



NATIONAL COLLEGE OF ART AND  
DESIGN.  
FACULTY OF DESIGN  
DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL  
DESIGN.

PROGRESS THROUGH  
INGENUITY.

THE ROLE OF IMPOSING DESIGN ON SOCIETY IN  
CATERING FOR ITS NEEDS: RENAULT DESIGN FROM  
THE '60S.

*by*

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NATIONAL COLLEGE OF ART AND  
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DESIGN

## PROGRESS THROUGH INNOVATION

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# PREFACE

More than any other manufactured product, the car enshrines and projects the values of the culture which created it: Ferraris must be red, a Mercedes-Benz has to be the colour of hard metal, not crushed soft fruit.

(Bayley, 1986, pg. 34)

Humanity has always been more at home in France than elsewhere. But the French themselves were not aware of this - their books simply contained the ideology that everyone already recognised.

The better things in life still led a separate existence: the special tone of voice, the feats of gastronomy, the brothels, and the cast iron urinals.

(Adorno, 1944, pg. 40)



# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my thesis supervisor Paul Caffrey, Mrs. K. Stanley, the staff of Auto Ireland, and Steve from Renault U.K., for all their help.

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# INTRODUCTION

Buying a new car represents the second largest purchasing commitment people make, second only to the acquisition of a house. Therefore, reliability and a well-trusted and established marque are obviously important.

But the car is also a designed object, where the purchasers are subject to an environment entirely contrived, clothed in an exterior that is likewise designed. All cars (by definition) will transport their occupants - the comfort of these passengers and their driver is always important - as is the car's appearance, for its expense dictates its status as a symbol of the owners' success.

Driving the car, existing in it, and looking at it, is design imposing itself upon users and those who are subjected to its presence in public places. In transporting its occupants, time is spent in a devised environment; the car is constantly traversing bumps and negotiating corners, and the driver is constantly having to make the effort to concentrate and control the car safely and swiftly, sometimes for long periods of time.

Design should therefore seek to render all the above as pleasurable as possible an experience, by fully utilising its resources. For progress to exist, design must be as underivative as possible, so that drivers can enjoy the driving experience, in a responsive car with good handling and so that all occupants enjoy a comfortable ride, having as much room as possible, in a car which looks new, offering a new style direction, and embodying a new concept. Designer talent and ingenuity must be utilised in this aim, for these people are trained for this work.

By designers remaining focused upon needs and desires, the product's appeal is risen above merely functioning reliably. The car is thus no longer an appliance, but something pleasurable to own, and joyous to use, because the object's designers have followed their own ideas.



The sole aims of management, however, are to make money for the company. Progress requires new solutions which have to be researched, developed and engineered from scratch, which costs much more money than relying on a previous solution.

By relying on a familiar style and concept, designers offer the public something they can easier relate to, and are thus offered what they can accept as progress, rather than the genuine benefits of research and innovation - what designers feel they deserve.

Implicit in Renault designer's attempts in offering the best possible solution is that the product of this innovation reflects its origins. The fact that the car company is French dictates a certain design feel, as does the company's house style dictate small common detail styling, to unify the range, but to preserve the individuality of the solutions.

This design feel will not be pleasing to everyone, and thus narrows the cars appeal. This is not helpful to sales, but those who find French style compatible with their tastes can be enthusiastic about the car's design approach and style. Thus, Renault designers never tried to please all the marketplace all of the time. In doing so, they perceived the market as consisting of people with strong a strong design sense, and set about aiming to please those who find the car's styling approach pleasing.

Corresponding with changes in design philosophies, in the three decades since the 1960s, Renault went from being Europe's most successful car company (between 1973 and 1978 - with a maximum 12 percent penetration in 1975) with its most distinctive range of cars, to being the weakest member of the "big six" European manufacturers, in terms of both sales and image.

Chapter 1 is an analysis of Renault's dominant philosophies of the early sixties and mid - seventies. Two cars will be chosen from this era which epitomise a manifestation of the predominant philosophies.

In their time, the Renault 4 (1961) and its sister Renault 5 (1972) were France's best-selling cars, playing a major role in their manufacturers no. 1 sales position in Europe. The cars will be analysed according to how they related to those who drove them, the public's initial reactions to the cars, and subsequently, the effect they had on the public's perception of the company and subsequent loyalty to Renault products.



These car's imposition upon society will be evaluated according to their originality and excellence in meeting the market's needs in terms of progressive style/concept/engineering solutions - noting particularly how they rose above the requests of their management in what these people thought the public had a right to expect from their new cars. The R4's and R5's character and essence, as directly related to the company's design notions, will be shown as primary factors in establishing these car's appeal above that of mere transportational devices, though these factors will be shown as implicit in the car's conceptualisation. These car's sales will be connected to their successful encompassing of the conditions under which products can successfully be forced upon society.

The necessarily existent management/designer relationship conducive to creating an atmosphere where ingenious design is encouraged and manufactured, must also be looked at. How Pierre Dreyfuss (Director of Design from 1955 - 1964), related to the Renault management will be scrutinised by looking at this management's faith in their designer's instincts. How prepared management were to accept solutions which were unproven will be determined by examining their willingness to take chances in deviating from a previous solution. The presence, at all stages of an individually - minded designer with the power to see an underivative design into production will be shown as crucial to a manufacturer's success in imposing design solutions upon society.

From scrutiny of the car's success throughout their life-span, the public's initial reactions to products following this philosophy (and their possible negative reactions to new Renault products) will be shown as almost predictable. When a product thoughtfully embodies unique solutions, this reaction will be shown as undemonstrative of the car's success in the long term.

This chapter will define exactly how the Renault philosophy placed, in essence, the needs of the consumer above those of the manufacturer. Consequently, through adhering to this philosophy, the car's appeal was risen above that of merely replacing an obsolete car with something convenient to produce. By Renault's seeking to address the market's desires, customers were regarded as humans with needs and wants, rather than a faceless mass, unappreciative of designer and management efforts, in their attempt to produce the best possible solution. Innovation and style flourished in Renault during this period



The first step in the process of identifying a problem is to define the problem. This involves identifying the symptoms of the problem and determining the scope of the problem. Once the problem has been defined, the next step is to identify the causes of the problem. This involves identifying the factors that are contributing to the problem and determining the relationships between these factors. The final step in the process is to develop a solution. This involves identifying the options available and determining the best option for the situation.

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- the boundaries of what could be expected from a car were shoved to their extremes in those classes where the company represented itself.

The chapter will associate the success and popularity of Renault's '60s cars with the design ideals which brought them about - noting the requisite of an individually minded designer talent which sees the market as consisting of individuals, with needs and desires, as well as the conditions which needed to exist between designer/management/consumer, in order to allow that design talent to manifest itself in mass-produced cars.

Chapter 2 examines why Renault lost £360 million in 1985. The Renault 18 (1978) and the Renault 19 (1987) will be analysed, to gauge the level at which this epoch of Renault cars appealed to their market. The cars will be assessed according to the same methods as in the previous Chapter (their embodying a design opinion which encouraged innovation in concept/style/engineering whenever beneficial to the consumers wants/needs).

This Chapter will show how Renault was mis-managed in this period - those in charge of the company taking a hand in the car's design coupled to unsolidly-built cars with practically no innovation/ingenuity, the cars will be shown as unappealing to either the mainstream, or to those who traditionally liked Renault's design style.

Having had thus established the parameters of Renault's appeal within the marketplace, both in producing cars whose design is the sole work of free designers, and models designed by non-designers, the relevant role of a design belief which enforces its solutions upon the market and its benefits to the consumer will be apparent.

In Chapter 3, those ideologies which will dictate the level of Renault car's appeal within the context of a newly unified Europe, as established under the reign of the current design director, Patrick Le Quement (Design Director since 1988) will be scrutinised.

In previously deciding on the relative benefits and relevancy of obviating design (Renault's heritage) and a design notion which produces cars whose forms appear coincidental (design post - 1975), Renault's success within the new market will be forecasted in this Chapter, as can the possibility of a universal application of imposing design upon society.

