARKER, Rozsika, & POLLOCK, Griselda (Eds.), *Framing Feminism*, London, Pandora, 1987. Original source: *Spare Rib*, 1973, no. 8, pp 13-16.
- MULVEY, Laura, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema", in PENNEY, C. (Ed.), *Feminism and Film Theory*, New York, Routledge, 1988, pp. 57-68. Original source: Screen, Vol. 16, No.3, Autumn 1975.
- MULVEY, Laura, "Afterthoughts on 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema' Inspired by *Duel in the Sun*", in PENNEY, C. (Ed.), *Feminism and Film Theory*, New York, Routledge, 1988, pp. 69-79. Original source: Framework, Volume 6, No. 15-17, 1981.

- MULVEY, Laura, "The Oedipus Myth: Beyond the Riddles of the Sphinx", in *Visual and Other Pleasures*, Houndsmill, Macmillan, 1989.
- MYERS, Kathy, "Towards a Feminist Erotica", in ROBINSON, Hilary (Ed.), Visibly Female: Feminism and Art Today, London, Camden, 1987, pp. 283-296. Original source: Camerawork, Vol. 24, 1982.
- NAGEL, Thomas, "What is it Like to be a Bat?", in HOFSTADTER, Douglas R., & DENNETT, Daniel C. (Eds.), *The Mind's I*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1981, pp. 391-403. Original source: *The Philosophical Review*, October 1974.
- NEALE, Steve, "Masculinity as Spectacle", in KUHN, Annette (Ed.), *The Sexual Subject: A Screen Reader in Sexuality*, London, Screen, 1992, pp. 277-287. Original source: Screen, Vol. 24, No. 6, Winter 1983, pp. 2-16.
- NEEDHAM, Gerald, "Manet, 'Olympia' and Pornographic Photography", in HESS, Thomas B. & NOCHLIN, Linda (Eds.), Woman as Sex Object: Studies in Erotic Art, New York, Newsweek, 1972, pp. 80-89.
- NEISSER, Ulrich, Cognitive Psychology, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967.
- NOCHLIN, Linda, "Why Have There Been No Great Women Artists?", in Women, Art, and Power and Other Essays, London, Thames and Hudson, 1989. Original source: Art News, Vol. 69, January 1971.
- NOCHLIN, Linda, "Eroticism and Female Imagery in Nineteenth-Century Art", in HESS, Thomas B. & NOCHLIN, Linda (Eds.), *Woman as Sex Object: Studies in Erotic Art*, New York, Newsweek, 1972, pp. 9-15.
- NOCHLIN, Linda, "Women, Art, and Power", in Women, Art, and Power and Other Essays, London, Thames and Hudson, 1989, pp. 1-36. Originally published 1988.
- NOCHLIN, Linda, "Starting from Scratch", Women's Art, No. 61, November-December, 1994, pp. 6-11.

ek en transforma a seura da esta a seu a seura da Ramana a a anna da cara a Anna da cara da cara da cara esta a seura esta seura da cara da cara a cara da cara da cara da cara da cara da Anna da cara da

- NOZICK, Robert, "Fiction", in HOFSTADTER, Douglas R., & DENNETT, Daniel
 C. (Eds.), *The Mind's I*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1981, pp. 461-464.
 Original source: *Ploughshares*, Vol. 6, No. 3, Autumn 1980.
- O'KELLY, Charlotte, "Sex-Role Imagery in Modern Art: An Empirical Examination", Sex Roles, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1980, pp. 99-111.
- OWENS, Craig, "The Discourse of Others: Feminists and Postmodernism", in JENCKS, Charles (Ed.), *The Post-Modern Reader*, London, Academy Editions, 1992, pp. 333-348. Original source: FOSTER, Hal (Ed.), *The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture*, Port Townsend, Bay Press, 1983.
- OWENS, Craig, *Beyond Recognition: Representation, Power, and Culture*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1992.
- PALM, Günther, "Natürliche und künstliche Intelligenz natürliche und künstliche neuronale Netze", *Kunstforum*, Vol. 126, March-June, 1994, pp. 179-184.
- PASSMORE, John, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1966.
- PENLEY, Constance, "Feminism, Psychoanalysis, and the Study of Popular Culture", in GROSSBERG, Lawrence, NELSON, Cary, & TREICHLER, Paula A., 1992, pp. 479-495. (NCAD photocopy file)

PENROSE, Roger, The Emperor's New Mind, London, Vintage, 1989.