The adherence, or otherwise, of the Renault Scenic (1991) and the Renault Twingo (1992), to the company's heritage will be deduced



using the same methods of analysis as used in the previous two chapters - the needs of the new Europe noted using studies by the design historian Penny Sparke (25 March 1992 lecture at N.C.A.D.).

This thesis will deduce whether the manufacture of cars whose designs are progressive and distinctive suffer from a narrowing of appeal. It will be clear that only those who can accept their product's aiming to establish a level of appeal where reliability, efficiency, newly freshened appearance and features are not as emphasised as progressive engineering/design, and a highly regionalised and distinctive style will buy these cars.

This work will also assess whether producing products which inevitably have a bad initial effect on their market (in being enforced upon it) manifests, at the same time, products which are not prone to premature obsolescence, giving a unique joy in use in making the life of the user a little happier, by seeking to satisfy desires as well as needs. The concept of brand loyalty to a manufacturer which offers products whose appeal encompasses more than straightforward performance, reliability and efficiency will be assessed, as will whether designers can be trusted in being granted minimum accountability to their employers, in striving to satisfy their client - the people who will buy the cars.



# CHAPTER 1:

## *RENAULT'S '60S NOTIONS ON IMPOSING DESIGN UPON SOCIETY*

As epitomes of a design for the market's needs and desires notion, the 1961 Renault 4 and the 1972 Renault 5 will be focused upon in this chapter. By showing how these cars were innovative and yet relatively inexpensive to buy to their market, distinctively styled and yet offering new levels of versatility and space - utilisation (uniquely extending the limits of what could be expected of comparable cars), it will be pointed out that these cars were created solely with the intention of giving the buyer the best and most ingenious solution.



*(Fig. 1.1: Renault 4CV.)*

The R4 was to replace the 1948 R4CV (see fig 1.1). In its own era, the R4CV was the Renault which utilised the latest



engineering, married to a distinctive and pretty body to meet its market's needs. The engine, transmission and drive train layout of this car was dictated (and limited) by its adhering to the well proven "all to the rear" philosophy (where the engine and transmission were placed at the rear of the car), typical of post-war cars: reflective of a lack of resources, as opposed to a lacking of ingenuity or ability.

Renault management's brief to its designers as to what the essence of the replacement for the R4CV should be was simple :- the

new budget car should have a comfortable suspension,  
with the manoeuvrability needed for poor second class  
roads - together with excellent access

(Bernis, 1991, pg. 26).

The design director, Pierre Dreyfuss (1955 - 1964), looked beyond these stated needs of what the company believed this car's clientele had the right to expect in the budget car class (buyers of inexpensive cars were accustomed to crude and cheaply designed machinery).

Dreyfuss initiated a separate assessment of the market's needs, and saw no reason why his successor to the 4CV should not also be designed and engineered to be as economical as possible, while still adhering to the brief. Despite being a bargain car, there was no reason why it shouldn't be designed and engineered with versatility, responsiveness, lightening the driving effort and maximising the available room to the forefront of the designer's mind.

This ideology became the unstated cornerstone of Dreyfuss' vision of Renault products. Rather than looking purely to the brief set to him by the company management (who couldn't see the need for a car much more accomplished than, and similar to, the R4CV, because that was how they perceived the market's feelings on what they wanted), and with the use of the company's sociologists, Dreyfuss established that the customer's desires far exceeded what this car offered - bearing in mind that engineering advances allowed a better solution.


Fundamental change was initiated in conceiving his 4CV replacement. Dreyfuss contradicted the conservative needs and expectations of his employers by giving the R4 front - wheel - drive, and putting the car's engine at that end of the car. In freeing the passenger cell of the power/transmission assembly (giving greater room to passengers), the packaging benefits of this engineering solution meant that the need to engineer, from scratch, a more complex



resolution than the Renault 4CV's arrangement was considered worth undertaking.

Stability benefits of "pulling" the car were coupled to novel suspension (independent torsion - bar) and steering (rack - and - pinion) types. The R4 (see fig. 2.1) was precisely engineered to fully utilise the benefits of its innovative engineering solutions. The result was a revelation to drive :- stable in crosswinds, agile in direction - changing, a car that could be handled swiftly, safely and accurately over any French road.

The suspension was engineered to provide comfort: the car was light and precise to drive, whilst remaining extremely manoeuvrable. Renault's 4 was a leader in its class. The car's positioning of its wheels at its extreme corners meant comfortable and stable fast driving, as well as predictable handling. Its' unusually long wheelbase, a by-product of the wheel (and thus suspension) - at - a - corner styling, also meant that the unusually long passenger cell was uncluttered.



(Fig. 2.1: The Renault 4)

With four doors, and a hatch door that extended all the way to the car's roof, the versatility offered by the novel new R4 was unequalled. Ingenuity extended to sealing the gearbox - rendering obsolete the need for expensive greasing, as had been the norm in cars




in this class. Innovating where needed/desired, Dreyfuss pushed back boundaries, and then saw to it that these introductions were efficiently utilised - all the time, Renault's head of design focused on the needs and wants of his market.

Refinement was also a feature of the design. The roof was designed to prevent "drumming" - where the roof reverberates with the engine's vibrations. The car also had an up - to - date heating system.


The R4's function and behaviour in use were at levels far above those of its competitors. Dreyfuss had honed in on a targeted desire - not recognised by his management - and responded with a car of new standards, whilst remaining at the same price level.

Utility dictated the style - for the R4 had its own, a honest, unpretentious style unaffected by fashion:- a rusticated, unpretty car, from conceptualisation to final development, Renault 4's adhering to the market's current taste was non-existent. The third window at the rear, and the minimalist interior, all reflected the fact that the car was intended to be practical (see fig. 2.2), in keeping with the car's role as a rugged carry-all, whose interior would have to be easily cleaned and maintained.



*(Fig. 2.2: Renault 4's versatility)*








To the bourgeois Parisian (perhaps as a second car - in which case, to be driven primarily by women), the R4 offered economy, five doors, manoeuvrability, ease of driving (because the car was so light and efficiently engineered), light operation of all the controls, comfort over cobblestones and composure around corners.

Working - class Frenchmen could utilise the R4's amazing carrying versatility - the car could carry any load which fitted between the rear bumper and the roof. The rear seat could be removed, the car was robust, and because of its high ride height, it could cross most fields with ease (see fig. 2.3).

As desired by all buyers in its market, it was also inexpensive in operation. The car offered enjoyable and secure driving characteristics and stood out from other designs. The car's appeal on these levels was above that of cars conceived to solely fill the transport for the masses role. To Dreyfuss, who had designed this car (which was to become France's most successful ever), it would appear as though that had to be done was launch the car and stock the garages.



(Fig. 2.3: Renault 4)

However, there existed among the management those who doubted severely whether such a huge break with a previous solution



was appropriate. Pre-launch reactions (from women in particular) were off - putting ; they reacted very badly to the car's rustic styling.

Dreyfuss had to persuade the board of his conviction that these reactions - both that the car was too progressive, and too without a fashionable style - were not reliable indicators of the cars potential. In launching the R4, Renault management were convinced that it was a gamble. At the 1961 Paris salon de L' automobile, their fears would seem to have been founded, as the initial public reaction to the launched car was indeed poor. A bad indication was the fact that at the press shoot for the Italian market brochure, no model would allow herself be pictured beside the car, as they were repelled by the car's initial impact.

All it took was a drive, however, for anybody to realise that the car was just what they needed/desired, and after the initial reaction to the car had eased, it quickly earned a reputation as a revelation.

Every part of the R4 reflected its instinctual design by a designer solely concerned for the individual's needs. Its consistent unencompassing of superficial luxury items echoes the cars placement at the lower scale of the market - and yet the company heritage that it adheres to ensures the car is neither cold nor anaesthetised - rather it was responsive, agile, easy to drive, and comfortable. At all times guided by what the public actually needed/desired, rather than what the company felt it was prudent to produce, the car is the product of a visionary individual (Dreyfuss) - its character and essence are unique, and only that niche in society who can appreciate its essence, strong French style and excellence in aiming to cater solely for society's needs can ever truly appreciate its appeal and design honesty, in not lending itself to a calculated 'modernise a dated concept' notion.

Thus R4 rose above its role of mere basic transport - the car was unique in the extent of its attempts to address the traditional inefficiencies of cars in its class. The market's preconceptions on how cars in the R4's class could be expected to perform were superseded - thus was the car so successful for such a long time. Inherent in its embodying a honest and uncompromising design ideology, the car's unfashionable style and progressive engineering/concept led to a classless appeal. To those without much money to spend, this permitted the Renault 4's charm to override its spartan nature. From conceptualisation, the car was meant as one that defied its low placing in the market. Though its customers were without much money to spend, the car did not offer this market mere cheaply designed transport,



The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that proper record-keeping is essential for the integrity of the financial system and for the ability to detect and prevent fraud. The document also highlights the need for transparency and accountability in all financial activities.

The second part of the document focuses on the role of internal controls in ensuring the accuracy and reliability of financial information. It outlines the key components of an effective internal control system, including the establishment of clear policies and procedures, the assignment of responsibilities, and the implementation of monitoring and reporting mechanisms. The document stresses that internal controls are a critical line of defense against errors and fraud.

The third part of the document addresses the importance of regular audits and reviews in identifying and correcting weaknesses in the financial system. It discusses the different types of audits, such as internal audits and external audits, and the role of auditors in providing independent and objective assessments of the organization's financial health. The document also emphasizes the need for management to act on the findings of audits and to implement corrective actions to improve the system.

The fourth part of the document discusses the role of technology in enhancing financial reporting and control. It highlights the benefits of using modern accounting software and data analytics tools to streamline processes, reduce errors, and provide real-time insights into financial performance. The document also notes the importance of ensuring the security and integrity of financial data in a digital environment.

The fifth and final part of the document provides a summary of the key points discussed and offers recommendations for improving financial reporting and control. It emphasizes the need for a strong culture of integrity and ethical behavior, as well as ongoing training and education for all employees. The document concludes by stating that a robust financial reporting and control system is essential for the long-term success and sustainability of any organization.



by being a non-risk update of the 4CV. It is a response to the needs of its market in being versatile, spacious and easy to drive. But it also responded to its market as consisting of people with as much a right as anyone to enjoy motoring, by embodying the most up to date engineering/conceptualisation/distinctive styling solutions possible, regardless of what solutions the predecessor offered, wholly idealising a successful incorporation of Dreyfuss' convictions.


The Renault 4's design honesty, in appearing French, and embodying the Renault design style, is all-encompassing. The car's designers absolute intention in bringing the best new solutions, regardless of fashion and the influence of non-designers in the design process (whilst remaining relevant to the market's desires, due to the designers focusing upon these), contrives to the car's appeal above that of a calculated obsolescence - since adhering to fashion or the dictates of society is not part of Renault's design stance in this epoch. Because the cars are launched as such progressive designs, their standards of ride/handling/comfort/convenience/versatility was not likely to date very quickly, relative to the other designs on the market.

In this era, the instance of the Renault 5 compounds the company's ideals on imposing design upon society.

Devised by Michel Boue (Renault Assistant Designer in the sixties), the car serves as a model of Renault designer's ability to recognise a gap in what manufacturers offered to address society's needs. In initiating the R5 (see fig 3.1), Boue saw that there was a need in the economy car class for a city car, a "chic" car - a more feminine, less spartan vehicle, with front wheel drive, of simple and logical form. He felt that this need wasn't being sufficiently filled by the R4 - because of its rustic style and ruggedness (Bonnaud, 1992, p. 22).

However, the R4 also filled the gap at the bottom of Renault's range - where the proposed car would be positioned. Effectively, Renault would have two cars in roughly the same price range if the car were produced. The fact that the car would be smaller than the R4, but would command a higher price because of its less spartan nature, meant that the battle to get the car produced would be an uphill one for those who were convinced that it was feasible. The R5 was to be the stylish baby saloon - Renault's first niche model.





(Fig. 3.1: Renault 5)

Since the driving requisites of this car were very little different from the Renault 4, that car's chassis could be used, if fine tuned to this cars weight balance.

M. Dreyfuss took on the case of the car. In his embracing the notion of the car, its feasibility was more credible. Once again, the car overcame the brief of:

to be capable of transporting, on all roads, either two people and lots of baggage, or 4 people and some baggage .. to be aimed at the city lifestyle

(Bonnaud, 1992, pg. 26).

The car was indeed a lifestyle car - and its appeal to women was to last throughout its lifetime. The R5's style - pretty, with pert proportioning - was as original as its concept. So finely was the car engineered, that it was blessed with new standards of ride and comfort, like the R4. Its versatility (though hindered by the three door only option - deemed more suitable for the car's role as a second car) was helped by its folding rear seat - a first.

To emphasise the car's endearing, pretty and unaggressive appeal, the designers gave its front a subliminal "face" - the car's headlights resembled eyes, its grille (with its rise upwards towards its corners) a smiling mouth. In this way, the car's unaggressive appeal was subtly insinuated. The rear was brash - high indicators were, uniquely, placed vertically around the car's c - pillar. Like the R4, the



R5 did not sell well for the first few months of sales, having had much the same initial effect on its market as its sister. As before, all the doubts about the car's mass-produced viability would seem to have been well - founded. But the car was conceived with a certain appeal in mind - focusing on traditional inefficiencies by manipulating the best possible technology, and new design ideas, so that the buyer got the best solution possible.



(Fig. 3.2: Renault 5)

The car's chic, friendly and fresh style (see fig. 3.2) was to appeal to feminine buyers, who were further attracted to the concept by the fact that the car was versatile, extremely light, responsive and comfortable to drive, economical, and easily manoeuvred.

The R5 went on to spearhead Renault's thrust upon the European market - the company was the best seller in Europe for most of the '70s. It was the best - selling car in France for a decade, and rated in most European Countries top - seller lists for most of the decade. Its purposefully narrow appeal, in having only three doors, was finally rectified by Renault in 1980, by their giving the car five doors. The R4 still sold sufficiently to stay in production.

It is in the '60s and '70s period that the concept of brand loyal to Renault emerges. Renault drivers usually bought Renault's again -



for the company's appeal was based on their designers addressing real and current needs and desires - best appreciated by owning the car. This was the biggest appeal of the company's products, directly connected to their design progress ideologies.


Either in the case of replacing a current car, or addressing a new need, the customer's needs were always evaluated afresh. New concepts were usually initiated, and the cars were always distinctive. Every new car represented new thinking, and the new solutions were always packaged in a visually stimulating new shape. The style of any new Renault car's shape had a consistently Renault style, French in execution.



*(Fig. 4.1: Renault 16)*

Renaults such as the R16 (see fig.4.1), R12 (see fig 5.1) and Alpine - Renault (see fig. 6.1), further exemplify the company's ability to take a car in a specific segment, and give it new definition by introducing new standards of handling, ride, versatility, economy, stability and, most of all, comfort to that class, always clothed by a visually stimulating body, of underivative layout.









WELL, BILL, IT'S THE CAR REALLY I MEAN FOR SHEER COMFORT AND PERFORMANCE THERE'S NOTHING TO TOUCH THEM. THEY'RE DEFINITELY THE BEST ECONOMICAL FAMILY CAR IN THE BUSINESS. YOU'VE GOT FRONT-WHEEL DRIVE WITH RADIALS AND SERVO-ASSISTED DISC BRAKES FOR A START. THAT FANTASTIC SUSPENSION, LUXURIOUS SEATING, AND LITTLE TOUCHES LIKE HEATED REAR WINDOW, THROUGHFLOW VENTILATION - EVEN A CIGAR LIGHTER. AND DID I SHOW YOU HOW THE FRONT SEATS RECLINE...

WHAT A DRIVE, JACK.

ALL IT NEEDS IS A GOOD DRIVER.


**You can't stop Renault owners talking about it!**

**RENAULT 12**

Smiths (Distributors) Ltd., Chapelizod, Dublin 20. Tel. (01) 365711

(Fig. 5.1: Renault 12)





*(Fig. 6.1: Renault Alpine)*

In most of their products, the manufacturer demonstrated a unique French and Renault style (inherent in the car's stance, and driving behaviour), and, above all, a fresh approach. All the time, the design department considered what they felt was right for the customer's needs/desires and were free to react to the findings of their sociologists by fully exploiting their talents. This resulted in Renault's car's desirability, whose appeal was based on an ability to make the driver feel (regardless of price) that they got the best, most stylish compromise - assured by the company's design departments designing solely for the market's needs/desires, and the company's imposing these design on society.