- PIAGET, Jean, Structuralism, London, Routledge, 1968. Original source: Le Structuralisme, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1968.
- POLAN, Dana, "Postmodernism and Cultural Analysis Today", in KAPLAN, E. Ann (Ed.), Postmodernism and its Discontents: Theories, Practices, London, Verso, 1988, pp. 45-58.
- POLLOCK, Griselda, "Vision, Voice and Power: Feminist Art History and Marxism", in FRASCINA, Francis, & HARRIS, Jonathan (Eds.), Art in Modern Culture: An Anthology of Critical Texts, London, Phaidon, 1992. Original source: Kvinnovetenskaplig Tidskrift, No. 4, 1981.

i menunia da la forma da compañía de ser en el de la menuna de la forma de la marte de la compañía. Esta de la compañía de la menuna de la defensiva de la compañía de la compañía de la compañía de la compañía de Esta de la compañía d

na manifesta de la presidente de la construcción de la construcción de la construcción de la construcción de l Referencia de la construcción de la

titut Sectificate consense figer e values diger e constant par set productivity for large figer to equal part a set energy free energy

and phase is another in the destinence with lateration starting, the constant of the size of the size is a constant on the Blocker's starting formers. If the Phase Was constants, the size one with the size of the

internation of the second second to the second of the second second second second for the second 1999 Second se

anger (1999) and an and angel an and an and an an angel (1999) an angel an an an an an an angel (1999). An ana angel (1997) an angel angel an an an angel (1999) an an angel (1997) an angel an an angel (1997) an an Angel (1997) angel (1997) angel (1997) angel (1997) angel (1997) an angel (1997) angel (

- POLLOCK, Griselda, "Feminism and Modernism", in PARKER, Rozsika, & POLLOCK, Griselda (Eds.), *Framing Feminism*, London, Pandora, 1987, pp. 79-122.
- POPPER, Karl, "Falsificationism versus Conventionalism", in MILLER, David W. (Ed.), *Popper Selections*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1985, pp. 143-151. Original source: *Logik der Forschung*, Springer, 1934.
- POPPER, Karl, "The Problem of Demarcation", in MILLER, David W. (Ed.), *Popper Selections*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1985, pp. 118-130.
 Original source: "Intellectual Autobiography", in SCHILPP, P. A. (Ed.), *The Philosophy of Karl Popper*, Open Court, 1974.
- POPPER, Karl, "The Self", in MILLER, David W. (Ed.), Popper Selections, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1985, pp. 276-286. Original source: POPPER, Karl, & ECCLES, J., The Self and Its Brain, Springer, 1977.
- RANDO, Flavia, "The Essential Representation of Woman", Art Journal, Vol. 50, No. 2, Summer, 1991, pp. 48-52.
- ROSE, Jacqueline, "Introduction II", in MITCHELL, Juliet & ROSE, Jacqueline (Eds.), *Feminine Sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the Ecole Freudienne*, London, McMillan Press, 1982, pp. 27-57.
- ROSE, Jacqueline, "Sexuality in the Field of Vision", in HARRISON, Charles, & WOOD, Paul (Eds.), Art in Theory, 1900-1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992, pp. 1101-1106. Original source: Difference: On Representation and Sexuality [exhibition catalogue], Museum of Contemporary Art, New York, 1984.
- RUCKER, Rudy, Infinity and the Mind: The Science and Philosophy of the Infinite, London, Paladin, 1982.
- RUSHTON, J. Philippe, "Creativity, Intelligence, and Psychoticism", *Personality* and Individual Differences, Vol. 11, No. 12, 1990, pp. 1291-1298.
- SANTROCK, John W., & YUSSEN, Steven R., Child Development: An Introduction, Dubuque, Wm C. Brown, 1987.

ne pellenne selen film i de seren par l'hier en entre l'hier de seren de l'hier de l'hier de l'hier de l'hier d Ne selen a ben i antipiste de seren d'hier a ben a ben a ben a ben d'hier a ben d'hier a ben d'hier a ben d'hier

(4) STATUTES - Martine Charles and Charles and Charles and Charles for the fact space space.
(4) STATUTES - Martine Charles and Statutes and Charles and Charles (1990).
(4) Statutes and Statutes and Statutes and Statutes and Statutes and Charles (1990).
(4) Statutes and Statutes

er de Bourde, a la ser de Barrage Bourde Berner, de Bourde Berner, de Barrage Bourde Berner, de la contrata de La servición de la servición de Barrage Bourde Bo Professiones de Bourde Bourd

to of the K. Planetae, "Party increases the presentation of Winnergen's interview operations," in the Second second

en de Borden en de la monder de la la de Marie Albare Rederige de la composition Président de la recentral de company de composition de la composition de la composition de la composition de la Président de la composition de la compo

Stanta (E. Contacto) (C. Contacto) (C. E. Substantial) (E. Secondo) (C. Contacto) (

ant a bhfa aite an 1946 ann anna 1977 ann anna 1977 a' bhreach an 1978 ann an 1977 ann ann ann ann ann ann ann Le macair a failteach 1977

a brio de la facilitatione de la secondo da particular como General e andre de la seconda de la seconda de la Compañía de la seconda de la seconda de la facilitativa de la seconda de la seconda de la seconda de la seconda

SCHOR, Mira, "Patrilineage", Art Journal, Vol. 50, No. 2, 1991, pp. 58-63.