## CHAPTER 2:

### *IMPLICATIONS OF A CHANGE IN PHILOSOPHY*

This chapter will examine the next generation of Renaults that replaced the R12, R16 and R5 family, incurred during and after the oil - crisis that dominated the '70s. The Renault 18 and 19 will be contrasted with the R5 and R4 of the previous generation, with respect to their representation of the company's heritage, their subsequent success, and the car's effect on the public's perception of the marque.



*(Fig. 7.1: Renault 18)*

The 1978 R18 (see fig. 7.1) represented a change in the design of Renault cars - the first product of Gaston Buchet's 1975 changes to Renault Management. The car was the first Renault with international appeal - designed to be sold to the largest possible number of people,



especially those outside France. At this time, Renault had purchased the American Motor Corporation (AMC), and in the interests of saving money, the cars destined for the European market would also be sold in America, incorporating as few as possible changes, for cost reasons. For reasons of either national propaganda, traditional market or taste, French design (because of its strong regionality and language) is often distasteful to segments of exterior markets.

Within the context of creating cars for an oil-conscious market, and the need to produce cars that are compatible with diverse American and European tastes, design was felt to be too important to be trusted solely to designers. In this reassimilation of Renault, Buchet rationalised Renault designer's freedom in encompassing their ideas on how best to address car buyers needs. He intended that Renault would create cars that offended as few Americans as possible whilst appealing to the conservative European market, whose tastes were closest to those of the Americans.

By seeking a dilution of their distinctive French style in this way, Management decided the talents and insights of their designers were insufficiently trustworthy as a means of initiating and finalising cars that the company would manufacture. Through engineering/designing perceived quality, uniformity and non-distinctiveness in cars (always under Management supervision), the attraction of this generation of Renault car would centre less on style and progress, and more on convenience, conservatism and reliability.

To appeal more to this new market in replacing their R12, Renault Management decided that the straightforward, established concept (the established four - door saloon format, with engine to the front, and front - wheel - drive), was appropriate. This layout assured a comfortable ride and traditional Renault driving characteristics, but in other respects, the car offered no more than its competitors (Ford Cortina, Opel Ascona, Peugeot 305 etc.), and because ingenuity was disallowed, the car was not much of an advance over the R12.

Unlike the R12, the R18's style was neither distinctive nor original. The angular, distinctive profile of the R12 was dropped, in favour of a more insipid, rounded profile with conventional proportioning and no sculptural detailing of the body (see fig. 7.2).





*(Fig. 7.2: Renault 18's profile)*



*(Fig. 7.3: Renault 18)*



It is the nose of the car (see fig. 7.3) where its blandness is most apparent. This Renault initiated the use of "family face" styling. Renault's "family face" integrated visually the grill, lights and indicators of their range of cars in one slat which spanned the car's front - a most obvious way to establish a visual common identity between a range of cars. Renault emulated the styling devices employed by prestigious marques, like BMW and Mercedes-Benz (manufacturers who incorporate an established and atypical family face in their narrow range of cars), to give their products a convincingly coherent style. Renault's family face was most damaging to their prestige models, for it established too strong a styling link between their disparate range, which spanned nearly all car classes and prices. Their larger car's prestige was diversely affected by Renault's small cars having the same styling and design detail treatment of their large saloons. Far from designing for the disparate market segments, who would buy these cars, the whole Renault range looked too similar, in the same unimaginative way.

Management had dictated a corporate styling approach to their designers. This was the antithesis of the designer/management relationship which brought about cars like the Renault 4, 5 & 16 - cars conceived and styled by designers who were free to follow their ideas on new solutions to newly perceived needs.

The car was a team effort, a reversal of the previous responsibility given to designers. Under Robert Opron, the new director of design (from 1975 to 1984), several designers such as Olivier Mourgue, Mario Bellini and Terence Conran, were employed as consultants.

The Company now produced products which were conceived without regard to the desires of customers, resulting in products which met solely logical needs. The R18 adhered to what Renault company bosses felt appropriate in the gloom of the oil - crisis: sensible, low-risk and uninteresting cars, which merely updated an out-of-date model, offering little advance in either style or engineering over their predecessor (the R12 in this case). The designers of this generation of Renaults were not allowed to instil an appeal on any terms other than newness, convenience and reliability - in direct contrast with the company's heritage, which more completely incorporated all these factors, while producing a car which was more satisfying to own, and use.



The first part of the report is a general introduction to the subject of the study. It discusses the importance of the study and the objectives of the research. The second part of the report is a detailed description of the methodology used in the study. This includes a discussion of the data sources, the sampling method, and the statistical techniques used to analyze the data. The third part of the report is a presentation of the results of the study. This includes a discussion of the findings and their implications. The final part of the report is a conclusion and a list of references.

The study was conducted in a systematic and rigorous manner. The data was collected from a representative sample of the population. The statistical analysis was performed using appropriate techniques. The results of the study are presented in a clear and concise manner. The findings of the study are discussed in detail, and their implications are explored. The study provides valuable insights into the subject of the research. The methodology used in the study is described in detail, and the data sources are clearly identified. The statistical techniques used to analyze the data are also described. The results of the study are presented in a clear and concise manner. The findings of the study are discussed in detail, and their implications are explored. The study provides valuable insights into the subject of the research.



The effect of Renault's 18/14/20/9/11/Supercinque losing their identity, relative both to other cars in their market, and to the other cars in their range, lost the company much credibility. The buyer of the R20 couldn't be sure that the replacement for the R9 would look appreciably different from his car to justify him buying the more expensive car - its prestige being adversely affected, its distinctiveness and progression non-existent.

In not having been enforced upon society, but a product of its wishes, the initial market impact of the R18 was extremely good. The car continued to sell extremely well for that length of time until it took the cars to rust or prove unreliable. For then, the sales of the car fell to the floor, because its regular style was not endearing. Its convenience and handling, if not comfort and stability, were matched by many other competitors. There was no longer joy to be found in class-leading driving pleasure, new levels of versatility, or styling that was visually stimulating and enduring in clothing a new concept, as had been the case with the R4, R5 and R16.

Their products suffered from poor image, bad company morale, and patchy build quality. By deciding to appeal to the international conservative buyer, Renault car's lacking high build quality (a typically French car weakness) shattered Renault's credibility and reputation. In deciding design (rather than mismanagement and lack of quality control) was the cause of Renault's misfortune, those in charge ordered evermore unprogressive products as the company fell deeper into the red. In the years between 1981 and 1987, Renault lost £6 billion sterling.

The company's products offered no more obvious appeal than anybody during this era. There existed many manufacturers offering the correct blend of quality and reliability in the market segment in which Renault now competed, whose product's appeal in these terms was well established. Renault's dilution of their car's heritage in order to find new customers meant that the cars were unadvanced: the company ceased to offer progressive solutions which brought new standards to the market in which they were sold, and those who associated the company's products with a French and Renault design approach, were disillusioned.


Following the R18, the 1981 Renault 9, the next Renault designed for the world market, made such an impression at its launch, *and* in the following months, that a hatchback version, the R11 had to be rushed into production - a clear indication of Renault product's



incompatibility with the market's needs. It is with this car that the manufacturer began using marketing clinics in their car's final development - something that was to dictate the final shape of their cars for the next ten years.

With the launch of the 1987 Renault 19 (see fig. 8.1) came a period of radical change for Renault. Very shortly after the launch of the car, the Chairman, Georges Besse, was assassinated. This was also the year that Renault ceased to lose money, through redundancy and rationalisation.

The Renault 19 illustrated a result of marketing researcher's assumption of the designer's role in deciding a new car's final form. Through research, it became clear that Renault's build quality was a problem for the conservative customers who formed the vast majority of those who would be interested in a car with international appeal. Therefore, the brief for the new Renault 9 was to build a "solidly - built Renault in the B - B1 (Volkswagen Golf) class sector".(Renault 19 press release, pg.35, 1992).




(Fig. 8.1: Renault 19)

This segment in Europe is dominated by the Volkswagen Golf - by far Europe's most solidly built, conservative and successful car in its class. As solidity was the only stipulation in the brief, Renault




spent £500 million modernising their plants, to bring the quality of their new car up to Golf levels - Volkswagen's car in this class being the well established yardstick of high build quality, reliability and perceived solidity.



(above: Fig. 8.2: Renault 19's rear view below: Fig. 8.3: Renault 19's profile)







Not alone did the company emulate the Golf's build quality, the R19 also borrowed the Golf's layout, overall dimensions, and some styling cues, such as the high positioning of the rear lights (see fig. 8.2 and 8.3). The original Golf's designer was the Italian Giorgetto Giugaro. He was employed to design a competitor to the Golf - international in appeal - to emulate that car's concept, and styling cues. Thus, the R19 was not designed to feel French, to look French, to be ingenious in engineering or design terms, or to excel in any way.


The car was meant to offer nothing new at all, in any respect, for this would mean that the car would impose unfamiliar design solutions upon society. The Renault 19 was intended to merely fulfil what was dictated to the designers in their brief. Because of management's purging of the car's heritage, it could have come from a number of companies of any nationality. It had neither innovation nor style to attract conservative customers, solely serving as an alternative to a well - established concept (the Golf), from a well - established company in this marketplace. If a competitor's car was newer than the R19, or even a little cheaper, then there would be little reason why that car should not be bought in preference to the Renault - because perceived solidity, build quality, newness, reliability and convenience were the only things which interested Renault's market researchers, who had full control over Renault's cars. To finalise the design, market impact forecasts of the proposed new Renault involved showing various prospective buyers (perhaps 100) the new car along with rivals in the same class (this process is referred to as design clinicing). The impact that the car makes in the space of a few minutes was solely relied upon in forecasting the extent of its purely logical appeal.

With this car, Dreyfuss' attempts to build cars of individual character with sustaining appeal, had been lost. The 19 was neither flesh nor fowl - it offered nothing unusual/exceptional enough to be esteemable, and because the market researchers had ensured that no element of the car had a hint of the avant - garde, it also wasn't detestable, with maximum sales occurring at launch.

In order to appear solid, the car 's lines were styled to look heavy and strong, in contrast with the Renaults of the previous generation. The rear pillar was too thick, and the high rear - end styling emulated the Golf, as did the high positioning of the rear lights, the extremely integrated overall styling, the dark cabin colours, and slab - sided dashboard (see fig. 9.4). In emulating the Golf's style, the car did



successfully appeal as a sturdy object, which would be reliable and functional, but in an extremely unoriginal way.



(Fig. 9.4: Renault 19 dashboard)

It also engendered no esteem above that incurred through functioning reliably and efficiently. The R19 stood for everything that Dreyfuss had fought against in getting the R4, R5 and R16 into production. It was not in the least an advancement over the R9/R11, except in terms of appearing better built, therefore being much heavier and less economical. Coupled with the loss of a French and Renault penchant for distinctive styling, fresh concepts, and ingenious engineering, the car stood for a complete rebuking of the convictions of the previous generation of Renault's designers.

Through an embracement of the design for the world notions, Renault's appeal had been debased solely to the levels of maximum sense of newness, solidity and seamless functionality - offered in droves from other companies at the same time. Unlike Renault's previous generation of cars, there was nothing to persuade the Renault 19 owner that a Renault possessed a special something, over other manufacturers, in terms of driving/engineering or concept/styling.

Renault did get the quality of the R19 comparable with that of the Golf and the car was to become the best - selling import in the land



from which came that car upon which they based the needs of their customers: Germany, land of the Golf, where it won the 1992 ADAS award for most reliable car in the lower medium category. The "Neustros Talleres" Spanish trade magazine found the car most reliable vehicle and found it designed to be the easiest to maintain. The car's popularity has declined in the face of newer competitors like Citroen's ZX, the new Volkswagen Golf, Opel's Astra, etc, confirming the fact that its newness was a main factor in its appeal to its market segment.

There existed many manufacturers doing what Renault decided to do. In choosing to compete with them on their own level the company management gave design responsibility to external consultancies, to dilute the Frenchness out of their cars. Through clinicing, market research people manipulated family face, distilled character, and initiated non-impact design, to meet the needs of the new target market. Renault management turned on those who wanted more than just transport from their cars, and offered them alternatives to what existed, rather than something completely new, as had been the case in the previous generation of cars. In doing so, they insufficiently met the needs of their new market by building unsolid cars, losing the company as much credibility as money.

All those factors conducive to labelling the cars of the previous generation as exponents of a design notion which seeks to solely fulfil the market's needs had been lost in the 1975 re - assertion of Renault, leaving the company a second-rate producer of uninteresting cars, with a maximum appeal of 3 years from new, offering progress to nobody.



## CHAPTER 3:

### *RENAULT'S DESIGN STANCE FOR THE '90S*

The late '80s are important because of the reorganisations incurred at management level, and subsequently to Renault's design department. The 1988 assassination of company chairman Georges Besse, brought about a change in management, resulting in another redefinition of Renault designer's relationship to society and the company management. Renault had lost £360 million sterling the previous year, and elimination of these losses took the priority.

The newly-appointed Chairman did not come from a background in the car industry. Raymond Levy (Chairman 1988 - 1992), having had come from the iron and steel industry, recognised that Renault's management having such a decisive input in design was inappropriate (he felt managers had no instinct for this work) and his deciding that this interference would not continue under his directorship initiated the most important change in relation to Renault designer's freedom in encompassing whatever design solutions they felt appropriate in addressing the customer's needs. Gaston Buchet (Director of Design from 1984 - 1987) resigned, and was replaced by Patrick Le Quement, Director of Design since 1988.


Le Quement's new design/marketing policies for the company are outlined in his thesis. Fully endorsed by Levy, it offered Le Quement's unfettered opinions on Renault's '60s - mid '70s philosophies, as well as those that were in place up until his arrival.

The importance of Levy's placing design responsibility undividedly with the design instincts of his Design Director, is of the utmost importance in relation to the company's potentially re-embodiment of their heritage. Just as in the '60s, Renault's Design Director has a free reign in incorporating his ideas on how Renault design should relate to society, however drastically different these may be.



Since the company's design ideology was solely incurred by a designer free to react to his perceptions of society's needs, it is a unique example of how relevant the future role of design imposed upon society is perceived by an unconstrained Design Director.

The conceptualisation, design and development of cars takes 5-6 years, and only one Renault which exemplifies the current epoch's views - the 1992 Twingo (see fig. 9.1), is in production.




*(Fig. 9.1: Renault Twingo)*

Within the constraints of designing a production car (car's components compatibility with mass-manufacturing processes, sales to justify mass-production, and the increased capital expenditure of setting up factories to produce the car), Twingo's scrutiny is extremely important in determining whether Renault's designers can fulfil the conditions necessary for Renault car's reassuming their predecessor's role in the '60s.


However, the conceptualisation, design and development of show cars takes much less time, as their launch to the public does not have to coincide with mass - production sales. By their embodying a manufacturers design ideals, show cars are meant to be an exciting epitome of the company's potential, and future plans. Therefore, the Scenic (1991) (see fig. 10.1), intended as a technological show-case for Renault for their 1991 stand at the Frankfurt Auto Messe car show, can







be examined to gauge how Renault's head of design regards the thought of looking to the market's needs and responding with an instinctually progressive, original design, unconstrained from even the constraints of mass-production. In an altered form, Scenic is also the basis for a niche development of the next generation of the R19 range.



*(Fig. 10.1: Renault Scenic)*

How these cars reflect Le Quement's and Renault management's vision on how relevant the Renault heritage is to '90s society's needs will be gauged, as will how the company intends to manipulate their heritage in fulfilling the needs of a new unified Europe. A study of the new Europe's needs has been undertaken by Penny Sparke, which will be used to assess Renault's compatibility with this new society's needs. As previously, the cars will be assessed according to their innovative and ingenious responses to the needs (highlighted by Sparke) of those people to whom the car will be offered - embodying the essence of the manufacturer's traditional derivation.