- SEARLE, John R., "Minds, Brains, and Programs", in HOFSTADTER, Douglas R.,
 & DENNETT, Daniel C. (Eds.), *The Mind's I*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1981, pp. 353-373. Original source: *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, Vol. 3, 1980.
- SHAFFER, David R., Developmental Psychology: Theory, Research and Applications, Monterey, Brooks/Cole, 1985.
- SHEEHY, Jeanne, "The Training and Professional Life of Irish Women Artists before the Twentieth Century", in *Irish Women Artists*, Dublin, National Gallery of Ireland & Douglas Hyde Gallery, 1987, pp. 7-11.
- SHOTTER, John, Images of Man in Psychological Research, London, Methuen, 1975.
- SIM, Stuart, Beyond Aesthetics: Confrontations with Poststructuralism and Postmodernism, London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992.
- SIM, Stuart, "Structuralism and Post-Structuralism", in HANFLING, Oswald (Ed.), *Philosophical Aesthetics*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992, pp. 405-439.
- SIMONTON, Dean K., "Eminence, Creativity, and Geographic Marginality: A Recursive Structural Equation Model", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 35, 1977, pp. 805-816.
- SMULLYAN, Raymond M., "An Unfortunate Dualist", in HOFSTADTER, Douglas
 R., & DENNETT, Daniel C. (Eds.), *The Mind's I*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1981, pp. 382-388. Original source: *This Book Needs No Title*, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1980.
- SOLOMON-GODEAU, Abigail, "The Legs of the Countess", in APTER, Emily, & PIETZ, William (Eds.), *Fetishism as Cultural Discourse*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 199, pp. 266-306. Original source: *October*, Vol. 39, Winter 1986, pp. 65-108.



- SPIVAK, Gayatri Chakravorty, "The Letter as Cutting Edge", in *In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics*, New York, Methuen, 1987, pp. 3-14. Original source: Yale French Studies, 1977.
- SPIVAK, Gayatri Chakravorty, "Explanation and Culture: Marginalia", in *In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics*, New York, Methuen, 1987, pp. 103-117. Original source: *Humanities in Society*, 1979.
- STAM, Robert, BURGOYNE, Robert, & FLITTERMAN-LEWIS, Sandy, New Vocabularies in Film Semiotics, London, Routledge, 1993.

STURROCK, John, Structuralism, London, Paladin, 1986.

- TICKNER, Lisa, "The Body Politic: Female Sexuality and Women Artists since 1970", in PARKER, Rozsika, & POLLOCK, Griselda (Eds.), Framing Feminism, London, Pandora, 1987, pp. 263-276. Original source: Art History, June 1978, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 236-249.
- TOP, Titia, "Vrouwen in de beeldende kunst: alleen als naakt?", *Psycholoog*, March, 1991, pp. 124-128.
- TURING, Alan M., "Computing Machinery and Intelligence", in HOFSTADTER, Douglas R., & DENNETT, Daniel C. (Eds.), *The Mind's I*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1981, pp. 53-67. Original source: *Mind*, Vol. LIX, No. 236, 1950.
- TURNER, Frederick, "Biology and Beauty", in CRARY, Jonathan & KWINTER, Sanford (Eds.), *Incorporations*, New York, Urzone, 1992, pp. 406-421.
- WARNOCK, Geoffrey, "Berkeley", in GREGORY, Richard L. (Ed.), *The Oxford Companion to the Mind*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987, pp. 82-83.
- WILLIAMS, R., "Means of Cultural Production", in BOCOCK, Robert, & THOMPSON, Kenneth (Eds.), Social and Cultural Forms of Modernity, Cambridge, Polity, 1992, pp. 403-407. Original source: Culture, London, Fontana, 1981.
- WILSON, Elizabeth, Hidden Agendas: Theory, Politics and Experience in the Women's Movement, London, Tavistock, 1986.

ing an and the set of the set of

WOLF, Naomi, The Beauty Myth, London, Vintage, 1990.

- ZIZEK, Slavoj, Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture, Cambridge, October Books, 1991.
- ZOLA, Émile, "Édouard Manet", in FRASCINA, Francis, & HARRISON, Charles (Eds.) *Modern Art and Modernism*, London, Harper & Row, 1982, pp. 29-38.
 Original source: "Une nouvelle manière en peinture: Edouard Manet", *Revue du XIX Siècle*, January 1, 1867.