(Ciniti, 1991, pg. 35)

In theory, its traditional design stance is preserved in the '90s Renault design department. In disregarding the results of marketing clinics, Le Quement aims to build Renaults which are purchased



because they are distinctive, innovative and stylish. Through owning the cars from the latest era, their excellence and unique appeal will offer reasons supplementary to logic why they should remain with the marque for their next purchase, for these cars do not aim to merely function flawlessly, or merely compete. As seen in Chapter 2, cars with this type of appeal must be progressive, and are unique to companies which allow their designers to initiate whatever solutions they feel will benefit the consumer the most.

Le Quement's asserting that family face design makes the job of producing a car easier (for there are less variable design elements), but that it results in less distinctive cars for the consumer, is in line with Dreyfuss' dictates. As important, in relation to the Company's tradition, is his distrust of the company's use of exterior design consultancies, holding that only from within can the company produce cars that truly follow its design ideologies in a way which is dependent both on cultural and company heritage.

In also endeavouring to produce a new concept whenever possible, and where not, to introduce new styling, a strong parallel can therefore be drawn between Le Quement's and Dreyfuss' notion of how the company's products will relate to their market.

This inconsistency in the manufacturer's total range being underivable (when only some solutions can utilise new concepts) is that part of the new Renault design's notions which relates it both to the company's traditional design stance, and the needs of the new Europe.

According to Sparke (25 March 1992 lecture at N.C.A.D.), the needs of the new Europe will consist of two parallel markets. One market segment in this new society will consist of those who desire a strong individuality in their products - a strong sense of regionality and distinctive design. The other market is more pan - European, and conservative: a greater concern is placed on the product's quality and reliability. The establishing of these disparate market trends is a pan - European reaction to the stronger links between the different countries (whose individual design styles are strongly regionalised). Because of lowered trade barriers, these countries can now sell their products competitively and freely in the other European states. There now exists less reasons why nationalistic products appeal because they are cheaper. In line with the company's attunement to its' markets needs, Renault will offer a mainstream car (to appeal to the conservative pan -



European market), and an alternative in concept and execution (whose design is wholly in keeping with the company's heritage), in all the car sizes they manufacture.

Within these market segments, new Renault's will follow Le Quement's Most Advanced Yet Acceptable (MAYA) philosophy: a wording of Renaults relating their heritage to the new Europe's needs. (Harvey, 1991, pg. 54).

MAYA decrees that Renaults for the '90s will be as ingenious, daring, and imaginative as possible, according to the confines of whatever is acceptable to the market segment for whom the car will be devised. In relating the heritage to the '90s, a feeling of quality, and a cocooning cabin layout featuring new colours appropriate to that sector will be incorporated in new Renault cars, for the first time, for the former is essential in the new Europe, and the latter is an approach unique to the design studio.

With external design by Anne Ascencio, and interior design By Martine Chevarail, the Scenic is Le Quement's studio's first work in which he claims to have combined the emotive and technological aspects that characterise his view of Renault's appeal. Women's creative role in the new Renault is assured: in being conceived and developed by women, the Renault Scenic is almost unique - only the Japanese batch produced Nissan S-Cargo involves women in car design to such a degree. Women's alternative views and disparate style from men in terms of their style/colour/concept sensitivities, and their positions in Renault Design, mean that their solutions will be fully incorporated in the company, in its attempts to bring fresh ideas and diversity to the car market.


In "deeply exploring the socio - cultural terrain on which the car of the future will have to measure up" (Ciniti, 1991, pg.40), he intends that the car be a reaction to his perception of a new need in society. The niche needs which Scenic addresses are those of the new, young, responsible working couples with a family and a strong sense of family values, who feel that their children should be treated as young adults with individual needs. These mid - 20's to 35's couples, the first generation of parents who grew up during the late '70s and early '80s, feel that as much as possible, life should not be endured, but enjoyed. This idea also extend to the products they utilise.

Since there exists only the conformist mainstream in the current market, the response to these needs has initiated a mid - sized



family car that will appeal to those who feel that a car should cocoon its passengers in luxury and safety: for Le Quement uses an equality in marriage - a common trait among the couples who constitute this market - as a means to qualifying the cars appeal in an affectionate, rather than a passionate way. However exciting a couples life is, when they drive with their children, they "become Scenic, i.e. responsible. Family safety is foremost". Renault designer's traditional wholehearted response to incorporating the latest relevant technology is wholly embodied in the Scenic's theoretical conceptualisation.

(Cinti, 1991, pg. 132).




(Fig. 12.1: Renault Espace)

The car uses the monovolume concept in the layout of its interior. This concept of the mass - produced car, as pioneered the manufacturer in its' Espace (see fig. 12.1) is wholly different from the saloon car approach. A van - like silhouette (see fig. 10.2) means that the driver and passenger are pushed forward in the cabin, which has a flat floor because of the front engined layout. The car is meant as a family car, competing with larger hatchbacks and small estates, due to the extra expense incurred in building a monovolume car. Just as the R5 was supplementary to the R4 in appeal, so would the Scenics'




appeal parallel that of the new 19 - not directly competing with the car, but aimed at a complimentary market sector.



*(10.2: Renault Scenic's profile)*

As a family car it has room for five people, in separated seats, each of which use different coloured upholstery. By separating the seats as much as possible in this way, and yet by a generic seat design, none of the passengers are discriminated: the most innovative piece of design being that of the child seat, called Treasure Island (see fig. 11.3). This seat combines style that is at one with the distinctive interior, but yet one which is warm, safe and functional: the first time the child seat is not an afterthought, muddled into the interior layout, the heightened design means that the baby can look out through the side glass. It's material is typical of the innovative use of trim design, which segregates the seats using colour, and yet consolidates them by using similar colour hues. The overall effect of the cabin cocoons the passengers in comfort - very much in the French, and Renault traditions, and a direct response to the needs of the market.





*(Fig. 10.3: Renault Scenic interior)*



By sliding along the floor, the front console becomes the common console if the children want to play video games : in such design details as these, and in the overall conception of the Scenic, children are treated as part of the journey experience, encouraged by the interior layout.

As in the case of all Renaults of the '60s generation, the benefits of the Scenic's innovative monovolume concept are fully exploited. It is unique in its method of luggage storage (under the floor), its interior layout and overall dimensions.

Although the car appears designed in France, and by Renault, the underivative exterior and interior styling is extremely regionalised, and individualistic. Perforated steel is used for the first time in a car body (see fig. 10.4). In profile, the rear - end styling manages to completely differentiate the car from for a van, by the scallop in the hatch under the window, and by unusual indicator design. Le Quement also displayed innovative engineering solutions in the Scenic, such as the roof support that goes down to the sills only on the driver's side, leaving the passenger side without a centre pillar. On this side of the car, the free space left by this method of roof suspension allowed the location of two doors which open without leaving a central pillar to disrupt access. There is no passenger door on the driver's side of the car, so children cannot get out onto the drivers side of the road - the



safety benefits of not allowing them exit the car into oncoming traffic made possible by the unique engineering solutions. As in the '60s innovations are fully exploited to maximise their benefits, both directly and indirectly.



*(above: Fig. 10.4: Renault Scenic's use of perforated sheet steel, below:fig. 10.5: Rear view of Scenic.)*

The windscreen wiper telescopes from the roof on request, and retracts under a cover that renders the mechanism flush with the roof when not in use. A visual car navigation aid, self - levelling suspension, the use of a camera instead of a mirror for reversing, 4 wheel drive, and the soft - tyre detection system, validate the claim that



the Scenic is a show-case for both technology and safety, responding completely to the deduced desires of his market segment. To partake a journey in the Scenic is to experience the car ride as something to enjoy rather than a waste of time - a feature unique to the medium family car class, the largest in Europe.

(Cinti, 1991, pg.132).

The car is a new concept using new engineering solutions, has a distinctive and original style, and, most importantly, an initial slightly shocking reaction that sinks to affection. Through their conceptualisation and development the designers were totally free to incorporate their ideas on how the needs of the targeted market segment could be filled with a new concept - thus the car can appeal on a wholly different level to that which typifies almost all current cars.

The Scenic can therefore be seen as successfully epitomising the Renault heritage, in striving to fulfil the market's desires. The analysis of the needs of that new European couple who desire more from their car than current solutions can facilitate was felt to be sufficiently present to justify the car, its unique appeal a response to these unfulfilled needs. It represents the avant - garde and is an alternative in concept, styling and engineering; it meets the market's new requisites in an exciting and emotive way. As an epitome of Renault design, Scenic indicates that without the constraints of mass-manufacture, the company is intent in embodying cars which encompass the best possible/feasible solutions, regardless of their ingenuity or underderivativeness.

A successful show car does not need to sell in showrooms, and these cars are only imposed upon those who see them at car show. Design for mass - production must also produce products which appeal sufficiently to earn the company money, and the Scenic only serves to point out to the public who attend car shows the direction the company will take. Most Advanced Yet Acceptable (MAYA) assures market acceptance, and the first potential exponent of this form of design is the Twingo. This car won several awards when announced at the 1992 Paris salon, including "Autocar and Motor's" design of the year award. The car's appeal is meant to parallel the Clio's in the small car class, the latter car appealing extremely well to the mainstream.

Intended as a replacement for neither the Supercinque nor the 4, Twingo is the second monovolume in the Renault range (the Espace being the first), and the first in this market segment. The appeal is to



The document is a copy of a letter from the Secretary of the Department of the Interior to the Secretary of the Department of the Army, dated August 1, 1901. The letter discusses the proposed construction of a dam on the Colorado River, and the need for a survey of the river and its tributaries. The letter is signed by the Secretary of the Department of the Interior, and is addressed to the Secretary of the Department of the Army.

The proposed dam is to be located on the Colorado River, about 10 miles below the mouth of the Grand Canyon. The dam is to be 1,000 feet high, and will have a reservoir behind it. The reservoir will be used for irrigation, and will also be a source of water for the city of Phoenix. The dam is to be built by the Army, and the Department of the Interior is interested in the project because it will affect the land owned by the Department of the Interior.


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the more colour-conscious buyer, who would like their car to be an expression of their lifestyle, and aspirations. These people want the objects they use to express the joy and vibrancy of life, and have no qualms about expressing this vibrancy. They want a simplicity of choice, and detest uniformity or stereotyping in the objects they own, or the life they lead. A strong style is desired, and therefore, a strong statement is expressed. The car represents a lifestyle; it should be as human and friendly in operation as possible, for that is what the market desires.



*(Fig. 9.2: Twingo's versatility)*

Like the R4, the Twingo's wheels are shoved to the car's extremes. Uncommon proportioning is the result of a peculiarly wide, tall and short car. The monovolume concept minimises a car's bonnet length, relative to the car's front, resulting in the car looking slightly van-like in profile. As with Dreyfuss' Renaults, the benefits of innovation in interior layout are fully employed. Among cars of comparable size, Twingo has the most headroom, kneeroom and front and rear shoulder room. Unparalleled versatility in seating is manifest in the rear seat's ability to slide backwards and forwards (when the rear seat is slid along its rails, then the rear legroom is equivalent to a large



saloon car), and partially or fully recline: the cars front and rear seats can combine to make a single or double bed (see fig. 9.2).

Versatility is further exhibited in the car's upright folding rear seat, and the luggage cover which lifts with the hatch, leaving the loading area uncluttered - when the seats are reclined to make a bed, it can be folded completely to screen off the rear window.



*(Fig. 9.3: Twingo's rear view)*

From all angles, inside and out, the appearance of strength and freshness is displayed in the cars design. As in the Scenic, a potentially harsh design is avoided at the rear end of the car. A scallop breaks the edge, and blends beautifully with the lamp housings (see fig. 9.3). When operational, the rear indicator has the appearance of a winking eye, in accordance with the requisite of appearing as human as possible a design. The design of the front head lamps, indicators, and grille, resembles very strongly a smiling face: the overall appearance of the car is uniquely distinctive and friendly (see fig. 9.4). This lends the car a special personality and appeal, solely the result of its designer's uncompromising strife to adhere to the Renault heritage, and the company's '90s ideologies.






*(Fig. 9.4: Twingo's smiling front.)*

Design problems such as how to make the wiper clear such a big screen initiated innovation: a pantograph wiper is used for the first time in a production car. But the car excels in addressing traditional design inefficiencies. The field of vision straight ahead and to the left and right is maximised, because the cabin offers a unique layout (see fig. 9.5). The main control display (speed, fuel gauge etc.) is placed in the centre of the windscreen bay. In this position, the base of the windscreen coincides with the horizon, which is in the driver's field of vision all the time when driving, so that reading these outputs takes less effort and time. The warning displays are separated from the main panel, and are placed in front of the driver as they are of secondary importance. The whole effect is unique.

In accordance with the needs of the niche market, this new Renault Twingo places a greater emphasis in colour and trim than has ever been seen in a mass-production car. Innovation is very obvious in this area - the Twingo is audacious in the use of body colours like indian yellow, coriander green, aquamarine blue etc, and trim which combines all these colours (see fig. 9.5). Individuality is further expressed in the choice of options - two - toned steering wheel, pockets



for dashboard, seats and door panel, a pouch for the key, air conditioning, a powered canvass roof and an umbrella.



*(Fig. 9.5: Renault Twingo's interior)*

Like the Scenic, the Twingo incorporates many safety features - uniquely, in this class, the car has safety belt pretension and side impact bars. In the event of losing control, the car's chassis engineering was designed to "prevent" and "forgive" - the friendliness extends beyond the car's style.

(Twingo press release, 1992, pg.22)

The suspension is also new (an ingenious type of torsion - beam axle suspends the rear of the car) asserting its addressing different needs to the Clio, and in doing so, drawing on its own design/engineering solutions.

This expensive individualism indicates that the Twingo exemplifies Renault management's faith in their designer's instincts. As is the norm with underivative cars, Twingo's market research clinic went very badly indeed. At its first attempt, 15% of those questioned liked the car wholeheartedly, 45% hated it and the rest found it difficult to express an opinion. Flying in the face of this, and reflecting the attitudes of '60s Renault designers/management, the car's development continued, and in a unique second clinicing among the same people six



months later, the car achieved a 40% liking, the car's styling having surpassed its shocking impact, it's appeal and nature now manifesting themselves.

Moreso than any Renault saloon since the R16, the Twingo upholds the Renault tradition, and is an epitome of the company current potential in its ingenuity and atypical style. Though it sells at the same price as the cheapest version of the Renault Clio (see fig. 11.1), it does not compete with that car, for the two car's styles and approaches are completely separate.



(Fig. 11.1: Renault Clio)

Twingo is mould - breaking: the first small European car to be built since the 1972 R5 which does not conform that car's concept/layout. In engineering, concept and styling, inside and out, the car is independent of the Clio (in using different engineering and design solutions), whilst remaining French in feel. Colour and trim choice compound its personality, and its progression at launch is comparable with that of the Renault 4, 5 and 16. It makes an assertion, is friendly and desirable, and creates a lasting impression. It is an alternative, entirely in keeping with the niche market's requisites, as targeted by Renault's society researchers.



Le Quement's philosophy relies on constant inspection of the market's needs to formulate new products relevant to today and tomorrow. By incorporating his own visions for the company, he did not forget the Renault heritage and those qualities that made the R4, R5 and R16 so special. His freedom to formulate a Renault vision free of those qualities that brought it to its knees during the '80s, demonstrates the upper management's acceptance of his instincts, leaving him free to embody those solutions which will secure Renault's future.

In allowing their designers freedom to react to the new Europe's needs with reasserting the relevancy of the company's heritage, Renault management have accepted the role of a design notion which solely looks to the market's needs in deciding their car's essence. In Le Quement's recognising this role as essential to the Renault heritage, and successfully re - embodying Dreyfuss' notions in fulfilling the '90s market's needs, Le Quement asserted himself as a suitable director of Design for Renault. Under the new design director, the company's traditional approach to design has again become the cornerstone of Renault car's essence, and is assured a full embodiment in Renault' future plans. Once again, Renault are redefining what is acceptable from cars in terms of their performance, concepts, style and engineering, solely to the buyer's benefit.



The first paragraph of the report states that the purpose of the study was to determine the effect of the treatment on the response rate. The second paragraph states that the treatment was applied to the subjects and the results were compared with the control group. The third paragraph states that the treatment was applied to the subjects and the results were compared with the control group. The fourth paragraph states that the treatment was applied to the subjects and the results were compared with the control group. The fifth paragraph states that the treatment was applied to the subjects and the results were compared with the control group. The sixth paragraph states that the treatment was applied to the subjects and the results were compared with the control group. The seventh paragraph states that the treatment was applied to the subjects and the results were compared with the control group. The eighth paragraph states that the treatment was applied to the subjects and the results were compared with the control group. The ninth paragraph states that the treatment was applied to the subjects and the results were compared with the control group. The tenth paragraph states that the treatment was applied to the subjects and the results were compared with the control group.



# CONCLUSION

From the evaluation of Renault in the '60s to mid '70s, it became clear that Company's designers were free to incorporate whatever design/engineering solutions they felt beneficial to the market, however underivative the solutions were.

Renault's designers recognised the marketplace as consisting of people - a group of individuals. They therefore looked to those who bought the products, recognised them as people, and aimed to respond to their needs with the best solutions possible.

To Renault's designers, the public was their client. This customer was given what designers felt they deserved, as opposed to what they felt they wanted. That is what gave Renault, in the '60s to the mid '70s, a truly progressive and influential range of cars which continually altered what could be expected from a specific market segment.

In this period, the company refused to sell cars on the basis of pleasing a faceless mass, who deserved no better than a rehash of that which they could relate to. From the analysis of the effects this had on the public, it is clear that the market did, in time, appreciate the car designer's goal of offering them the best design solution within the constraints of price and technology. Because the cars were enforced upon society by designers with a sensitivity for the company's heritage, freely incorporating their ideologies and talents into the designs, their appeal transcended time and the cars became Gallic icons of what France is capable of producing - cars that lead the world.

It is clear that Robert Opron's 1975 reorganisation was misguided - for in attempting to change the company's traditional appeal, its products became dishonest to their heritage and essence. Renault became market led, as opposed to market leaders who introduced the most progressive design using the latest technology, where this was appropriate.



The cars of this generation at Renault were far from as compatible with the needs of their generation as the previous epoch had been to theirs.

Designer instinct played no part in the model line-up; no manipulation was made of progress in ideas or engineering innovations, for those that could best incorporate these in the cars were not allowed to do so. Through employing market researchers and exterior consultancies, management took the distinctive looks and the tradition of initiating new concepts out of Renault design, ceasing to impose solutions upon society, in taking account of the market's initial opinions to new designs.

Renault need not have joined the swollen ranks of manufacturers who offered cars with the appeal of a new appliance. Due to mismanagement, the manufacturer's products fell between the tastes of two markets, and pleased none. Renault was now a company which produced products offering no more than functional transportation - instead of manufacturing, coherent and instinctual products, focused on the markets real needs, imposing new solutions on them. Now the market got what it felt it wanted, in a solution barely different from a previous solution: not enough of a progression to date the current offering, but enough to be superficially fresh. Innovation was non-existent, and new ideas were stagnant, as the market's real needs were no longer considered. The car that the non-French consultancy designed was not an exponent of the Renault heritage, and from being subsequently market cliniced, the resultant car was unengaging, derivative and completely unprogressive.

Renault's problems - lack-lustre image, similar looking cars, lack of progression, uninteresting products and bad build quality - highlighted the results of management's controlling design creativity in an failed effort to introduce international appeal to the manufacturer's products.

If a product is to be progressive, it will have an impact by way of its drawing on unfamiliar solutions. It must be initiated and developed by those trained to do so with an instinct for the job, coupled with the flair to incorporate a culture and heritage into the designed product. In this way, when design is dictated by designers and imposed upon society, it will improve their lives, rendering the designed product's appeal lasting and not subject to fashion's whims.



Levy's 1988 recognition of management incompetence being the root of Renault's problems, as opposed to a change in society or untalented designers, was the most important change in the company's design stance since the 1975 reorganisation.

His granting design liberty to Le Quement meant a situation occurred where a new head of design could freely and completely assimilate Renault's heritage within the context of addressing the new Europe's needs. The Design Director's Most Advanced Yet Acceptable (MAYA) notion utilised to address the needs of both market segments within Renault's range for the '90s should ensure the company success, for their cars have thus far been compatible with the market's perceived desires. MAYA assures that within the constraints of the particular segment, new Renaults will be as progressive and underivative as possible. All the time, the needs/desires/tastes/acceptability limits, of those to whom the car will be offered, will be solely considered in designing new Renaults.

Designers are once again trusted in Renault; the design studio has had all constraints on imagination lifted, initial results of marketing clinics are disregarded, and Renault products again look original, French and therefore, implicitly distinctive.

This signals a return to the design honesty predominant in the previous generation. Innovation in style/concept/engineering comes through designer's freedom to incorporate their ideas on how best to respond to the market's needs.

Renault's Design Director believes that "The greatest risk of all is to take no risks"(\*), and so, again, Renault cars do not rely on previous solutions - they continue to push back boundaries in offering the best car for the money, regardless of preconceptions, or a few months of initial poor sales.

(\*) Green, 1992, pg. 57.

Because new design influences (such as women designers and the introduction of the monospace concept) are allowed and encouraged within the new Renault, the company should continue to produce such diverse, interesting and relevant cars, such as Twingo and Scenic. These are cars which draw on their own solutions and the company heritage as much as the Renault 4,5,12 and 16 did in their time. Renault car's character was singularly intensified by its designer's freely incorporating their intuitive notions on form and concept into their solution. This character is what renders the appeal of the unit above



that of an esteemable competent utility, allowing even an inexpensive design, at the bottom of the range to impart a joy in use upon the user. Designer's honesty to the client in pursuing the best solution also implies that the product should reflect the culture that it is a product of - this means that designers should be sympathetic to the cultural heritage of the company which employs them, embodying the ability to reveal this background in the product.

In incorporating women designers, fresh concepts and engineering solutions, the design department's focusing upon real needs has meant that Renault have begun to manufacture cars which profoundly alter what can be expected from a particular class of car - each new model offering honestly relevant benefits and enjoyment in use, giving the buyer and all who travel in the car, the finest, most ingenious design solution.

It is now clear that design which seeks to truly offer the best solution can only originate from unconstrained designers. So that design for its sake is not the result of this liberty, designers must continually look to society's needs. Remaining focused upon these needs, as well as the constraints of price and manufacture, the designer must also be sufficiently capable and talented to initiate a thoughtfully advanced design. Exclusively in this way can design justify a trust that is implicit in minimum-accountability to management.

Only design which is imposed upon society can offer it genuine betterment. Renaults have epitomised the benefits of this design notion in their cars. The company has learned that its heritage and culture are implicit to their appeal and nature. In reincorporating these into their cars' essence, Renault will again offer a special direction for the car buying market, into the next century.



The first part of the report is a general introduction to the subject of the study. It discusses the importance of the study and the objectives of the research. The second part of the report is a literature review. It discusses the work of other researchers in the field and identifies the gaps in the current knowledge. The third part of the report is the methodology. It describes the methods used in the study and the data collection process. The fourth part of the report is the results. It presents the findings of the study and discusses their implications. The fifth part of the report is the conclusion. It summarizes the main findings of the study and provides recommendations for future research.

The study was conducted using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. Data was collected through interviews, focus groups, and surveys. The data was analyzed using content analysis and statistical methods. The results of the study indicate that there is a significant relationship between the variables studied. The findings suggest that the proposed model is a valid representation of the phenomenon being studied. The study has several limitations, including a small sample size and a cross-sectional design. Future research should address these limitations and explore the relationship between the variables in greater detail.

The study has several implications for practice and policy. The findings suggest that the proposed model can be used to predict the outcomes of the study. This information can be used to inform decision-making and to develop interventions. The study also highlights the need for further research in this area. The findings suggest that there are still many questions that need to be answered. Future research should focus on identifying the factors that influence the relationship between the variables and on developing strategies to improve the outcomes of the study.

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